China

China has consistently affirmed its full compliance with the NPT and its pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world (advocating the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons).

China has adhered to the policy of unconditional no-first-use of nuclear weapons (NFU).

China has adhered to the policy of providing unconditional negative security assurances (NSA) to non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) and nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs).

China has signed and ratified the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Protocols II and III to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia; shown support for the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia and similar efforts in the Middle East.

China has claimed to adhere to keeping its arsenal at the minimum level necessary for national security, though warhead numbers have grown and over 300 ICBM silos under construction have been discovered, raising concerns over China’s adherence especially when the calculation of “minimum level” is not explained.

China has often emphasized NPT’s importance as the “cornerstone” of the non-proliferation regime.

China has never threatened to use nuclear weapons against any country.

China has never deployed nuclear weapons on foreign territory, nor provided extended deterrence to any other state.

China has pushed hard to materialize the January 2022 P5 joint statement on preventing nuclear war and made extra efforts to add language such as “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and the reaffirmation that none of the nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other state.

China has generally endorsed the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to nuclear disarmament and the implementation of NPT obligations.

China has supported step-by-step, consensus-based nuclear disarmament measures, including CTBT entry into force, FMCT negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament, and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

China has participated in P5 transparency and confidence-building efforts, including the P5 Glossary process and common reporting framework, but has not accepted detailed quantitative transparency regarding its own nuclear forces.

China has maintained that verification arrangements for nuclear disarmament should be negotiated multilaterally and should not prejudice national security interests.

China has closed down its nuclear weapon research and production facilities in areas including Chongqing and Qinghai.

China is reportedly to have last produced HEU in 1989 and last produced separated plutonium in 1991.

China has urged the two largest nuclear powers (the United States and Russia) to lead the way in making drastic and substantive cuts of their nuclear weapons.

China has kept a qualitative posture that is more aligned with Action 3, such as the long-standing unconditional NFU, NSA, commitment to no nuclear sharing, no forward deployment, and no extended deterrence/nuclear umbrella arrangements.

China has increased the number as well as the types of its nuclear weapons in contrast to reducing and ultimately eliminating all types of nuclear weapons.

China has observed its commitment of a moratorium on nuclear tests, supported the preparation of the implementation of CTBT, and pledged not to be an obstacle for the entry into force of the CTBT.

N/A: Action 4 is addressed specifically to the Russian Federation and the United States. China is not a party to New START and has not participated in U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction negotiations. China has nevertheless repeatedly called on the States with the largest nuclear arsenals to undertake further drastic and substantive reductions and to create conditions for broader multilateral disarmament.

For a) b) c) and d), China has continued the above-mentioned commitment/policies from Action 1 and 3, including positive and negative ones.

For e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security, f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons, and g) Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence:

China has kept its nuclear forces at a low alert (de-mated storage);

China has concluded a China–Russia launch notification agreement for ballistic missiles and carrier rockets in 2009, extended to 2030 as a risk-reduction/confidence-building measure;

China has led the P5 Glossary working group, with the P5 explicitly identifying the Glossary and their common reporting framework as implementing Action 5(g);

China has published two White Papers on arms control and disarmament (1995 and 2005).

China has expressed support in line with Action 6, but such support has been explicitly conditioned on the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, encompassing not only nuclear disarmament but also parallel priorities such as the prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. In practice, China has participated in and praised the work of Subsidiary Body 1 on nuclear disarmament following the partial revitalization of the CD since 2018.

China has long shown support for the efforts by the CD to start substantive work on an international legal instrument for unconditional NSA as soon as possible.

China has consistently maintained unconditional NSAs to non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

China has signed and ratified several nuclear-weapon-free-zone protocols containing NSA commitments, including protocols to the Latin American and Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), African (Treaty of Pelindaba), and Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties.

China has not provided nuclear umbrella for other countries and has not deployed nuclear weapons outside its own territories.

China has consistently supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, in line with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines. It has signed and ratified all protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties that are open for signature, including Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Protocols II and III to the Treaty of Rarotonga, Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Pelindaba, and the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.

China has also supported Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

China has supported and promoted CTBT on multilateral fora.

China has maintained a moratorium on testing.

China has consistently paid its contributions to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in full and on time, and has been the second largest contributor since 2020.

