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Russia

Russia is one of five recognized nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), having succeeded the Soviet Union’s signature and ratification in 1970. Russia commits to the treaty’s three pillars—non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and disarmament—while maintaining the world’s largest nuclear arsenal of approximately 5,500 warheads.

Russia

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Disarmament

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia is one of three depositories of the NPT– it has consistently expressed support for the NPT and advocated for strengthening and universalizing the Treaty.

    Russia has expressed commitment towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and identified the promotion of international efforts aimed at achieving this goal ‘as soon as possible’ as one of priorities of Russian foreign policy.

    Furthermore, Russia has pursued a range of actions in support of the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons prior to the current Review Cycle:

    Arms control

    • Since 2010 Russia has reduced numbers of deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear forces under the New START Treaty with the United States. Russia met the treaty’s central limits by February 2018. In 2021 Russia and the USA concluded an agreement to extend New START until 5 February 2026.
    • Russia has unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear forces to less than 25 percent of their 1991 level according to its official statements
    • Following US withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russia made a unilateral commitment in 2019 not to deploy medium-range or shorter-range ground-launched missiles in certain regions unless similar missiles manufactured by the USA were deployed there. Russia reiterated the commitment to the moratorium in October 2020. In August 2025, Russia formally rescinded its offer, citing US ‘plans to deploy ground-launched INF-range missiles in various regions’ and ‘significant progress in the practical implementation of their intentions’.
    • In 2019-2020 Russia engaged in a series of talks with the USA on strategic stability and nuclear arms control.
    • In 2021 Russia and the USA issued a joint statement on strategic stability and held a series of meetings under Russia-US strategic stability dialogue
    • In 2020 Russia, for the first time, made the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence publicly available.
    • Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019
    • Russia joined a P5 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought in 2022.

    Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties

    • Russia has signed and ratified relevant protocols to the following NWFZ Treaties
      • Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia in 2014
      • African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 2011
      • Russia previously signed and ratified relevant protocols to Treaty of Rarotonga in 1988 and Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1979.
      • Russia has expressed support for the establishment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East as one of the designated co-convenors of the conference on the Zone. Since 2019 Russia participated as an observer in the UN Conferences on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    Regional issues

    • Russia participated in negotiation and implementation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme.
    • Russia has taken a part in finding a political and diplomatic settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. Russia has developed and promoted a roadmap towards the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula together with China in 2017.

    Other instruments

    • Russia has maintained a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1991. It has signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified the treaty in 2000. Russia has expressed support for the treaty’s entry into force. Russia is the second-largest host country of International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities after the USA.
    • Russia has ceased production of fissile materials for weapon purposes[A2.1]. Russia has expressed support for and engaged in the work on a possible Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), including in the Group of Governmental Experts established under the Resolution 67/53 of the UN General Assembly in 2014-2015 and in the FMCT High Level Expert Preparatory Group established under the Resolution 71/259 of the UN General Assembly in 2017-2018.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Over the current Review Cycle Russia has:

    • Reiterated support for the NPT as a cornerstone of the international security architecture
    • Reiterated commitment to nuclear-weapon-free world as the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament
      • Highlighted that the nuclear disarmament process is integrally linked to the general and complete disarmament as envisaged by the NPT provisions
      • Noted that nuclear disarmament process cannot exist outside the context of international security situation and the state of the relations between nuclear-weapon States
    • Reiterated commitment to the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
    • Participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issue in 2022-2023.
    • Served as chair of the P5 Process in 2023-2024.
    • Withdrawn its ratification of the CTBT in 2023 but continued to be a signatory to the CTBT and participates in the work of CTBTO.
      • In 2024 Russia has completed its segment of the International Monitoring System (IMS).
    • In August 2025, Russia formally rescinded its offer, proposed in 2019 and 2020, to establish a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles.
    • Suspended its participation in New START Treaty in 2023 but noted that it will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions under New START.
      • In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to New START limits for one year after the treaty expires in February 2026
    • In 2024 released an updated version of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.
    • In 2025 Russia has released a joint statement with China on Global Strategic Stability

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula’s problems, 4 July 2017. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1549360/

    Statement by Vladimir Putin on Additional Steps to De-Escalate the Situation in Europe in the Wake of the Termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), President of Russia, October 26, 2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64270.

    Statement by the Russian Federation. First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly at the Thematic Debate on «Nuclear Weapons» (New York), 5 November 2020. https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/05-11-2020_statement-by_7ea09b157a28d8894e30459b759a93a6/

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. Working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51. New York: United Nations, 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956428.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, 3 January 2022.

    http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67551

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 August 2022. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/8CmKgQeW0qnV_en.pdf

    “Foreign Ministry Statement in Connection with the Russian Federation Suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START),” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, February 21, 2023, https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/1855184/?lang=en.

    “Law Revoking the Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” President of Russia, November 2, 2023, http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/72635.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s answer to a question from Kommersant newspaper about Russia’s assessments of its chairmanship in the group of five Nuclear Weapon States”, 26 July 2024.

    https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963794/

    “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” November 19, 2024, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I Specific Issue: Nuclear disarmament and security assurances. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/2013557/?lang=en

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I: Nuclear disarmament. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability, 8 May 2025.

    http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6310

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, 4 August 2025. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2039749/?lang=en

    “Meeting with Permanent Members of the Security Council,” President of Russia, September 26, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78051.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has historically undertaken efforts to reduce its nuclear forces under a series of arms control agreements with the United States. Although the treaties varied in their specific obligations and verification arrangements, they collectively developed an extensive bilateral framework for transparency, and verification through notifications, inspections, and data exchanges.

    As part of the 2010 New START Treaty framework, Russia publicly released information on the aggregate numbers of its strategic offensive arms relevant to the central limits established by the treaty. Russia also provided an overview of the numbers of reductions in its nuclear forces in national reports to the NPT Review Conferences in 2015 and in 2022.

    Additionally, Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    In 2023 Russia has suspended participation in the New START Treaty, including its transparency and verification regime.

    In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference, Russia divulged information that quantitative indicators of Russia’s nuclear forces did not exceed the limits set by the expired New START Treaty as of March 2026.

    Additionally, Russia again participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2022-2023

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has issued statements recognising its special responsibility to meet disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

    Russia has undertaken efforts to reduce its nuclear arsenal in various contexts

    According to official statements, the overall capacity of Russian strategic arms has been reduced by 85 percent since 1991.

    Russia has also reduced the quantity of its non-strategic nuclear weapons to less than 25 percent of that of the USSR possessed in 1991 according to official statements.

    The following treaties have led to reductions in Russia’s nuclear forces prior to the current Review Cycle:

    • Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987)
    • START I Treaty (1991)
    • Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (2002)
    • New START Treaty (2010)

    Under exchange of data provisions of the New START Treaty, Russia shared information regarding its nuclear forces. As of 1 September 2022, Russia possessed:

    • Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers – 540
    • Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers – 1549
    • Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers – 759

    Russia extended the New START Treaty with the USA for five years in February 2021 until February 2026.

    In 2021-2022 Russia engaged in a dialogue on strategic stability with the USA where the sides discussed, among other issues, potential follow-on arms control measures.

    Russia has been modernising its nuclear forces since early 2000s, replacing Soviet-era delivery systems with new designs.

    In 2018 Russia announced the development of new nuclear delivery systems, including a new ICBM, hypersonic delivery systems, nuclear-powered underwater torpedo and cruise missile.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia reaffirmed its commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

    Russia stated that nuclear disarmament cannot be considered in isolation without taking into account the existing political and military and strategic realities.

    Russia stressed that nuclear disarmament should be placed within the context of general and complete disarmament.

    In 2023 Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty alleging that the USA is in material breach of the treaty.

    Russia stated that it continues to comply with the quantitative restrictions under the New START.

    In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to New START Treaty limits for one year after the agreement expires in February 2026

    In 2023 Russia has announced that it has deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus. Russia stated that nuclear weapons in Belarus are fully under the control of the Russian Federation.

    Russia continued its nuclear modernisation programme. According to official statements, 92 percent of nuclear forces have been modernised as of the end of 2025.

