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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Russia is one of three depositories of the NPT– it has consistently expressed support for the NPT and advocated for strengthening and universalizing the Treaty.

    Russia has expressed commitment towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and identified the promotion of international efforts aimed at achieving this goal ‘as soon as possible’ as one of priorities of Russian foreign policy.

    Furthermore, Russia has pursued a range of actions in support of the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons prior to the current Review Cycle:

    Arms control

    • Since 2010 Russia has reduced numbers of deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear forces under the New START Treaty with the United States. Russia met the treaty’s central limits by February 2018. In 2021 Russia and the USA concluded an agreement to extend New START until 5 February 2026.
    • Russia has unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear forces to less than 25 percent of their 1991 level according to its official statements
    • Following US withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russia made a unilateral commitment in 2019 not to deploy medium-range or shorter-range ground-launched missiles in certain regions unless similar missiles manufactured by the USA were deployed there. Russia reiterated the commitment to the moratorium in October 2020.
    • In 2019-2020 Russia engaged in a series of talks with the USA on strategic stability and nuclear arms control.
    • In 2021 Russia and the USA issued a joint statement on strategic stability and held a series of meetings under Russia-US strategic stability dialogue
    • In 2020 Russia, for the first time, made the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence publicly available.
    • Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019
    • Russia joined a P5 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought in 2022.

    Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties

    • Russia has signed and ratified relevant protocols to the following NWFZ Treaties:
    • Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia in 2014
    • African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 2011
    • Russia previously signed and ratified relevant protocols to Treaty of Rarotonga in 1988 and Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1979.
    • Russia has expressed support for the establishment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East as one of the designated co-convenors of the conference on the Zone. Since 2019 Russia participated as an observer in the UN Conferences on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    Regional issues

    • Russia participated in negotiation and implementation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme.
    • Russia has taken a part in finding a political and diplomatic settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. Russia has developed and promoted a roadmap towards the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula together with China in 2017.

    Other instruments

    • Russia has maintained a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1991. It signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified the treaty in 2000. Russia has expressed support for the treaty’s entry into force. Russia is the second-largest host country of International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities after the USA.
    • Russia ceased production of fissile materials for military purposes in 1994. Russia has expressed support for and engaged in the work on a possible Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), including in the Group of Governmental Experts established under the Resolution 67/53 of the UN General Assembly in 2014-2015 and in the FMCT High Level Expert Preparatory Group established under the Resolution 71/259 of the UN General Assembly in 2017-2018.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Over the current Review Cycle Russia has:

    • Reiterated support for the NPT as a cornerstone of the international security architecture
      Reiterated commitment to nuclear-weapon-free world as the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.
    • Highlighted that the nuclear disarmament process is integrally linked to the general and complete disarmament as envisaged by the NPT provisions.
    • Noted that nuclear disarmament process cannot exist outside the context of international security situation and the state of the relations between nuclear-weapon States
    • Reiterated commitment to the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
    • Participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issue in 2022-2023.
    • Served as chair of the P5 Process in 2023-2024.
    • Withdrawn its ratification of the CTBT in 2023 but continued to be a signatory to the CTBT and participates in the work of CTBTO.
    • In 2024 Russia completed its segment of the International Monitoring System (IMS).
    • Suspended its participation in New START Treaty in 2023 but noted that it will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions under New START.
    • In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to New START limits for one year after the treaty expires in February 2026.
    • In 2024 released an updated version of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.
    • In 2025 Russia has released a joint statement with China on Global Strategic Stability

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015. https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula’s problems, 4 July 2017. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1549360/

    Statement by Vladimir Putin on Additional Steps to De-Escalate the Situation in Europe in the Wake of the Termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), President of Russia, October 26, 2020. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64270.

    Statement by the Russian Federation. First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly at the Thematic Debate on «Nuclear Weapons» (New York), 5 November 2020. https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/05-11-2020_statement-by_7ea09b157a28d8894e30459b759a93a6/

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, 3 January 2022. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67551

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 August 2022. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/8CmKgQeW0qnV_en.pdf

    “Foreign Ministry Statement in Connection with the Russian Federation Suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START),” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, February 21, 2023, https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/1855184/?lang=en.

    “Law Revoking the Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” President of Russia, November 2, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/72635.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s answer to a question from Kommersant newspaper about Russia’s assessments of its chairmanship in the group of five Nuclear Weapon States”, 26 July 2024. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963794/

    “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” November 19, 2024, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I Specific Issue: Nuclear disarmament and security assurances. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/2013557/?lang=en

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I: Nuclear disarmament. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/2013105/

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability, 8 May 2025. http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6310

    “Meeting with Permanent Members of the Security Council,” President of Russia, September 26, 2025. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78051.

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf.

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. Working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51. New York: United Nations, 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956428.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Russia has issued statements recognising its special responsibility to meet disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

    Russia has undertaken efforts to reduce its nuclear arsenal in various contexts: According to official statements, the overall capacity of Russian strategic arms has been reduced by 85 percent since 1991. Russia has also reduced the quantity of its non-strategic nuclear weapons to less than 25 percent of that of the USSR possessed in 1991 according to official statements.