China has participated in CTBTO activities and development of the verification regime (IMS stations on Chinese territory).

China has expanded the Lop Nur test site with the construction of buildings and at least one new tunnel, which, together with the lack of official explanation, raised concerns over its nuclear testing activities.

China has expanded its contribution to the International Monitoring System:

As of 2014, China has undertaken the construction work of 11 monitoring stations and one radionuclide laboratory of the International Monitoring System, of which 6 seismic stations, 3 radionuclide stations, the Beijing radionuclide laboratory and the National Data Center in Beijing have been completed.

As of 2019, radionuclide stations in Beijing, Guangzhou, Lanzhou, and seismic stations in Hailar, Lanzhou have been certified and began real-time data transmission; China has accelerated the certification of remaining infrasound stations (e.g., Kunming).

China has developed advanced verification technologies, including mobile Ar-37 measurement system (MARDS), and radioxenon sampling and analysis systems (XESPM). Contributed equipment and expertise to Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14).

China has provided support for developing countries in CTBT capacity-building by hosting regional and international CTBTO training workshops.

China has provided critical monitoring data during real-world nuclear events (DPRK tests, Fukushima).

China has maintained its nuclear-testing moratorium since 1996.

China has supported CTBT objectives and participated in the development of the CTBT verification regime.

At the same time, external analysts, including those from the U.S. government, have raised concerns about construction activity at Lop Nur, although China has denied any intention to conduct nuclear tests.

China has expanded its contribution to the International Monitoring System:

• As of 2014, China has undertaken the construction work of 11 monitoring stations and one radionuclide laboratory of the International Monitoring System, of which 6 seismic stations, 3 radionuclide stations, the Beijing radionuclide laboratory and the National Data Center in Beijing have been completed.
• As of 2019, radionuclide stations in Beijing, Guangzhou, Lanzhou, and seismic stations in Hailar, Lanzhou have been certified and began real-time data transmission; China has accelerated the certification of remaining infrasound stations (e.g., Kunming).

N/A: Action 12 is addressed specifically to States that have ratified CTBT. China has signed but not ratified CTBT. Although Action 12 is addressed specifically to States that have ratified CTBT, China participated in the 2011 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT and reported on its support for the Treaty. In its 2011 statement, China reaffirmed that it firmly supports the purposes and objectives of the CTBT, strictly observes its moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, supports international efforts to facilitate the Treaty’s entry into force, and has participated in all previous Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT. China also reported that it had supported relevant UN General Assembly resolutions, participated constructively in the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, and made progress in establishing national monitoring stations and supporting the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre.

N/A: Action 13 is addressed specifically to States that have ratified CTBT. China has signed but not ratified CTBT. Although Action 13 formally applies to States that have ratified CTBT, therefore not including China, China has taken several measures consistent with the promotion and implementation of the CTBT. It has maintained a moratorium on nuclear testing, supported the purposes and objectives of the Treaty, participated in the Article XIV process to facilitate the Treaty’s entry into force, and contributed to the development of the CTBTO verification regime. China has also participated in the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and its subsidiary bodies, including negotiations on technical and operational documents for the International Monitoring System, the International Data Centre and on-site inspections. China has also supported CTBTO training and capacity-building, has hosted or participated in CTBTO-related workshops and technical cooperation activities.

China has undertaken construction and certification of CTBTO International Monitoring System stations and the Beijing radionuclide laboratory. China has expanded its contribution to the International Monitoring System:

• As of 2014, China has undertaken the construction work of 11 monitoring stations and one radionuclide laboratory of the International Monitoring System, of which 6 seismic stations, 3 radionuclide stations, the Beijing radionuclide laboratory and the National Data Center in Beijing have been completed.
• As of 2019, radionuclide stations in Beijing, Guangzhou, Lanzhou, and seismic stations in Hailar, Lanzhou have been certified and began real-time data transmission; China has accelerated the certification of remaining infrasound stations (e.g., Kunming).

China has developed advanced verification technologies, including mobile Ar-37 measurement system (MARDS), and radioxenon sampling and analysis systems (XESPM). Contributed equipment and expertise to Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14).

China has provided support for developing countries in CTBT capacity-building by hosting regional and international CTBTO training workshops.