    Russia has conducted tests of several of its new nuclear delivery systems

    Russia has developed and tested a new nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). In December 2025 this missile was deployed in Belarus.

    In 2024 Russia released an updated version of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence

    Sources

    Statement by the Russian Federation. General Debate. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2022. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/8CmKgQeW0qnV_en.pdf

    President of Russia. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, 1 March 2018.

    http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Right of reply. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2022

    https://estatements.un.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/E84S0uoXLeD1_en.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, 13 October 2022

    https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/1833766/?lang=en

    Joint Statement of the Russian and Belarusian delegations. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 22 July 2024. https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/22-07-2024_joint-statem_d1ad4a5b730b3aaf2e4fd6ecc98391cb/

    President of Russia. “Expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board”, 17 December 2025.

    http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78801

    “Oreshnik Missile System Is Put on Combat Duty in Republic of Belarus,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, December 30, 2025, https://t.me/mod_russia_en/25041.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Foreign Ministry statement in connection with the Russian Federation suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), 21 February 2023

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1855184/

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, 3 December 2024.

    https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    The Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) between Russia and the United States entered into force on 5 February 2011. Russia met the treaty’s central limits by February 2018 and continued to observe them in the following years.

    In 2017-2020 and in 2020-2021 Russia engaged in strategic stability talks with the United States where the sides discussed, among other issues, potential follow-on arms control measures.

    In 2021 Russia and the United States concluded an agreement to extend New START Treaty until 5 February 2026.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    In 2023 Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty but noted that it will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions under the treaty.

    In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to New START limits for one year after the treaty’s expiration date

    After the treaty expired in February 2026, Russia released a statement indicating that it remains open to ‘seeking political and diplomatic ways to comprehensively stabilize the strategic situation on the basis of equal and mutually beneficial dialogue-based solutions, should the right conditions for such cooperation arise’.

    Russia stated that, as of March 2026, it has not exceeded the central limits under New START

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Foreign Ministry statement in connection with the Russian Federation suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), 21 February 2023

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1855184/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    a) & b) Russia has engaged in reductions of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. (see Action 3)

    c) Russia in official statements declared that it is consistently reducing the place and role of nuclear weapons in its defence policy.

    Russia stated that the Military Doctrine of Russia gives priority to implementation of a set of diplomatic, military and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggression through non-nuclear means in the framework of the system of non-nuclear, including strategic, deterrence.

    Russian military doctrine and the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence declare that the state policy on nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature. These documents stipulate that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if an attack on Russia, including a conventional aggression, threatens the very existence of the state.

    d) Russia has engaged in dialogue on policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons in various formats.

    Since 2010 Russia has participated in discussions on issues pertaining to transparency, confidence, nuclear risk reduction and nuclear doctrines under the auspices of the P5 Process.

    As part of the P5 process Russia has contributed to the development of the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms which was first released in 2015.

    In 2019-2020 Russia engaged in a series of talks with the USA on strategic stability and nuclear arms control.

    In 2021 Russia and the USA issued a joint statement on strategic stability and held a series of meetings under Russia-US strategic stability dialogue

    In 2020 Russia, for the first time, made the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence publicly available.

    Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019

    e); f) & g) Russia has undertaken a number of measures that reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

    Russia stated that it acts in such a manner as to avert situations that could lead to dangerous aggravation of relations at the international and regional levels and to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war, and is also taking the necessary steps to reduce the nuclear threat.

    Russia exchanged notifications of ballistic missile launches under corresponding agreements with the USA (1988 U.S.-Soviet Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement) and China (2009 Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles). Russia extended the agreement with China in 2020.

    Russia joined a P5 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought in 2022.

    In 2001, China and Russia agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other or target strategic nuclear missiles against each other. Russia has signed a mutual de-targeting agreement with the USA in 1994.

    Russia stated that it maintains the policy of non-deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons, keeping them at centralised storage facilities and not on delivery systems.

    In 2020 Russia, for the first time, made the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence publicly available.

    The doctrine outlines a list of conditions under which Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons

    Russia states that the doctrine ensures the level of transparency and clearness with regard to the parameters of nuclear deterrence

    Under exchange of data provisions of the New START Treaty, Russia shared information regarding its nuclear forces with the USA annually.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    a) & b) (see Action 3)

    c) Russia released an updated version of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence in 2024.

    The revised document includes language asserting that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear attack or a conventional aggression that threatens the very existence of the state, but also to respond to a conventional aggression that creates a critical threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and (or) Belarus.

    Russia has reiterated the commitment to the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought in official statements.

    d) Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issue in 2022-2023.

    Russia served as chair of the P5 Process in 2023-2024.

    e); f) & g) Russia continued to issue notifications on launches of ballistic missiles in accordance with relevant treaties.

    In 2024 Russia released an updated version of its nuclear doctrine (Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence)

    In 2025 Russia has released a joint statement with China on Global Strategic Stability in which the two sides emphasized special responsibility of nuclear-weapon states for international security and global strategic stability and called for building confidence to avoid dangerous miscalculations and refrain from actions that generate strategic risks.

    Russia suspended its participation in New START Treaty in 2023 but noted that it will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions under New START.

    In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to New START limits for one year after the treaty expires in February 2026

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula’s problems, 4 July 2017. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1549360/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly at the Thematic Debate on «Nuclear Weapons» (New York), 5 November 2020. https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/05-11-2020_statement-by_7ea09b157a28d8894e30459b759a93a6/

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, 3 January 2022.

    http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67551

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 August 2022. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/8CmKgQeW0qnV_en.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s answer to a question from Kommersant newspaper about Russia’s assessments of its chairmanship in the group of five Nuclear Weapon States”, 26 July 2024.

    https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963794/

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, 3 December 2024.

    https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I Specific Issue: Nuclear disarmament and security assurances. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/2013557/?lang=en

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I: Nuclear disarmament. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/2013105/

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability, 8 May 2025.

    http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6310

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf.

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. Working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51. New York: United Nations, 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956428.

    United Nations Digital Library. ‘Letter dated 94/01/26 from the representative of the United States of America to the Conference and the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting texts of certain documents issued in Moscow on 14 January 1994.’, 26 January 1994.

    https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/194315?v=pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia expressed its support for the creation of subsidiary bodies, including one to deal with nuclear disarmament, in 2018 and in 2022.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia expressed its support for the creation of subsidiary bodies, including one to deal with nuclear disarmament, in 2024 and 2025.

    In 2026 Russia stated that it considers it counterproductive to adopt a decision on the re-establishment of subsidiary bodies, including one to deal with nuclear disarmament, and instead called for negotiating a more focused and ambitious mandate for each subsidiary body.

    Sources

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 28 February 2018.

    https://mid.ru/de/foreign_policy/news/1564914/?lang=en

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 22 February 2022.

    https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/28-02-2022_statement-ma_94912087a65c1a566063847165c87afb/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 23 January 2024

    https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_(2024)/Statement_of_the_Russian_PR_23-01-2024_ENG.pdf

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 23 January 2025.

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/1992770/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 3 February 2026.

    https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/statement_by_a_russian_representative_at_the_plenary_session_of_the_conference_on_disarmament/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia expressed its support for the adoption of a CD programme of work in 2009 which included the item “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”

    Russia expressed its support for the creation of subsidiary bodies, including one to deal with “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” in 2018 and in 2022.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia expressed its support for the creation of subsidiary bodies, including one to deal with “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” in 2024 and in 2025.

    In 2026 Russia stated that substantive discussion on the topic of negative security assurances with remains highly relevant. However, Russia opposed the re-establishment of subsidiary bodies, including on negative security assurances, and instead called for negotiating a more focused and ambitious mandate for each subsidiary body.

    Sources

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 20 January 2009, P.17

    https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g09/606/36/pdf/g0960636.pdf

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 28 February 2018.

    https://mid.ru/de/foreign_policy/news/1564914/?lang=en

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 22 February 2022.

    https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/28-02-2022_statement-ma_94912087a65c1a566063847165c87afb/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 23 January 2024

    https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_(2024)/Statement_of_the_Russian_PR_23-01-2024_ENG.pdf

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 23 January 2025.

