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Pillar 3

Action 57

Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has linked the development of peaceful nuclear energy with safeguards, nuclear safety and nuclear security commitments. As a nuclear-weapon State, China concluded a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1988 and brought an Additional Protocol into force in 2002. Under this framework, China has submitted selected civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. China has also established a domestic nuclear-safety and nuclear-security regulatory framework, acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and accepted its Amendment, and applied graded physical protection of nuclear material and zoning of nuclear facilities with reference to the CPPNM Amendment and INFCIRC/225. In its nuclear exports, China has required peaceful, non-explosive use, IAEA safeguards and prior consent for re-transfer.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued to implement safeguards, safety and security measures alongside nuclear-energy development. China has submitted 30 nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, including power reactors, research reactors, a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, a uranium enrichment plant and a nuclear fuel fabrication line. China’s Atomic Energy Law, which entered into force in January 2026, reaffirms peaceful use, treaty compliance, opposition to nuclear proliferation and prevention of nuclear-terrorism risks.

In nuclear safety, China reported continued strengthening of its regulatory system, and the IAEA’s 2025 IRRS mission found that China had a mature and robust nuclear and radiation safety regulatory framework while recommending further improvements in emergency protection strategies, inspection planning and safety-culture oversight.

In nuclear security, China continued cooperation with the IAEA through the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence and stated that it would participate in the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2026–2029, support the Nuclear Security Fund, and provide experts and technical solutions for IAEA nuclear-security activities.

China has opposed armed attacks against nuclear power plants and has supported the IAEA’s role in nuclear-safety and security issues.

Sources

Statement by the Chinese Delegation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, May 6 2025

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

China adopts atomic energy law, Sep 14 2025

Statement by Minister Counsellor Li Sen at the Conference of the Parties to the A/CPPNM under Agenda Item：12.i. Provisions on Physical Protection, Mar 31 2022

China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis, Feb 24 2023

China firmly opposes armed attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities: spokesperson, Mar 31, 2026

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The following agreements have been adopted to place relevant French installations under safeguards, according to the specificies of nuclear-weapon states:

  • Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) between France, Euratom and the IAEA of July 27, 1978 (INFCIRC/290) in force since 12 September 1981
  • Additional Protocol (AP) of 22 September 1998 (INFCIRC/290/Add.1) in force since 30 April 2004
  • Safeguards Agreement for the Caribbean French territories of 21 March 2000 (INFCIRC/718) in force since 26 October 2007, together with the modifications on the Small Quantities Protocol of 17 September 2017, in force since 25 February 2019.

From 2013 to 2022, between 15 and 23 IAEA inspections were conducted annually on 17 eligible installations.

As per EURATOM agreements, financial and personnel costs linked to inspections are covered by EURATOM members.

Regarding nuclear security and safety, a national action plan, published in December 2012 by the Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection was peer reviewed at European level. The closing report for this plan, published in 2020 by the Authority, presented the measures defined by EDF in response to the peer review recommendations and the Authority’s requirements, which aim at improving protection against natural hazards and the loss of safety systems, as well as improving the management of a serious accident through the deployment of resources, such as the EDF nuclear rapid response team or the commissioning of an emergency power generator at each of the 56 nuclear reactors then in service.

Since 1985, France has also hosted 36 Operational Safety Review Team missions dedicated to the safe operation of nuclear power plants, and as many follow-up missions.

France contributes to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

In 2023 and 2024, the IAEA and the French government indicated that 10 inspections had taken place in France. Discussions are ongoing with the IAEA on the possibility of placing additional French civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections.

Regarding nuclear security and safety, in the framework of the second thematic peer review on the safety of nuclear installations in the European Union, as provided for in Directive 2014/87/EURATOM of the Council of the European Union, France submitted its national self-assessment report on the topic of fire, coordinated by the Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, in 2023, and took part in the assessment of other member States’ reports.

Since 2024, IRSN, now the Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, has been designated as an IAEA Collaborating Centre in the field of the safe use of ionizing radiation in medicine for diagnostic and treatment applications to contribute to the fight against cancer. Since 2021, the Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection has also been an IAEA capacity-building centre on radiological crisis management including, since 2024, with assistance from the IAEA technical crisis centre for crisis management preparedness and response.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee and Russian legislation requires its civilian nuclear cooperation partners to be Party to the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards. Russia consistently encouraged all states to join relevant international conventions on nuclear safety and security.

Russia implemented capacity-building and training programmes for Russian and international nuclear specialists, including on nuclear safety and security, and provided assistance to newcomer countries in establishing the infrastructure necessary for the safe and successful implementation of national nuclear energy programmes, including regulatory frameworks, spent fuel and radioactive waste management systems, and personnel training, especially in countries constructing nuclear power plants based on Russian reactor technology.

In 2017 Russia and the IAEA signed an agreement aimed at strengthening IAEA efforts to promote capacity building in newcomer and expanding countries in areas including nuclear safety, stakeholder involvement and the development of a national position on nuclear power.

Russia reported that 74 training events for over 1200 foreign experts were organized in 2017-2023 within the framework of this initiative.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Russia reaffirmed that its national export control system is based on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and the export rules and control lists produced by them.

Russia continued to provide nuclear newcoming countries with assistance in establishing infrastructure for safe and secure implementation of their national nuclear energy programmes

In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reported that over 2,800 foreign specialists from 95 countries have been trained at Rosatom Technical Academy and more than 5,000 operational personnel have been trained for nuclear power plants that Russia is building abroad.

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘IAEA, Rosatom Sign Agreement to Strengthen IAEA Nuclear Infrastructure Capacity Building’. 19 April 2017.

https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/19-04-2017_o-peregovora_78ce8d4cb235da22b1f250d9984c4aa7/

Statement by Russia. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2024 Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference (Geneva), 29 July 2024

https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1964213/?lang=en

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

After Brexit the UK established an independent domestic nuclear safeguards regime. The Office for Nuclear Regulation took over responsibility for domestic safeguards from Euratom, and the UK signed new international agreements with the IAEA to replace the existing trilateral arrangements. As part of the same process, the UK concluded a number of bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements to maintain continuity of civil nuclear trade under international safeguards.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom states that it ensures that “civil nuclear cooperation is used to encourage others to adhere to safeguards implementation. For example, when we discuss Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and MoUs with third countries, we raise the importance of the AP. We also encourage any countries who have not yet signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to enter into talks with the IAEA to do so”.

On new reactor designs, the UK states that it is working closely with the IAEA to ensure safeguards are designed into new reactor types such as SMRs from the outset

On AUKUS, the UK states that its cooperation with Australia to build nuclear-powered attack submarines is in line with its international obligations under the NPT and IAEA. The UK IAEA will maintain oversight of nuclear material under an Article 14 arrangement, which will include verification measures to enable the IAEA to continue to meet its technical safeguards objectives throughout the submarines’ lifecycle.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 33<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 23. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

See Actions 29-37 and 41-46.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

See Actions 29-37 and 41-46.

Sources

See Actions 29-37 and 41-46.