China has provided critical monitoring data during real-world nuclear events (e.g, DPRK tests on 6 January and 9 September 2016 and 3 September 2017, and the Fukushima incident).

China has expressed official support for the goal of FMCT and for early FMCT negotiations.

China has actively participated in the useful discussions held by the relevant subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament on issues related to FMCT.

China has participated in the UN preparatory group of high-level experts on such a treaty.

China has organized a non-formal discussion on the FMCT during its Presidency in the CD.

China has participated in the P5 coordination and the dialogue process of P5 with relevant countries.

China is reportedly to have last produced HEU in 1989 and last produced separated plutonium in 1991.

Prior to 2017, China regularly reported its civilian plutonium stocks to the IAEA under INFCIRC/549. However, China has ceased submitting annual declarations of its civilian plutonium holdings to the IAEA under the voluntary INFCIRC/549 reporting framework since 2017.

N/A: China has not declared HEU or plutonium as excess to defence needs, nor placed such material under IAEA verification. Although China has not publicly declared military fissile material as excess or placed such material under IAEA verification, it has supported in principle the development of verification arrangements for nuclear disarmament and fissile material measures by participating in discussions relevant to FMCT verification and nuclear disarmament verification, while stressing that verification arrangements must be non-discriminatory and should protect national security.

China has reportedly ceased production of HEU for weapons in 1989 and separated plutonium for weapons in 1991.

China has supported cooperation on nuclear disarmament verification primarily through intergovernmental and UN mechanisms. It participated constructively in the United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification established pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 71/67 and 74/50, contributing to their consensus reports and discussions on the political and technical challenges of verification.

China has actively participated in P5 engagement, including:

• Leading the P5 Glossary Key Nuclear Terms, which serves as a confidence-building measure intended to reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation among the nuclear-weapon States;
• Pushing hard to materialize the January 2022 P5 joint statement on preventing nuclear war and made extra efforts to add language such as “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and the reaffirmation that none of the nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other state.

China has actively engaged with the IAEA, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, UN processes, and regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone mechanisms.

China’s engagement with civil society and independent verification initiatives has been more limited than its intergovernmental engagement, but Chinese experts have participated in Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues, including those organized by European, U.S., Japanese NGOs and think tanks.

China has submitted national implementation reports for the 2015 and 2020 review processes (NPT/CONF.2015/32; NPT/CONF.2020/41), describing its disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful-use policies.

China has agreed with other P5 states on a common reporting framework in 2014 and filed national reports according to the common framework.

China has not publicly reported a dedicated Action 22 program explicitly framed around the implementation of the recommendations contained in A/57/124. However, it has undertaken related education, training and capacity-building activities in support of NPT objectives. These include training on nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, export controls and non-proliferation implementation, including cooperation with the IAEA and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. China has also supported expert exchanges and research on nuclear disarmament verification, and has provided nuclear science and technology education opportunities to students and professionals from developing countries through the China Atomic Energy Scholarship Program and IAEA-related training platforms.

Chinese universities, research institutes, and think tanks have long participated in and provided arms control education and capacity-building activities. For instance, between 2002 and 2010, Professor LI Bin at Tsinghua University used to organize arms control summer school for students and professionals in international relations.

China has consistently supported the authority, effectiveness and universality of the NPT, describing the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and calling on States that have not yet joined the NPT to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States.

China has also treated the peaceful settlement of regional nuclear issues, especially through diplomatic processes such as the Six Party Talks on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, JCPOA, and the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, as important to preserving confidence in the NPT regime.

China has opposed arrangements including extended deterrence, forward deployment, nuclear sharing, and transfer of nuclear-powered submarines and naval nuclear-propulsion technology to non-nuclear-weapon States, most notably under AUKUS that it considers as undermining the object and purpose of the NPT.

China has urged States outside the Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States and has supported regional approaches, including a Middle East WMD-free zone, that would reinforce universality.

N/A: As a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, China is not required to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement covering all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities as called in Action 24. Nevertheless, China has supported the role of IAEA safeguards in implementing article III of the Treaty. China concluded a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1988 and signed an Additional Protocol in 1998, which entered into force in 2002, making China the first nuclear-weapon State to bring an Additional Protocol into force. China has also submitted selected civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards under its voluntary offer arrangement and has supported IAEA safeguards-related training, research and technical capacity-building.