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/1992770/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 3 February 2026.

    https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/statement_by_a_russian_representative_at_the_plenary_session_of_the_conference_on_disarmament/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has affirmed its commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in 1995. This commitment was noted in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 984.

    Russia has specified that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on Russia, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Latest version of the Russian nuclear doctrine adopted in 2024 outlines a list of conditions under which Russia would consider employment of nuclear weapons. These conditions may apply to non-nuclear-armed states. Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to respond to a conventional weapons attack that creates a critical threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and (or) Belarus. It also specifies that aggression against Russia and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.

    In a working paper submitted to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia expressed doubt whether there are sufficient grounds for providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that are involved in nuclear-sharing and extended nuclear deterrence arrangements.

    Sources

    Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, S/1995/261, 6 April 1995.

    https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Disarm%20S1995261.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, 3 December 2024.

    https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/

    Russian Federation. Negative security assurances. Working paper. NPT/CONF.2026/WP.38. 9 April 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/WP.38

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has signed and ratified relevant protocols to the following NWFZ Treaties:

      • Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1979
      • Treaty of Rarotonga in 1988
      • African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 2011
      • Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia in 2014

    Russia has expressed support for the establishment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East as one of the designated co-convenors of the conference on the Zone.

    Since 2019 Russia participated as an observer in the UN Conferences on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to express support for the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and noted that, in its view, the establishment of such zones helps to strengthen regional and international stability and security and to build mutual trust.

    Russia confirmed that it is ready to accede to the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty, in the form and manner stated in 2012, when all domestic procedures for such a step were completed.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently reaffirmed its support for the CTBT. Russia was one of the key negotiators of CTBT, signed the Treaty the day it opened for signature in September 1996, and ratified it in June 2000.

    Russia has maintained a national moratorium on nuclear testing since its last explosive nuclear test in 1990.

    In bilateral contacts with States that have not yet joined the CTBT, including Annex 2 States, Russia stressed the importance of the universalization of the CTBT and called upon those States to sign/ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. Russia promoted the important entry into force of the CTBT and the need for the further universalization of the Treaty in the United Nations and within other international fora as well as in contacts at the regional level.

    Russia has worked on constructing, certifying and maintaining CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities as the second-largest host country (32 stations).

    Russia supported the development of the CTBT’s on-site inspection protocols and detection capabilities.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    In November 2023 Russia revoked its ratification of the CTBT. Russia continued to be a signatory to the CTBT and to participate in the work of the CTBTO.

    Russia has reaffirmed its full commitment to the goals and objectives of the CTBT, as well as to efforts to ensure its entry into force in official statements.

    Russia continued to stress the importance of a prompt entry into force of the CTBT and urged relevant countries to sign and/or ratify the Treaty.

    Cost-Free Experts and Junior Professional Officers from Russia have contributed to CTBTO’s work

    In December 2023 Russia has completed the construction and certification of the national segment of the CTBT IMS.

    Russia did not participate in the 14th Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) citing disagreements over certain elements of the text of the final declaration.

    Sources

    Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. “Activities undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States under Measure (L) of the Final Declaration of the 2019 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in the period June 2019 – May 2021”, 22 September 2021

    https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/Documents/CTBT-Art.XIV-2021-4.pdf

    United Nations. Russian Federation: Withdrawal of the instrument of ratification, 2 November 2023

    https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2023/CN.463.2023-Eng.pdf

    Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. “Activities undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States under Measure (L) of the Final Declaration of the 2019 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in the period June 2023 – May 2025”, 26 September 2025

    https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/CTBT-Art.XIV-2025-4.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Foreign Ministry statement on the reasons for Russia’s refusal to participate in the 14th Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 27 September 2025

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2049467/

    Mikhail Ulyanov. Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna at the 65th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 10 November 2025.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_to_the_international_organizations_i_101125/

    Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO). “Voluntary contributions: 2025 highlights”, 2025.

    https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/2025%20VC%20Highlights.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has maintained a national moratorium on nuclear testing since its last explosive nuclear test in 1990.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    In November 2023 Russia has revoked its ratification of the CTBT. Russia continued to be a signatory to the CTBT and to participate in the work of the CTBTO.

    Russia has reaffirmed its full commitment to the goals and objectives of the CTBT, as well as to efforts to ensure its entry into force in official statements.

    In 2026 Russia reaffirmed that it intends to continue observing the national moratorium on nuclear testing, provided that other nuclear-weapon States adhere to a similar approach.

    Sources

    United Nations. Russian Federation: Withdrawal of the instrument of ratification, 2 November 2023

    https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2023/CN.463.2023-Eng.pdf

    Mikhail Ulyanov. Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna at the 65th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 10 November 2025.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_to_the_international_organizations_i_101125/

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia participated in all Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held prior to the current Review Cycle and reported on measures taken to promote the Treaty’s entry into force.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia participated in the 13th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in 2023 and reported on measures taken to promote the Treaty’s entry into force.

    Russia did not participate in the 14th Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT in 2025 citing disagreements over certain elements of the draft text of the final declaration. However, Russia submitted a report on measures taken to promote the Treaty’s entry into force.

    Sources

    Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. “Activities undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States under Measure (L) of the Final Declaration of the 2019 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in the period June 2023 – May 2025”, 26 September 2025

    https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/CTBT-Art.XIV-2025-4.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Foreign Ministry statement on the reasons for Russia’s refusal to participate in the 14th Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 27 September 2025

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2049467/

    Mikhail Ulyanov. Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna at the 65th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 10 November 2025.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_to_the_international_organizations_i_101125/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia reported that it stressed the importance of the universalization of the CTBT and called to sign/ratify the Treaty as soon as possible in bilateral contacts with States that have not yet joined the CTBT, including Annex 2 States. Russia also promoted the importance entry into force of the CTBT and the need for the further universalization of the Treaty in the United Nations and within other international fora as well as in contacts at the regional level.

    Russia has consistently supported UN General Assembly resolutions in support of the CTBT.

    Russia participated in all Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held prior to the current Review Cycle

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    In November 2023 Russia has revoked its ratification of the CTBT. Russia continued to be a signatory to the CTBT and to participate in the work of the CTBTO.

    Russia has reaffirmed its full commitment to the goals and objectives of the CTBT, as well as to efforts to ensure its entry into force in official statements.

    Russia continued to stress the importance of a prompt entry into force of the CTBT and urged relevant countries to sign and/or ratify the Treaty.

    Russia participated in the 13th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in 2023. However, Russia did not participate in the 14th Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT in 2025 citing disagreements over certain elements of the draft text of the final declaration.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    United Nations. Russian Federation: Withdrawal of the instrument of ratification, 2 November 2023

    https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2023/CN.463.2023-Eng.pdf

    Mikhail Ulyanov. Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna at the 65th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 10 November 2025.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_to_the_international_organizations_i_101125/

    Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. “Activities undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States under Measure (L) of the Final Declaration of the 2019 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in the period June 2019 – May 2021”, 22 September 2021

    https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/Documents/CTBT-Art.XIV-2021-4.pdf

    Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. “Activities undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States under Measure (L) of the Final Declaration of the 2019 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in the period June 2023 – May 2025”, 26 September 2025

    https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/CTBT-Art.XIV-2025-4.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently expressed support for the establishment of a mechanism for the verification of compliance with the CTBT. Russia has further supported the establishment of the verification system in following ways:

    • Russia has worked on constructing, certifying and maintaining CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities in its territory
    • Russia organized annual training courses at the National Data Centre for the staff of IMS stations and worked on developing technical models for IMS stations, including a high-performance noble gas detection system.
    • Russia provided technical support and expertise towards the development of the CTBT’s on-site inspection protocols and detection capabilities

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    In November 2023 Russia has revoked its ratification of the CTBT. Russia continued to be a signatory to the CTBT and to participate in the work of the CTBTO.

    Russia has reaffirmed its commitment to the goals and objectives of the CTBT, as well as support for the establishment of the Treaty’s verification regime.