    The following treaties have led to reductions in Russia’s nuclear forces prior to the current Review Cycle:

    • Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987)
    • START I Treaty (1991)
    • Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (2002)
    • New START Treaty (2010)

    Under exchange of data provisions of the New START Treaty, Russia shared information regarding its nuclear forces.

    As of 1 September 2022, Russia possessed:

    • Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers – 540
    • Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers – 1549
    • Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers – 759

    Russia extended the New START Treaty with the USA for five years in February 2021 until February 2026.

    In 2021-2022 Russia engaged in a dialogue on strategic stability with the USA where the sides discussed, among other issues, potential follow-on arms control measures.

    Russia has been modernising its nuclear forces since early 2000s, replacing Soviet-era delivery systems with new designs.

    In 2018 Russia announced the development of new nuclear delivery systems, including a new ICBM, hypersonic delivery systems, nuclear-powered underwater torpedo and cruise missile.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Russia reaffirmed its commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

    Russia stated that nuclear disarmament cannot be considered in isolation without taking into account the existing political and military and strategic realities.

    Russia stressed that nuclear disarmament should be placed within the context of general and complete disarmament.

    In 2023 Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty alleging that the USA is in material breach of the treaty. Russia stated that it continues to comply with the quantitative restrictions under the New START.

    In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to New START Treaty limits for one year after the agreement expires in February 2026

    In 2023 Russia has announced that it has deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus. Russia stated that nuclear weapons in Belarus are fully under the control of the Russian Federation.

    Russia continued its nuclear modernisation programme. According to official statements, 92 percent of nuclear forces have been modernised as of the end of 2025.

    Russia has conducted tests of several of its new nuclear delivery systems.

    Russia has developed and tested a new nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). In December 2025 this missile was deployed in Belarus.

    In 2024 Russia released an updated version of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence

    Sources

    Statement by the Russian Federation. General Debate. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2022. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/8CmKgQeW0qnV_en.pdf

    President of Russia. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, 1 March 2018. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Right of reply. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2022. https://estatements.un.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/E84S0uoXLeD1_en.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, 13 October 2022. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/1833766/?lang=en

    Joint Statement of the Russian and Belarusian delegations. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 22 July 2024. https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/22-07-2024_joint-statem_d1ad4a5b730b3aaf2e4fd6ecc98391cb/

    President of Russia. “Expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board”, 17 December 2025. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78801

    “Oreshnik Missile System Is Put on Combat Duty in Republic of Belarus,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, December 30, 2025. https://t.me/mod_russia_en/25041.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Foreign Ministry statement in connection with the Russian Federation suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), 21 February 2023. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1855184/

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, 3 December 2024. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    For (a) and (b) Russia has engaged in reductions of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. (see Action 3)

    For (c) Russia in official statements declared that it is consistently reducing the place and role of nuclear weapons in its defence policy.

    Russia stated that the Military Doctrine of Russia gives priority to implementation of a set of diplomatic, military and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggression through non-nuclear means in the framework of the system of non-nuclear, including strategic, deterrence.

    Russian military doctrine and the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence declare that the state policy on nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature. These documents stipulate that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if an attack on Russia, including a conventional aggression, threatens the very existence of the state.

    For (d) Russia has engaged in dialogue on policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons in various formats.

    Since 2010 Russia has participated in discussions on issues pertaining to transparency, confidence, nuclear risk reduction and nuclear doctrines under the auspices of the P5 Process.

    As part of the P5 process Russia has contributed to the development of the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms which was first released in 2015.

    In 2019-2020 Russia engaged in a series of talks with the USA on strategic stability and nuclear arms control.

    In 2021 Russia and the USA issued a joint statement on strategic stability and held a series of meetings under Russia-US strategic stability dialogue

    In 2020 Russia, for the first time, made the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence publicly available.

    Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019

    For (e) (f) and (g) Russia has undertaken a number of measures that reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

    Russia stated that it acts in such a manner as to avert situations that could lead to dangerous aggravation of relations at the international and regional levels and to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war, and is also taking the necessary steps to reduce the nuclear threat.

    Russia exchanged notifications of ballistic missile launches under corresponding agreements with the USA (1988 U.S.-Soviet Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement) and China (2009 Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles). Russia extended the agreement with China in 2020.

    Russia joined a P5 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought in 2022.

    In 2001, China and Russia agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other or target strategic nuclear missiles against each other. Russia has signed a mutual de-targeting agreement with the USA in 1994.

    Russia stated that it maintains the policy of non-deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons, keeping them at centralised storage facilities and not on delivery systems.

    In 2020 Russia, for the first time, made the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence publicly available.

    The doctrine outlines a list of conditions under which Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons

    Russia states that the doctrine ensures the level of transparency and clearness with regard to the parameters of nuclear deterrence

    Under exchange of data provisions of the New START Treaty, Russia shared information regarding its nuclear forces with the USA annually.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    For (a) and (b) (see Action 3)

    For (c) Russia released an updated version of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence in 2024.