N/A: As a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, China is not required to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement covering all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities as called in Action 25. Nevertheless, China has supported the role of IAEA safeguards in implementing article III of the Treaty and has generally supported the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements for non-nuclear-weapon States parties. China also concluded a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1988 and brought an Additional Protocol into force in 2002, becoming the first nuclear-weapon State to do so. Under this voluntary framework, China has submitted selected civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards.

China has consistently supported the authority, effectiveness and universality of the NPT, describing the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and calling on States that have not yet joined the NPT to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States.

China has participated in the P5+1/E3+3 process on the Iranian nuclear issue and supported the JCPOA as a diplomatic solution.

China has supported denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions, though its emphasis has shifted over time between relatively strict sanctions implementation and a stronger preference for sanctions relief, reciprocal measures and political dialogue.

China has opposed arrangements including extended deterrence, forward deployment, nuclear sharing, and transfer of nuclear-powered submarines and naval nuclear-propulsion technology to non-nuclear-weapon States, most notably under AUKUS that it considers as undermining the object and purpose of the NPT

China has supported the IAEA’s role in resolving safeguards issues, while emphasizing dialogue, impartiality and avoidance of politicization.

On Iran, China supported the JCPOA and opposed the U.S. withdrawal from it and subsequent unilateral sanctions.

China has had an Additional Protocol in force since 2002 (signed in December 1998, and ratified in March 2002).

China has actively encouraged others to follow suit and supported universalization of the AP as a new norm for verifying nuclear activities.

China has supported IAEA efforts to assist States in concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

China has encouraged universalization of safeguards and additional protocols, while maintaining that AP universalization should not be imposed in a discriminatory manner or used to restrict peaceful-use rights.

China concluded a voluntary offer safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with the IAEA, which entered into force in 2002, making China the first nuclear-weapon State to bring an Additional Protocol into force, under which selected Chinese civil nuclear facilities may be offered for IAEA safeguards.

China has placed some civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, but the scope remains limited, consistent with the voluntary-offer model for nuclear-weapon States.

N/A: China is not subject to Action 31 because, as a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, it does not have a comprehensive safeguards agreement with a small quantities protocol.

China has supported the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and maintained cooperation with the Agency under its voluntary offer safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol. China joined the IAEA Member State Support Programme in 2007 and undertook research and development work on safeguards verification tools and methods, including support for IAEA research on safeguards concepts and nuclear-material measurement uncertainty. China also submitted selected civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, thereby supporting the practical implementation and evaluation of safeguards under its voluntary offer arrangement.

China has expressed concern about politicization and double standards in safeguards implementation.

China has provided political and technical support for the IAEA’s safeguards function. As a nuclear-weapon State, China concluded a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the IAEA and brought an Additional Protocol into force in 2002. Under this framework, China has cooperated with the IAEA in the application of safeguards to selected peaceful nuclear facilities. China also joined the IAEA Member State Support Programme in 2007 and undertook research and development work on safeguards verification tools and methods, including work related to measurement uncertainty and safeguards concepts. China has further supported safeguards training through the China-IAEA Joint Training Center on Nuclear Safeguards and Security

China has structured its financial support to the IAEA around a combination of assessed contributions, voluntary funding, and extra-budgetary support. China has consistently fulfilled its assessed obligations to the Agency and gradually increased its financial weight as its overall UN contribution share rose. At the same time, it has become as a reliable contributor to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), emphasizing full and timely payment and supporting capacity-building in developing countries.

In addition, China began providing extra-budgetary contributions and in-kind assistance, particularly in nuclear security and safeguards cooperation. For instance, since 2011 China has made continuous contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, supporting capacity-building projects in the Asia-Pacific region and reinforcing its role as a contributor to global nuclear governance.

China has actively contributed to the development of a robust and adaptive international safeguards technology base through sustained cooperation with the IAEA and other Member States. Joining the IAEA Member State Support Programme in 2007, China has since undertaken research and development on safeguards verification tools, methodologies, and concepts, including measurement uncertainty analysis and safeguards approaches for advanced reactor types.