    In 2023, Russia completed the construction of its national segment of the International Monitoring System, which is the second largest in the world and consists of 32 facilities

    Russia continued to engage in the work of the CTBTO involving the discussion of relevant issues, including the on-site inspection regime.

    Russia continued to organize annual training courses at the National Data Centre for the staff of IMS stations and work on developing technical models for IMS stations, including a high-performance noble gas detection system.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    United Nations. Russian Federation: Withdrawal of the instrument of ratification, 2 November 2023

    https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2023/CN.463.2023-Eng.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia ceased production of high enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons in 1989 and plutonium for military purposes in 1994. Russia shut down all its 13 reactors that previously produced weapons-grade plutonium by 2010.

    Russia consistently expressed support for launching negotiations on FMCT based on the principles set forth in the 1999 document CD/1299 (the 'Shannon mandate').

    Russia engaged in the work on a possible FMCT, including in the Group of Governmental Experts established under the Resolution 67/53 of the UN General Assembly in 2014-2015 and in the FMCT High Level Expert Preparatory Group established under the Resolution 71/259 of the UN General Assembly in 2017-2018.

    Russia converted 500 tons of weapons-grade weapon-origin uranium under the implementation of the Agreement Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (the HEU-LEU Agreement) with the USA

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to express support for launching negotiations on FMCT on the basis of the mandate set out in document CD/1299 of 1995 (‘the Shannon mandate’).

    Russia stated that it considers the idea of FMCT to has become to a considerable extent obsolete. However, Russia is ready to participate in negotiations on its development should such a decision be adopted.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Main Committee I, Nuclear Disarmament. 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 May 2026

    https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-EleventhReview_Conference_(2026)/Russian_Federation_engl.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Agreement on application of safeguards between Russia and IAEA entered into force on 10 June 1985.

    In its National Report to the Tenth NPT Review Conference Russia stated that the list of facilities to which IAEA safeguards could be applied included more than 40 nuclear installations at more than 20 facilities

    Russia submitted annual reports to the IAEA detailing its stock of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel

    In October 2016, Russia suspended participation in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement with the United States, in which the parties agreed to eliminate 34 tonnes of excess weapon-grade plutonium

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to submit annual reports to the IAEA regarding the stock of its civilian plutonium

    In 2025 Russia reported owning 66.1 thousand kg of civilian plutonium as of 31 December 2024

    In October 2025, Russia denounced the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement with the United States, in which the parties agreed to eliminate 34 tonnes of excess weapon-grade plutonium.

    Sources

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. INFCIRC/327/. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc327.pdf

    “Draft Law Suspending the Russia-US Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement Submitted to the State Duma,” President of Russia, October 3, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/53009.

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Communication Received from the Russian Federation Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549/Add.9/27, 23 July 2025

    https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a9-27.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    “The Law On Denunciation of the Intergovernmental Agreement with the United States On Plutonium Management and Disposition,” President of Russia, October 27, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/78303.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) between Russia and the United States the two states have engaged in negotiations with the IAEA to verify the disposition of plutonium declared in excess of military needs. However, the verification arrangements were not completed. Russia suspended implementation of the PMDA in 2016.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia has not communicated on further implementation of this action in the current review cycle.

    Sources

    Communication from the Permanent Missions of the Russian Federation and the United States of America regarding a Joint Letter regarding the Agreement concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation. INFCIRC/806, 16 September 2010

    https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2010/infcirc806.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    “The Law On Denunciation of the Intergovernmental Agreement with the United States On Plutonium Management and Disposition,” President of Russia, October 27, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/78303.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia ceased production of HEU for military purposes in 1989 and shut down its plutonium production sites in between 1987 and 2010

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia has not communicated on further implementation of this action in the current review cycle.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, 1993.

    https://fissilematerials.org/library/heu93b.pdf

    Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Shutdown of Plutonium Production Reactors and The Cessation of Use of Newly Produced Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons, 1994.

    https://fissilematerials.org/library/gov94.pdf

    Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation Regarding Plutonium Production Reactors, 1997.

    https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/international_contracts/2_contract/47399/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019 and participated in activities of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) as observer in 2015-2017.

    However, Russia clarified that, in its view, verification procedures should be considered should be considered in the context of specific agreements on arms reduction and limitation and they should be aligned with the subject and scope of the restrictions set out therein.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2022-2023

    Russia reaffirmed that it opposes initiatives that attempt to develop ‘universal’ verification procedures and technologies in isolation from actual negotiations on specific international agreements.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia submitted national reports to the NPT Review Conference in 2015 and in 2020. The reports include general categories of issues concerning all three pillars of the Treaty under which the relevant information is reported: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia has submitted a national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia played a role in negotiating a standard reporting form through the P5 dialogue process.

    Russia submitted national reports to the NPT Review Conference based on the common reporting framework in 2015 and in 2020

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia stated that the reporting framework remains relevant and needs no updating

    Russia has submitted a national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference.

    Russia participated in discussions on a new reporting framework under a working group on further strengthening the review process at the first session of the Preparatory Committee in July 2023. Russia criticised the discussions as an attempt to impose transparency and accountability measures on nuclear-weapon States and to convert the NPT review process into a means of oversight and coercion.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III Specific Issue on Strengthening the Review Process of the NPT. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Geneva), 30 July 2024

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Issues of transparency, reporting and accountability. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 7 May 2025

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia submitted a report on the implementation of A/57/124 in 2004 and signed a Joint Statement on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education in 2010. Russia consistently supported relevant UN GA resolutions on disarmament and non-proliferation education

    In its national report to the 2015 NPT Review Conference Russia has reported that it fully complied with its obligations under Action 22 through the activities of its academic and non-governmental organizations

    Russia has supported the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) through financial contributions.

    Russia organized training and education for international specialists in the nuclear energy sector, and contributes to capacity building programmes with the IAEA and the CTBTO

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia reported that it continues to actively participate in educational processes on disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including through academic and non-governmental organizations

    Russia supported the activities of the P5 Young Professional Network as chair of the P5 Process in 2023-2024.

    Russia supported the organisation of the Moscow Non-Proliferation Conference which included a youth segment in 2022, 2024 and in 2026

    Russia continued to organize training and education for international specialists in the nuclear energy sector, and contribute to capacity building programmes with the IAEA and the CTBTO

    Russia continued to support the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) through financial contributions

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

Non-Proliferation

View non-proliferation actions for all countries

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently expressed support for strengthening and universalization of the NPT

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia reaffirmed its support for strengthening and universalization of the NPT in its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    As a nuclear-weapon state, Russia has a Voluntary Offer Agreement with the IAEA that allows the IAEA to apply safeguards to designated nuclear material within its civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The agreement entered into force in 1985.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia has not communicated on further implementation of this action in the current review cycle.

    Sources

    The Text of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, INFCIRC/327, 1 July 1985

    https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc327.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently expressed support for the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system as a reliable tool for verifying compliance by states with their Treaty obligations.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia reaffirmed its support for comprehensive safeguards agreements under the NPT as a reliable tool for verifying States’ compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia participated in negotiation and implementation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme, which was endorsed by Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).

    Russia has supported UN Security Council resolutions demanding that the DPRK act in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement since 2006.

    Russia has taken a part in finding a political and diplomatic settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, including through the Six-Party Talks held between 2003 and 2009. Russia has developed and promoted a roadmap towards the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula together with China in 2017.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia stated that it will continue to promote the earliest possible agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, taking into account Iran’s legitimate rights under the NPT

    Russia continues to advocate a political and diplomatic settlement of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia provided support to the IAEA’s safeguards implementation, including through its national safeguards support programme, and contributed to resolution of safeguards non-compliance through its role on the IAEA Board of Governors and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council

    Russia supported a series of IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security Council resolutions linked to DPRK nuclear and missile programmes and the Iranian nuclear programme

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to provide support to the IAEA’s safeguards implementation, including through its national safeguards support programme and contribute to resolution of safeguards non-compliance through its role on the IAEA Board of Governors and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 2000. It came into force on 16 October 2007.