In addition, China became a member of the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) and participated in sample analysis and technical validation, thereby contributing to the scientific and technical foundations of safeguards. It also supported the development of facility-specific safeguards approaches, including cooperation with the IAEA on new reactor technologies such as high-temperature gas-cooled reactors.

China has also invested in human capital and technical capacity, including the establishment of joint training initiatives with the IAEA to strengthen expertise in safeguards implementation and nuclear material accountancy.

China has established and progressively strengthened a comprehensive nuclear export control system aimed at ensuring that nuclear-related exports do not contribute to nuclear weapons development. China adopted a set of core export control principles, including: (1) peaceful use only, (2) mandatory application of IAEA safeguards, and (3) prohibition of re-transfer without prior authorization. These principles were institutionalized through national regulations and aligned with international non-proliferation norms. China introduced a licensing system and control lists covering nuclear materials, equipment, and dual-use items, incorporating elements from international export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee – both of which China has joined and whose guidelines are implemented. Examples of such regulations and lists include: Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Export (released in 1997, revised in 2006), Administrative Measures for Administration on Import & Export Licensing of Dual-use Items and Technologies (2005), Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited and Restricted from Export (released in 2001, revised in 2023). A full list is included in the below source section.

China has aligned its national export control system with multilaterally negotiated guidelines and understandings, particularly those developed under nuclear-related export control arrangements.

China formally joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004 and committed to implementing its guidelines on nuclear and nuclear-related exports, which aim to prevent the diversion of civilian nuclear technology to weapons programs.

In parallel, China joined and incorporated elements of the Zangger Committee trigger list and other international best practices into its national control lists and licensing procedures, thereby embedding multilateral standards into domestic regulation.

China has stated that nuclear exports should comply with NPT obligations and safeguards requirements.

China’s nuclear export-control regulations require end-use/end-user controls, safeguards-related conditions, and non-proliferation assurances in nuclear cooperation.

China’s membership in the NSG and Zangger Committee supports this practice.

China has consistently emphasized Article IV rights and opposed restrictions that it considers discriminatory or inconsistent with the NPT.

China has supported peaceful nuclear cooperation, especially for developing countries and the Global South. For instance:

• China has steadily increased financial contributions to IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), which supports peaceful nuclear projects in developing states. By August 2022, China has become the second-largest donor to the TCF, having contributed a total of nearly $100 million to the fund, with an annual donation of over $10 million since 2020.
• China has helped build human capacity by receiving more than 4,000 visits from other developing countries for the purposes of personnel training in science and technology areas, and sending over 3,000 Chinese experts to developing countries to provide services as of August 2022.
• China has in October 2021 signed an agreement with the IAEA to strengthen South-South and triangular cooperation. Under the agreement, the IAEA is leveraging China’s wealth of institutional experience to assist developing countries’ efforts to achieve the SDGs. The agreement was the first of its kind for the IAEA with a national overseas development agency (CIDCA).

China has promoted UNGA language on peaceful-use cooperation in the context of international security.

China has supported nuclear technology transfers and cooperation consistent with Articles I, II, III and IV of the NPT.

China has argued against undue constraints on peaceful nuclear cooperation, especially for developing countries.

China has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with numerous countries and supported IAEA technical cooperation.

China has developed a multi-agency regulatory framework, involving authorities such as the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and the National Nuclear Safety Administration, to oversee licensing, inspection, and enforcement of nuclear security requirements.

At the operational level, China has implemented strict physical protection measures, including access control, surveillance systems, material accounting, and graded protection requirements based on risk levels. It has also adopted a design basis threat approach, requiring facilities to regularly assess evolving threats and adjust protection systems accordingly.

China has further strengthened international alignment by ratifying and implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, which legally requires states to maintain appropriate physical protection regimes for nuclear materials and facilities.

In parallel, China has actively cooperated with the IAEA, including hosting International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions and contributing to the development of international nuclear security standards and training programs.

China has established nuclear security training and demonstration platforms, including the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence.

China has strengthened laws, regulations and technical standards for nuclear security and nuclear material control.