    Russia stated that it recognizes the importance of additional protocols to safeguards agreements and encouraged countries that have not yet signed an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible. Russia emphasized that this measure is strictly voluntary, and any coercion as to the signing of an additional protocol is completely inappropriate.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to express support for universalization of the Additional Protocol, stressing the voluntary nature and inadmissibility of imposing it as a mandatory measure.

    Sources

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Protocol between the Russian Federation and the IAEA Additional to the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. INFCIRC/327/Add.1. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 22 January 2009.

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. General debate. 2023 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 August 2023

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1899782/

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia supported the work of the IAEA to assist States parties in concluding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols through its national safeguards support programme.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to support the work of the IAEA to assist States parties in concluding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols through its national safeguards support programme.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia’s Voluntary Offer Agreement with the IAEA entered into force in 1985 and allows the IAEA to apply safeguards to designated nuclear material within its civilian nuclear fuel cycle.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reported that more than 40 nuclear facilities in its territory are listed as those to which the IAEA safeguards could be applied

    Sources

    The Text of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, INFCIRC/327, 1 July 1985

    https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc327.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia called upon all countries that have signed a small quantities protocol but have not yet adopted the modified text to do so as soon as possible and called upon any states in which nuclear facilities are being built to rescind the small quantities protocol in a timely manner

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia called upon all countries with small quantities protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements that have not yet adopted the modified text to take that step.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently expressed support to the IAEA’s efforts to ensure the reliability and improve the effectiveness of its verification mechanism and supported relevant IAEA General Conference decisions.

    Russia advocated that in any reforms, the IAEA safeguards system must continue to be objective, depoliticized, technically sound and consistent with the safeguards agreements concluded between States and IAEA and that the presumption of innocence and respect for the sovereignty of States should underpin IAEA activities in implementing safeguards.

    Russia also stated that any changes to the IAEA safeguards system must be made in such a way that the new methods are understood by all States members of the Agency and have their unanimous support.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to support Agency’s efforts to ensure the reliability and improve the effectiveness of its verification mechanism and continued to support relevant IAEA General Conference decisions.

    Russia continued to advocate for certain principles that must be followed in any reforms to the IAEA safeguards system and additionally clarified that they should apply to the State-level concept for safeguards being implemented by the IAEA.

    Russia stated that it considers the application of State-level approaches to the implementation of safeguards as an ongoing large-scale experiment by the secretariat and interested member States, which will become a recognized practice only if the State-level concept is approved by the IAEA policymaking bodies.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently cooperated with the IAEA in reinforcing the conceptual and technical framework used by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and provided political, technical and financial support to the Agency in that regard, including through the Russian Safeguards Support Programme.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to cooperate with the IAEA in reinforcing the conceptual and technical framework used by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and to provide political, technical and financial support to the Agency.

    In its report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia highlighted the following relevant activities:

      • Russia assisted the IAEA by examining in its analytical laboratories environmental samples collected by the Agency during inspections
      • Russia performed joint missions with the IAEA to elaborate approaches to verification for new types of nuclear plants, such as mobile nuclear power plants with small modular reactors, and to examine the feasibility of safeguards by design
      • Russia supported development of new technologies are being developed to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities and the Agency’s efforts to develop innovative measurement equipment that would allow for more accurate control of irradiated nuclear fuel its efforts to establish uniform non-discriminatory methods for implementing safeguards at facilities that are being decommissioned.
      • Russia emphasized importance of training of the Agency’s inspectors, including in the use of non-destructive techniques for testing nuclear material and in the conduct of inspections at uranium enrichment facilities.
      • Russia provided training in nuclear material accounting and control to IAEA Secretariat staff.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has supported and facilitated strengthening of the technical capability of the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to support and facilitate strengthening of the technical capability of the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    In its report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia highlighted the following relevant activities:

      • Russia assisted the IAEA by examining in its analytical laboratories environmental samples collected by the Agency during inspections
      • Russia performed joint missions with the IAEA to elaborate approaches to verification for new types of nuclear plants, such as mobile nuclear power plants with small modular reactors, and to examine the feasibility of safeguards by design
      • Russia supported development of new technologies are being developed to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities and the Agency’s efforts to develop innovative measurement equipment that would allow for more accurate control of irradiated nuclear fuel its efforts to establish uniform non-discriminatory methods for implementing safeguards at facilities that are being decommissioned.
      • Russia emphasized importance of training of the Agency’s inspectors, including in the use of non-destructive techniques for testing nuclear material and in the conduct of inspections at uranium enrichment facilities.
      • Russia provided training in nuclear material accounting and control to IAEA Secretariat staff

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. Russian legislation requires its civilian nuclear cooperation partners to be Party to the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia reaffirmed that its national export control system is based on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and the export rules and control lists produced by them.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. Russian legislation requires its civilian nuclear cooperation partners to be Party to the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia reaffirmed that its national export control system is based on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and the export rules and control lists produced by them. Russia implements the recorded decisions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in its regulatory framework in a timely manner and without delay.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. Russian legislation requires its civilian nuclear cooperation partners to be Party to the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia reaffirmed that its national export control system is based on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and the export rules and control lists produced by them.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia consistently asserted that international non-proliferation efforts should not lead to unreasonable restrictions on legitimate trade in dual-use goods and technologies and on civil scientific and technological cooperation.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to advocate broader access for States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and reaffirmed that each State Party has the right to pursue its national nuclear energy policy independently without interference, and to cooperate in this field without discrimination.

    Russia additionally noted that imposing unilateral coercive measures, creating artificial barriers to bilateral and international cooperation and undermining the principle of equal access to nuclear materials, equipment and technical information to be used for peaceful purposes are violations of article IV of the Treaty.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia consistently asserted that international non-proliferation efforts should not lead to unreasonable restrictions on legitimate trade in dual-use goods and technologies and on civil scientific and technological cooperation.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to advocate broader access for States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and reaffirmed that each State Party has the right to pursue its national nuclear energy policy independently without interference, and to cooperate in this field without discrimination.

    Russia additionally noted that imposing unilateral coercive measures, creating artificial barriers to bilateral and international cooperation and undermining the principle of equal access to nuclear materials, equipment and technical information to be used for peaceful purposes are violations of article IV of the Treaty.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Prior to the current Review Cycle Russia ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment

    At the 2015 NPT Review Conference Russia has reported that all nuclear materials, their storage sites and corresponding facilities in its territory, as well as the transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances, are provided with the necessary security measures, including physical protection, in compliance with legal and statutory instruments, and with a view to the IAEA recommendations.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    At the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reaffirmed that all nuclear material, storage locations and related facilities in Russia, as well as the transport of nuclear material and radioactive substances, are subject to the necessary security measures.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Relevant Russia’s national legislation adopted in 2014 reflected IAEA’s nuclear security recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Updated relevant Russia’s national legislation adopted in 2024 reflected IAEA’s nuclear security recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    Sources

    Federal Environmental, Industrial And Nuclear Supervision Service Of Russia (Rostechnadzor). ‘State Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in the Russian Federation’, April 2014

    https://www.en.gosnadzor.gov.ru/publications/35CSS%20%20with%20irrs%202%20April.pdf

    Requirements to Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Materials Storage Facilities (NP-083-15)

    https://docs.secnrs.ru/catalog/FNP/NP_083_15/

    Requirements to Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Materials Storage Facilities. (NP-083-23)

    https://docs.secnrs.ru/catalog/FNP/NP_083_23/

    Statement by the Russian Federation on measures taken by the Russian Federation as regards Actions 5, 20 and 21 contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 25 April 2014

    https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n14/318/72/pdf/n1431872.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2008. Russia welcomed the fact that the amended Convention came into force in May 2016 and further expressed support for its universalization

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia has not communicated on further implementation of this action in the current review cycle.

    Sources

    Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Concerning the Entry into Force of the Federal Law on Acceptance of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material’, 19 August 2008

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/1598523/?lang=en

    Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Comment by the Information and Press Department on the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material’. 12 April 2016

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1526345/

    Statement by Russia. Main Committee III. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 8 August 2022

    https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1825666/?lang=en

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has made a political commitment to implement Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Russia has further nominated a Point of Contact for the purpose of facilitating the export and/or import of radioactive sources.

    Russia further reported that it has promulgated relevant radiation protection laws and regulations, designated and empowering a regulatory body that establishes regulations and issues guidance relating to the safety and security of radioactive sources, established a national register of radioactive sources and a system for the notification, authorization and control of radioactive sources.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia has not communicated on further implementation of this action in the current review cycle.

    Sources

    International Atomic Energy Agency. The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Status list of countries. 26 August 2025.

    https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/ns/code-of-conduct-radioactive-sources/Documents/Status_list%2026%20August%202025.pdf

    State Self-Assessment Questionnaire submitted by Russia, 20 October 2005

    https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/orpnet/resources/Shared%20Documents/Russian%20Federation.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    At the 2015 NPT Review Conference Russia reported that it is taking measures to improve systems for accounting, control and physical protection of radioactive sources.

    Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

    Russia reported that under bilateral agreements and contracts, it has provided assistance to countries in the establishment of security systems for nuclear material and facilities

    In 2006 Russia and the United States launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Russia has organized a number of events relating to the Initiative since its launch, including on nuclear forensics

    Russia has supported and participated in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continues to participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)

    At the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reaffirmed that the transport of nuclear material and radioactive substances in Russia are subject to the necessary security measures in its national report.

    Russia also reaffirmed that it has founded its national export control system on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee and implements the recorded decisions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in its regulatory framework in a timely manner and without delay.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly following an initiative led by Russia. Russia was the first nuclear-weapon State to sign the Convention and ratified it in 2007.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia has not communicated on further implementation of this action in the current review cycle.

    Sources

    Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Adoption by Russian Federation State Duma of a Law on Ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism’. 21 September 2006

    https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1618709/?lang=en

    Statement by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Regarding Adoption of International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. 2 April 2005

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1706402/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia provided political, financial and expert support to relevant IAEA programmes as part of its overall support for the activities of the Agency in the area of non-proliferation.

    Russia provided training in nuclear material accounting and control to IAEA Secretariat staff and supported the Agency’s efforts to develop innovative measurement equipment that would allow for more accurate control of irradiated nuclear fuel.

    Russia supported the pilot phase of IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for system of accounting for and control of nuclear material and safeguards implementation (COMPASS) which was launched in 2020.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to provide political, financial and expert support to relevant IAEA programmes as part of its overall support for the activities of the Agency in the area of non-proliferation.

    Russia noted the importance of and expressed support for IAEA’s efforts to improve the effectiveness of State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material.

    Russia continued to support the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for system of accounting for and control of nuclear material and safeguards implementation (COMPASS) throughout its first phase which started in 2024.

    Sources

    Statement by Russia. ‘Safeguards Implementation Report for 2024’, IAEA Board of Governors Session (Vienna), 11 June 2025.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_the_delegation_of_the_russian_federation_on_the_agenda_item_6_c_of_the_session_of_the_i/

    International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘The IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs’

    https://www.iaea.org/es/node/87295

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

Peaceful Uses

View peaceful uses actions for all countries

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently advocated broad access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for NPT states parties, noting that it respects each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to advocate broader access for NPT States Parties to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and promote international cooperation in this sphere.

    At the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia underlined that each State Party to the Treaty has the right to pursue its national nuclear energy policy independently without interference, and to cooperate in this field without discrimination.

    Russia noted that imposing unilateral coercive measures, creating artificial barriers to bilateral and international cooperation and undermining the principle of equal access to nuclear materials, equipment and technical information to be used for peaceful purposes are violations of article IV of the NPT.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently reaffirmed its support for broad access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for NPT states parties and provided political, financial and expert support to various IAEA activities related to promotion, assistance and capacity building in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy

    Russia offered technical assistance, expertise and education on peaceful uses of nuclear energy uses through various cooperation programmes and provided nuclear newcomer countries with assistance in establishing all necessary infrastructure for successful and safe implementation of their national nuclear energy programmes, including countries where Russia is building nuclear power plants

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to express support for broad access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for NPT states parties.

    Russia continued to implement programmes aimed at providing technical assistance, expertise and education on peaceful uses of nuclear energy to NPT states parties and to provide support to relevant IAEA activities.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 August 2023

    https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Russia_NEW_Cluster_III_Russia.pdf

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 29 July 2024

    https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceSecond_session_(2024)/Russia_-_Cluster_III_-_ENG.pdf

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 6 May 2025.

    https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_Conference_(2025)/Russia_-_Cluster_3_Eng.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia exports nuclear fuel, nuclear power reactors, and other nuclear materials and technologies to non-nuclear-weapon states, including developing countries and offers technical assistance, expertise and education on peaceful nuclear energy uses and non-energy applications of nuclear technologies. Russia comprehensively supports and cooperates with the IAEA in promotion of nuclear energy.

    Russia supported and participated in the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and Generation IV International Forum (GIF)

    Russia has cooperated with the Nuclear Energy Agency within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (NEA OECD), and the CIS Commission for cooperation on peaceful uses for atomic energy.

    In 2007 Russia has established the In 2007 Russia has established the International Uranium Enrichment Center and a guaranteed low-enriched uranium reserve in Angarsk that is intended to provide uranium enrichment services for civilian nuclear power programmes and allow participating countries access to nuclear fuel.

    In 2019, Russia facilitated supply of first and second batches of low-enriched uranium to the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to actively promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy through its exports of nuclear fuel, nuclear power reactors, and other nuclear materials and technologies to non-nuclear-weapon states, including developing countries.

    In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia stated that it is currently building 22 power units abroad with WWER type reactors in China, India, Türkiye and Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran and Hungary. In 2025, a large-scale project was launched to build a nuclear power plant in the Republic of Kazakhstan. A project is under way in Uzbekistan to build a unique energy complex consisting of high- and low-capacity nuclear power plants on a single site. An intergovernmental agreement on the construction of a low-capacity nuclear power plant in Myanmar has also been signed.

    In 2024 Russia established a BRICS Nuclear Energy Platform designed to develop partnerships with key companies of members of BRICS in the nuclear industry. Russia is working on developing a BRICS nuclear medicine cooperation platform.

    In 2025 Russia signed a memorandum of understanding on peaceful nuclear cooperation with ASEAN Centre For Energy

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 August 2023

    https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Russia_NEW_Cluster_III_Russia.pdf

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 29 July 2024

    https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceSecond_session_(2024)/Russia_-_Cluster_III_-_ENG.pdf

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 6 May 2025.

    https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_Conference_(2025)/Russia_-_Cluster_3_Eng.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia is the biggest nuclear power technology provider in the world. Russia exports nuclear fuel, nuclear power reactors, and other nuclear materials and technologies to non-nuclear-weapon states, including developing countries

    Russia offers to non-nuclear-weapon states technical assistance, expertise and education on peaceful nuclear energy uses and non-energy applications of nuclear technologies, including in the construction of national centres of nuclear science and technology (CNST), as well as assistance and expertise in areas of public acceptance and personnel training in civilian nuclear industry.

    As of the end of the previous Review Cycle Russia was constructing/contracted to construct nuclear power in 12 countries, including Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Hungary, Iran and Türkiye.

    In 2007 Russia established the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk on the basis of agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan.

    In 2019, Russia supplied the first and second batches of low-enriched uranium to the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan.

    Prior to the current Review Cycle Russia signed agreements and/or memorandums of cooperation with a number of non-nuclear-weapon states that are developing countries, including in Latin America, Africa and Asia

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia stated that its portfolio of NPP projects in foreign countries totalled 33 power units of high-capacity nuclear power plants in ten countries as of May 2025.

    In the current review cycle Russia was constructing NPPs in the following non-nuclear-weapon states: Bangladesh, Hungary, Egypt, Iran, and Türkiye.

    In 2024 Russia signed the world’s first export contract for the construction of a small modular reactor in Uzbekistan.

    In 2024 Russia established a BRICS Nuclear Energy Platform designed to develop partnerships with key companies of members of BRICS in the nuclear industry. Russia is working on developing a BRICS nuclear medicine cooperation platform.