China has taken measures consistent with Action 41 by applying international nuclear security instruments and IAEA physical-protection guidance in its domestic nuclear security regime. China acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in January 1989 and participated in negotiations on the 2005 Amendment, which expanded CPPNM’s scope to the domestic use, storage and transport of nuclear material and to nuclear facilities. China has applied, with reference to Annex II of the CPPNM Amendment and the requirements of INFCIRC/225, a graded approach to the physical protection of nuclear material and zoning of nuclear facilities, categorizing nuclear-material physical protection into three levels and grading facility protection according to the importance of the target and potential risk.

China acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in January 1989 and accepted/ratified the 2005 Amendment in 2009. Before the Amendment entered into force in 2016, China had already acted in line with its object and purpose by developing domestic physical-protection measures for nuclear material and nuclear facilities. China participated in the negotiation of the Amendment and supported strengthening the effective protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes. China has also stated that its national system applies graded protection of nuclear material and zoning of nuclear facilities, with reference to Annex II of the CPPNM Amendment and INFCIRC/225 requirements.

China has supported the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and informed the IAEA Director General that it was amending domestic regulations and drafting measures on radioactive-source safety and accident management in accordance with the requirements and principles of the Code. China established a regulatory system under which entities producing, selling or using radioisotopes and radiation-emitting devices must obtain radiation safety licences, and transfers, imports and exports of radioisotopes, including radioactive sources and unsealed radioactive materials, require prior approval and registration. China has also notified the IAEA of its political commitment to follow the Code of Conduct and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and has nominated a point of contact to facilitate imports and exports of radioactive sources.

China has developed national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials through nuclear-security regulation, port-of-entry radiation detection, physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, and non-proliferation export controls. China’s 2016 national nuclear-security progress report stated that China regarded combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material as a key element in preventing nuclear terrorism and had installed more than 1,000 radiation-detection devices at sea, air, highway and railway ports. China also participated in international counter-nuclear-smuggling cooperation, including activities with the United States and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and developed domestic controls through export-control licensing, end-user and end-use certification, control lists, customs supervision and enforcement mechanisms.

China has supported UN Security Council resolution 1540 implementation and relevant non-proliferation capacity-building.

China signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and ratified it in 2010.

China has supported international cooperation against nuclear terrorism and has incorporated relevant obligations into domestic nuclear-security law and practice.

China’s 2016 nuclear security progress report stated that China regarded combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material as a key element in preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, had installed more than 1,000 radiation-detection devices at sea, air, highway and railway ports, and had conducted cooperation with the United States and Russia on preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material.

China established domestic regulatory controls for nuclear material, including licensing, nuclear-material accounting and control, physical protection, registration, inspection, inventorying and reporting requirements. Under China’s nuclear-material control regulations, licence holders are required to establish nuclear-material accounting and control systems, maintain strict security systems, take reliable security precautions, and report and respond to theft or loss of nuclear material. China also supported relevant IAEA safeguards programmes by joining the IAEA Member State Support Programme in 2007 and undertaking research and development on safeguards verification tools, methods and safeguards concepts, including work related to nuclear-material measurement uncertainty.

China has consistently supported the right of all States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has opposed restrictions that it views as discriminatory, politically motivated or inconsistent with Article IV of the NPT.

China has framed peaceful uses as an inalienable right and has emphasized that non-proliferation measures should not undermine legitimate nuclear energy cooperation, including cooperation related to fuel-cycle policies, provided that such cooperation remains peaceful and consistent with safeguards and non-proliferation obligations.

China has also supported IAEA technical cooperation and concluded intergovernmental agreements on peaceful nuclear-energy cooperation with more than 30 countries.

China has consistently reaffirmed the right of all NPT States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It has supported the central role of the IAEA in facilitating peaceful-use cooperation and has used bilateral and multilateral channels to promote nuclear technology exchange.

China has concluded intergovernmental agreements on peaceful nuclear-energy cooperation with more than 30 countries and has supported training and education for developing countries through nuclear-energy management schools, scholarships and technical cooperation.

China has also framed peaceful-use exchanges broadly, covering not only nuclear power but also nuclear applications in agriculture, medicine, industry, environmental protection, resources and other development-related fields.

China has cooperated with other States parties and international organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with particular attention to developing countries. It has supported the central role of the IAEA in technical cooperation, contributed to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, concluded intergovernmental agreements on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation with more than 30 countries, and provided education and training opportunities for developing countries through nuclear-energy management schools and the China Atomic Energy Scholarship Program.

China has also framed peaceful-use cooperation broadly, covering nuclear power as well as nuclear applications in agriculture, medicine, industry, environmental protection, resources and other development-related fields.

China has expanded its domestic nuclear power sector and has presented Chinese nuclear technology as a contribution to global low-carbon development.

China has steadily increased financial contributions to IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), which supports peaceful nuclear projects in developing states. By August 2022, China has become the second-largest donor to the TCF, having contributed a total of nearly $100 million to the fund, with an annual donation of over $10 million since 2020.

China has helped build human capacity in NNWS by receiving more than 4,000 visits from other developing countries for the purposes of personnel training in science and technology areas, and sending over 3,000 Chinese experts to developing countries to provide services as of August 2022.

China has signed inter-governmental agreements on nuclear energy cooperation with more than 30 countries to conduct mutually beneficial cooperation.

China has voiced against restrictions that unfairly limit developing countries’ access to nuclear technology in the UN and IAEA.

China has proposed a resolution on “Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security” which aims to balance states’ rights to access science/tech for peaceful benefits with non-proliferation and urges easier tech transfer while addressing security concerns. The resolution was adopted at the 76th session of the UN General Assembly.

China has in October 2021 signed an agreement with the IAEA to strengthen South-South and triangular cooperation. Under the agreement, the IAEA is leveraging China’s wealth of institutional experience to assist developing countries’ efforts to achieve the SDGs. The agreement was the first of its kind for the IAEA with a national overseas development agency (CIDCA).

China has consistently supported nuclear-technology transfer and international cooperation for peaceful purposes. It has supported the central role of the IAEA in facilitating peaceful-use cooperation, contributed to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, concluded intergovernmental agreements on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation with more than 30 countries, and supported education and training for developing countries through nuclear energy management schools and nuclear engineering scholarship programmes. China has also maintained nuclear export controls based on peaceful, non-explosive use, IAEA safeguards and prior consent for re-transfer, thereby linking technology transfer to non-proliferation obligations.

China supported the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme as a central mechanism for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology, especially for developing countries. It contributed to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, supported training and capacity-building activities, and participated in G77 and China efforts within the IAEA to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of technical cooperation while preserving its demand-driven, non-discriminatory and development-oriented character.

China also supported IAEA technical cooperation through education, expert exchanges, nuclear-energy management training and scholarship programmes for developing countries.

China has conducted all activities in the Action 50 (which are also aligned with Action 53).

China has assisted Ghana and Nigeria in converting their HEU-fuelled research reactor to LEU as part of the IAEA-coordinated “Research Reactor Conversion and HEU Minimization” activities.

China has supported the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and supported technical cooperation through training, expert exchanges, human-resource development and nuclear-technology capacity-building. Since 2020, China has become one of the largest contributors to the TCF and emphasized the importance of full and timely payments.

China has supported international efforts to strengthen the financial resources available for IAEA activities, including through extra-budgetary contributions to technical cooperation and nuclear security programmes.

By the end of 2003, China had provided approximately US$13 million in voluntary contributions and in-kind support to the IAEA. In 2004, China announced another US$1 million extra-budgetary contribution to support IAEA technical cooperation and nuclear security programmes.

China has supported workforce development for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through national training, bilateral cooperation, IAEA-related education programmes and scholarship schemes for developing countries. It cooperated with the IAEA in organizing Nuclear Energy Management Schools for nuclear newcomer countries, supported the China Atomic Energy Scholarship Program for master’s and doctoral training in nuclear engineering and nuclear technology, and hosted foreign students and experts for nuclear-science and nuclear-technology training. China also used bilateral cooperation to support regulatory, safety and technical capacity-building in partner countries.

China has linked the development of peaceful nuclear energy with safeguards, nuclear safety and nuclear security commitments. As a nuclear-weapon State, China concluded a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1988 and brought an Additional Protocol into force in 2002. Under this framework, China has submitted selected civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. China has also established a domestic nuclear-safety and nuclear-security regulatory framework, acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and accepted its Amendment, and applied graded physical protection of nuclear material and zoning of nuclear facilities with reference to the CPPNM Amendment and INFCIRC/225. In its nuclear exports, China has required peaceful, non-explosive use, IAEA safeguards and prior consent for re-transfer.