    In 2025 Russia won a tender to provide conversion and enrichment services for domestically produced uranium in Brazil

    In 2025, Rosatom was selected to lead an international consortium for the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant

    In 2025 Rosatom signed a memorandum of understanding On Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with ASEAN Centre For Energy

    In 2025 Russia reported that it has established Obninsk global centre for international nuclear training. Rosatom's Technical Academy has trained over 2,500 professionals from 95 countries. In addition, over 5,000 members of operational staff for the nuclear power plants that Russia is building abroad have been trained.

    In the current Review Cycle Russia signed new or additional agreements and/or memorandums of cooperation with a number of non-nuclear-weapon states, including:

    9 countries in Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Mexico)

    9 countries in Africa (Egypt, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mali, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Guinea)

    2 countries in South Asia (Vietnam, Myanmar)

    As well as Syria, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia

    Sources

    Mycle Schneider et. al. “World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2025”, 26 November 2025

    https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-2025-HTML-version

    ‘History of cooperation’, Rosatom, accessed 5 January 2026.

    https://www.rosatomafrica.com/en/rosatom-in-country/history-of-cooperation/

    Rosatom. Key Operating Results of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom 2023 (Moscow), 2024

    https://www.report.rosatom.ru/go_eng/go_rosatom_eng_2023/rosatom_key_2023_eng.pdf

    Rosatom. Key Operating Results of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom 2024 (Moscow), 2025

    https://www.report.rosatom.ru/go_eng/go_rosatom_eng_2024/rosatom_key_2024_eng.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 29 July 2024

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 August 2023

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia consistently asserted that international non-proliferation efforts should not lead to unreasonable restrictions on legitimate trade in dual-use goods and technologies and on civil scientific and technological cooperation

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to advocate broader access for States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and reaffirmed that each State Party has the right to pursue its national nuclear energy policy independently without interference, and to cooperate in this field without discrimination.

    Russia additionally noted that imposing unilateral coercive measures, creating artificial barriers to bilateral and international cooperation and undermining the principle of equal access to nuclear materials, equipment and technical information to be used for peaceful purposes are violations of article IV of the Treaty.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia called on IAEA to regularly update the Technical Cooperation Program to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the assistance provided through the Agency.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to stress the importance of the Technical Cooperation Programme remaining effective and efficient and is based on the real needs of countries.

    Russia called on the IAEA Secretariat to make additional efforts to improve the efficiency of using available resources.

    Sources

    Statement on behalf of the States Parties to the Treaty Establishing the Union State of Russia and Belarus. Technical Cooperation Report for 2018. 11 June 2019

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/11-06-2019_doklad-o-teh_41bbc4ddf7a57f122b676ba596ab957b/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. «Strengthening Agency’s Technical Cooperation Activities: Technical Cooperation Report for 2024». IAEA Board of Governors, (Vienna), 9 June 2025.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_the_delegation_of_the_russian_federation_on_the_agenda_item_3_of_the_session_of_the_iae/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia provides political, financial and expert support to the Agency's activities to IAEA’s Technical Cooperation (TC) programme.

    Russia reported that it has supported the implementation of the 2017 IAEA initiative to develop the nuclear energy infrastructure of newcomer countries

    74 training events for over 1200 foreign experts were organized in 2017-2023 within the framework of this initiative.

    Russia reported that in 2019, Russia made a supplementary contribution to the Agency’s ReNuAL+ project to modernize its research laboratories in Seibersdorf.

    In 2016, Russia joined the Agency’s Programme of Action for Cancer Treatment (PACT). Under this programme a number of training events organized by PACT have been held in Russia and funded from Russian contributions.

    Russia is the initiator and leading sponsor of IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to provide political, financial and expert support to the Agency's activities to IAEA’s Technical Cooperation (TC) programme.

    Russia reported that it remains one of the main donors to the Technical Cooperation Programme in terms of financial support and the provision of expertise for capacity building in other Member States.

    Russia noted that in terms of trained specialists from foreign countries, Russia is among the top three leaders.

    Russia reported that it has provided assistance to the IAEA in terms of the formation of nuclear infrastructure in countries developing nuclear energy, as well as through the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy and the IAEA Director General's Rays of Hope initiative.

    Russia reported that it has joined has work within the framework of the interregional project on small modular reactors.

    Russia reported that in these areas annual extra-budgetary contributions to the IAEA from Russia exceed 720 thousand euros in financial receipts and 380 thousand euros in kind.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 August 2023

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 29 July 2024

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    Statement by the Russian Federation. «Strengthening Agency's Technical Cooperation Activities: Technical Cooperation Report for 2024». IAEA Board of Governors, (Vienna), 9 June 2025.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_the_delegation_of_the_russian_federation_on_the_agenda_item_3_of_the_session_of_the_iae

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia consistently provided financial support to IAEA’s Technical Cooperation programme.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to provide financial support to IAEA’s Technical Cooperation programme.

    Russia called on all Member States to fulfil their voluntary commitments to fill the Technical Cooperation Fund in a timely manner and in full.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    Statement by the Russian Federation. «Strengthening Agency’s Technical Cooperation Activities: Technical Cooperation Report for 2024». IAEA Board of Governors, (Vienna), 9 June 2025.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_the_delegation_of_the_russian_federation_on_the_agenda_item_3_of_the_session_of_the_iae/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia made financial contributions to the IAEA, including through the Technical Cooperation Fund, Nuclear Security Fund and through its national safeguards support programme.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to make financial contributions to the IAEA, including through the Technical Cooperation Fund, Nuclear Security Fund and through its national safeguards support programme.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia reported that since 2010 it annually contributes 1 million US dollars to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. These funds support projects related to training on nuclear security and provision of assistance to interested states in that regard.

    Russia implemented capacity-building and training programmes for Russian and international nuclear specialists, including on nuclear safety and security, and provided assistance to newcomer countries in establishing the infrastructure necessary for the safe and successful implementation of national nuclear energy programmes, including regulatory frameworks, spent fuel and radioactive waste management systems, and personnel training, especially in countries constructing nuclear power plants based on Russian reactor technology.

    In 2017 Russia and the IAEA signed an agreement aimed at strengthening IAEA efforts to promote capacity building in newcomer and expanding countries in areas including nuclear safety, stakeholder involvement and the development of a national position on nuclear power.

    Russia reported that 74 training events for over 1200 foreign experts were organized in 2017-2023 within the framework of this initiative.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to issue annual financial contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and contributed to the establishment of the IAEA Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre which became operational in 2023

    Russia continued to implement capacity building and training programmes for Russian and international nuclear specialists.

    In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reported that over 2,800 foreign specialists from 95 countries have been trained at Rosatom Technical Academy and more than 5,000 operational personnel have been trained for nuclear power plants that Russia is building abroad

    Every year around 30 training events are held in Russia under IAEA auspices. More than 300 foreign specialists have taken part in them.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘IAEA, Rosatom Sign Agreement to Strengthen IAEA Nuclear Infrastructure Capacity Building’. 19 April 2017.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/19-04-2017_o-peregovora_78ce8d4cb235da22b1f250d9984c4aa7/

    Statement by Russia. “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts” (Vienna), 11 February 2020.

    https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/02/cn-278-russian-federation.pdf

    Statement by Russia. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2024 Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference (Geneva), 29 July 2024

    https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1964213/?lang=en

    Statement by Russia. “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future” (Vienna), 21 May 2024.

    https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/05/cn-321_russianfederation_eng.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee and Russian legislation requires its civilian nuclear cooperation partners to be Party to the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards. Russia consistently encouraged all states to join relevant international conventions on nuclear safety and security.

    Russia implemented capacity-building and training programmes for Russian and international nuclear specialists, including on nuclear safety and security, and provided assistance to newcomer countries in establishing the infrastructure necessary for the safe and successful implementation of national nuclear energy programmes, including regulatory frameworks, spent fuel and radioactive waste management systems, and personnel training, especially in countries constructing nuclear power plants based on Russian reactor technology.