China has participated in IAEA discussions on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear fuel-supply assurances. At the IAEA Board of Governors in December 2010, China stated that it in principle supports efforts that promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, and that it is generally open to initiatives establishing multilateral mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. China supported an active IAEA role, provided that the Agency maintains its independence. At the same time, China emphasized that such mechanisms involve complex political, economic, technical and legal factors, that the concerns of relevant States should be fully considered, and that Member States’ right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be affected.

China has become party to the principal nuclear safety, nuclear emergency, radioactive-waste and spent-fuel safety, nuclear-security and nuclear-terrorism conventions listed in Action 59. China ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1996; ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in 1987; acceded to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 2006; acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1989; ratified the CPPNM Amendment in 2009; and became a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2010. China also incorporated the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions into its nuclear-emergency preparedness framework, stating that notification and requests for assistance would be made through the IAEA and the international community as appropriate.

China has promoted the sharing of best practices in nuclear safety and security through IAEA peer review, nuclear-security training platforms and engagement with the nuclear industry. China participated in IAEA nuclear and radiation safety regulatory review missions and used IAEA safety standards and international good practices to identify areas for improvement in its regulatory system. China also established the State Nuclear Security Technology Center/Nuclear Security Center of Excellence as a platform for technical information exchange, best-practice sharing, training-course development and technical cooperation. In the nuclear industry, Chinese operators and industry bodies engaged with World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) mechanisms; WANO and the China Nuclear Energy Association signed an MoU in 2019 to strengthen cooperation on nuclear safety and reliability, and Chinese nuclear power groups used WANO safety-culture guidance in internal safety-culture assessment activities.

While previously some Chinese officials had questioned the proliferation relevance of facilities with small amounts of material, they have subsequently recognized the importance of civil HEU minimization. This has resulted in both domestic conversion efforts as well as international cooperation with both the United States and the IAEA on civil HEU reduction.

China made concrete contributions to civilian HEU minimization by converting Chinese-origin Miniature Neutron Source Reactors from HEU to LEU fuel. China supported the conversion of Ghana’s Chinese-designed MNSR to LEU between 2015 and 2017, with technical support from the China Institute of Atomic Energy and cooperation with U.S. Argonne National Laboratory on LEU fuel design, processing and zero-power testing. China also supported the conversion of Nigeria’s MNSR to LEU in 2018 and the removal/repatriation of its remaining HEU fuel to China, after which Nigeria became HEU-free. These projects provided practical experience for converting other Chinese-origin MNSRs and contributed to reducing civilian HEU use abroad.

China has developed domestic regulatory controls for the safe and secure transport of radioactive material as part of its broader nuclear and radiation safety management system. Its regulatory framework covers nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste, transport of radioactive material, radiation sources and nuclear emergency preparedness, and includes licensing, supervision, inspection and emergency-management elements for radioactive-material transport.

China also strengthened nuclear-security capabilities relevant to transport, including nuclear-material control, physical protection and emergency preparedness, while participating in relevant international nuclear-safety and nuclear-security instruments. These measures are broadly consistent with the objective of transporting radioactive material in accordance with international safety, security and environmental-protection standards, including IAEA transport safety standards.

China has not become party to the main international civil nuclear liability conventions, including the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. Instead, China has implemented Action 63 primarily through a domestic nuclear-liability framework. The State Council’s 1986 decision on third-party nuclear liability and its 2007 decision on liability and compensation for nuclear accident damage establish core principles broadly consistent with international nuclear-liability conventions, including operator liability for personal injury, death, property damage and environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. China has also established a nuclear accident liability insurance system; under the 2007 State Council decision, nuclear power plant licensees are required to purchase insurance sufficient to meet their liability limits before operation or before spent-fuel storage, transport and reprocessing.

China supported the norm embodied in the IAEA General Conference decision of 18 September 2009, GC(53)/DEC/13, on the prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations during operation or under construction. The decision recalled earlier IAEA General Conference resolutions recognizing that any armed attack on, or threat against, nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the UN Charter, international law and the IAEA Statute. China has generally framed this norm as part of the broader protection of peaceful nuclear facilities, nuclear safety, nuclear security and the peaceful settlement of regional nuclear issues.