    In 2017 Russia and the IAEA signed an agreement aimed at strengthening IAEA efforts to promote capacity building in newcomer and expanding countries in areas including nuclear safety, stakeholder involvement and the development of a national position on nuclear power.

    Russia reported that 74 training events for over 1200 foreign experts were organized in 2017-2023 within the framework of this initiative.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia reaffirmed that its national export control system is based on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and the export rules and control lists produced by them.

    Russia continued to provide nuclear newcoming countries with assistance in establishing infrastructure for safe and secure implementation of their national nuclear energy programmes

    In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reported that over 2,800 foreign specialists from 95 countries have been trained at Rosatom Technical Academy and more than 5,000 operational personnel have been trained for nuclear power plants that Russia is building abroad.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘IAEA, Rosatom Sign Agreement to Strengthen IAEA Nuclear Infrastructure Capacity Building’. 19 April 2017.

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/19-04-2017_o-peregovora_78ce8d4cb235da22b1f250d9984c4aa7/

    Statement by Russia. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2024 Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference (Geneva), 29 July 2024

    https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1964213/?lang=en

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently expressed support and engaged in cooperation with the IAEA to develop the concept of assured supplies and multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle services.

    In 2007 Russia has established the International Uranium Enrichment Center and a guaranteed low-enriched uranium reserve in Angarsk that is intended to provide uranium enrichment services for civilian nuclear power programmes and allow participating countries access to nuclear fuel.

    In 2019, Russia has facilitated supply of the first and second batches of low-enriched uranium to the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan

    Russia has supported international research on closed nuclear fuel cycle technologies

    Russia participated in the activities of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and Generation IV International Forum (GIF)

    In 2017, Russia hosted the IAEA International Conference on Fast Reactors and Related Fuel Cycles

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia continued to express support and engaged in cooperation with the IAEA to develop the concept of assured supplies and multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle services.

    Russia continued to operate the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk

    Russia continued to support international research on closed nuclear fuel cycle technologies

    Russia continued to participate in the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO).

    As of 2026, the total amount of annual voluntary extrabudgetary contributions from Russia exceeded 5 million euros.

    Russia supported and facilitated the establishment of BRICS Nuclear Energy Platform in 2024. The platform provides support for the introduction of advanced reactor designs and nuclear fuel cycles for BRICS member States and partners.

    In 2025 Russia announced plans to build the world’s first nuclear power system with a closed fuel cycle in the Tomsk Region by 2030.

    Sources

    Vladimir Putin. Address to the Global Atomic Forum, 25 September 2025.

    https://russiaeu.mid.ru/en/press-centre/news/vladimir_putin_addresses_the_global_atomic_forum/

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia became party to all conventions listed in Action 59 and ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material prior to the current Review Cycle.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia has not communicated on further implementation of this action in the current review cycle

    Sources

    International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Russian Federation – Country Nuclear Power Profiles’.

    https://cnpp.iaea.org/public/countries/RU/profile/preview

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia consistently expressed support for and facilitated exchange of information and best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security.

    In 2006, Russia and the United States launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism which supports exchanges of best practices in combating nuclear terrorism and strengthening nuclear security.

    Since 2010 Russia annually contributed 1 million US dollars to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. These funds support projects related training on nuclear security and assistance to interested countries. Russia also hosted IAEA peer review and advisory services missions focusing on nuclear safety and security at Russian nuclear facilities.

    Russia also implemented capacity building and training programmes for Russian and international specialists in the civil nuclear sector, including on nuclear safety and security.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia reaffirmed the central role of the Agency in the context of ensuring international cooperation on nuclear security. Russia contributed to the establishment of the IAEA Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre which became operational in 2023.

    Russia continued to issue financial contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and invite the IAEA to conduct peer review and advisory services focusing on nuclear safety and security to Russian nuclear facilities.

    In 2022-2026, there were four IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions to Russian facilities.

    Russia continued to implement capacity building and training programmes for Russian and international nuclear specialists.

    Russia reported that, as of 2026, over 2,800 foreign specialists from 95 countries have been trained at the Technical Academy of State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom” and more than 5,000 operational personnel have been trained for nuclear power plants that Russia is building abroad.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    Statement by Russia. “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts” (Vienna), 11 February 2020.

    https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/02/cn-278-russian-federation.pdf

    Statement by Russia. “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future” (Vienna), 21 May 2024.

    https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/05/cn-321_russianfederation_eng.pdf

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Peer Review and Advisory Services Calendar.

    https://www.iaea.org/services/review-missions/calendar?year=&type=All&location=503&status=2889

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia participated in international efforts aimed at minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium in nuclear fuel for research reactors where it is technically feasible and economically justified.

    Under the Agreement between Russia and the United States Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (the HEU-LEU Agreement), 500 tonnes of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium were downblended and reprocessed into low enriched uranium.

    Russia conducted feasibility studies on the conversion of six Russian research reactors from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel under a 2010 agreement with the United States. In 2014, Russia completed the conversion of one research reactor.

    From 2004 to 2016, Russia repatriated Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel from 14 countries under the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    Russia has not communicated on further implementation of this action in the current review cycle

    Sources

    Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, 1993.

    https://fissilematerials.org/library/heu93b.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has consistently expressed support for the IAEA efforts in reinforcing international cooperation in the areas of safe transportation of nuclear and radioactive material.

    In 2016 Russia has adopted new legislation on ‘Safety rules for the transport of radioactive materials’ (NP-053-16) designed to follow IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.

    The legislation has been updated in 2020 to bring it in compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material" (SSR-6).

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    In 2025 Russia has further amended its national legislation on ‘Safety rules for the transport of radioactive materials’ (NP-053-16) to reflect the revised IAEA Safety Standards "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material" (SSR-6 Rev.1).

    At the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reaffirmed that the transport of nuclear material and radioactive substances in Russia are subject to the necessary security measures in its national report.

    Sources

    Statement by Russia. 51st Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference (Vienna), 17 September 2007

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/27-09-2007_statement-to_5dc227a8aff8263f1d37ec4cfb19099e/

    Safety Rules in Transportation of Radioactive Materials. NP-053-16.

    https://docs.secnrs.ru/catalog/FNP/NP_053_16/

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia has put in force a civil nuclear liability regime through a combination of international commitments and national legislation. Russia ratified the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage in 2005. Russian national legislation incorporates key principles of the convention.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    At the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reaffirmed that it considers the Vienna Convention to be an integral part of the emerging global civil nuclear liability regime.

    Sources

    Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Concerning Russia's Ratification of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage’. 31 March 2005

    https://mid.ru/fr/foreign_policy/news/1705617/?lang=en

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

    Russia supported the IAEA General Conference decision of 18 September 2009 on the prohibition of armed attacks or threats against nuclear installations by joining the consensus through which the decision was adopted

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

    In March 2022, Russian military seized control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. Russia has subsequently stated that it was taking all necessary measures to ensure the nuclear safety and security of Zaporizhzhia NPP and accused Ukraine of conducting military attacks on the power plant.

    Russia stated that it is categorically opposed to strikes on any nuclear facilities, especially those under IAEA safeguards and has submitted a working paper to the 2026 NPT Review Conference that criticised military actions by the United States and Israel against Iranian nuclear facilities

    Sources

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Summary Records. First Plenary Meeting. 67th Session of the IAEA General Conference (Vienna), 25 September 2023. pp.15-16.

    https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc67or1_prl_0.pdf

    Statement by Russia. ‘Prohibition of All Forms of Attacks and Threats of Attack against Nuclear Sites and Facilities under IAEA Safeguards’. 69th Session of the IAEA General Conference (Vienna), 19 September 2025

    https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_mikhail_ulyanov_at_iaea_general_conference_prohibition_of_all_forms_of_attacks_and_threats_of_attack_against_nuclear_sites_and_facilities_under_iaea_safeguards/

    Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Foreign Ministry Statement regarding the Resolution of the 69th session of the IAEA General Conference – Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine’. 19 September 2025.

    https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/2047877/

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

    Working paper submitted by Russia. ‘Erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a result of the worsening situation related to the Iranian nuclear programme’. 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 13 April 2026

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/WP.44