    The revised document includes language asserting that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear attack or a conventional aggression that threatens the very existence of the state, but also to respond to a conventional aggression that creates a critical threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and Belarus.

    Russia has reiterated the commitment to the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought in official statements.

    For (d) Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts to further consider the nuclear disarmament verification issue in 2022-2023.

    Russia served as chair of the P5 Process in 2023-2024.

    For (e) (f) and (g) Russia continued to issue notifications on launches of ballistic missiles in accordance with relevant treaties.

    In 2024 Russia released an updated version of its nuclear doctrine (Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence)

    In 2025 Russia has released a joint statement with China on Global Strategic Stability in which the two sides emphasized special responsibility of nuclear-weapon states for international security and global strategic stability and called for building confidence to avoid dangerous miscalculations and refrain from actions that generate strategic risks.

    Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty in 2023 but noted that it will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions under New START.

    In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula’s problems, 4 July 2017. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1549360/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly at the Thematic Debate on «Nuclear Weapons» (New York), 5 November 2020. https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/05-11-2020_statement-by_7ea09b157a28d8894e30459b759a93a6/

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

    https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, 3 January 2022.

    http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67551

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 August 2022. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/8CmKgQeW0qnV_en.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s answer to a question from Kommersant newspaper about Russia’s assessments of its chairmanship in the group of five Nuclear Weapon States”, 26 July 2024.

    https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963794/

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, 3 December 2024.

    https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I Specific Issue: Nuclear disarmament and security assurances. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/2013557/?lang=en

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I: Nuclear disarmament. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability, 8 May 2025.

    http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6310

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf.

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. Working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51. New York: United Nations, 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956428.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Moscow Declaration by President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin, Moscow, Russia, January 14, 1994

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Russia has consistently reaffirmed its support for the CTBT. Russia was one of the key negotiators of CTBT, signed the Treaty the day it opened for signature in September 1996, and ratified it in June 2000.

    Russia has maintained a national moratorium on nuclear testing since its last explosive nuclear test in 1990.

    In bilateral contacts with States that have not yet joined the CTBT, including Annex 2 States, Russia stressed the importance of the universalization of the CTBT and called upon those States to sign/ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. Russia promoted the important entry into force of the CTBT and the need for the further universalization of the Treaty in the United Nations and within other international fora as well as in contacts at the regional level.

    Russia has worked on constructing, certifying and maintaining CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities as the second-largest host country (32 stations).

    Russia supported the development of the CTBT’s on-site inspection protocols and detection capabilities.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    In November 2023 Russia revoked its ratification of the CTBT. Russia continued to be a signatory to the CTBT and to participate in the work of the CTBTO.

    Russia has reaffirmed its full commitment to the goals and objectives of the CTBT, as well as to efforts to ensure its entry into force in official statements.

    Russia continued to stress the importance of a prompt entry into force of the CTBT and urged relevant countries to sign and/or ratify the Treaty.

    Cost-Free Experts and Junior Professional Officers from Russia have contributed to CTBTO’s work

    In December 2023 Russia has completed the construction and certification of the national segment of the CTBT IMS.

    Russia did not participate in the 14th Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) citing disagreements over certain elements of the text of the final declaration.

    Sources

    Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. “Activities undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States under Measure (L) of the Final Declaration of the 2019 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in the period June 2019 – May 2021”, 22 September 2021. https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/Documents/CTBT-Art.XIV-2021-4.pdf

    United Nations. Russian Federation: Withdrawal of the instrument of ratification, 2 November 2023. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2023/CN.463.2023-Eng.pdf

    Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. “Activities undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States under Measure (L) of the Final Declaration of the 2019 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in the period June 2023 – May 2025”, 26 September 2025. https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/CTBT-Art.XIV-2025-4.pdf

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Foreign Ministry statement on the reasons for Russia’s refusal to participate in the 14th Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 27 September 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2049467/

    Mikhail Ulyanov. Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna at the 65th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 10 November 2025. https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_to_the_international_organizations_i_101125/

    Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO). “Voluntary contributions: 2025 highlights”, 2025. https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/2025%20VC%20Highlights.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Russia ceased production of high enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons in 1989 and plutonium for military purposes in 1994. Russia shut down all its 13 reactors that previously produced weapons-grade plutonium by 2010.

    Russia consistently expressed support for launching negotiations on FMCT based on the principles set forth in the 1999 document CD/1299 (the ‘Shannon mandate’).

    Russia engaged in the work on a possible FMCT, including in the Group of Governmental Experts established under the Resolution 67/53 of the UN General Assembly in 2014-2015 and in the FMCT High Level Expert Preparatory Group established under the Resolution 71/259 of the UN General Assembly in 2017-2018.

    Russia converted 500 tons of weapons-grade uranium under the implementation of the Agreement Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (the HEU-LEU Agreement) with the USA

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Russia continued to express support for launching negotiations on FMCT based on the principles set out in the Shannon mandate.

    Russia stated that it considers the idea of FMCT has become to a considerable extent obsolete. However, Russia is ready to participate in negotiations on its development should such a decision be adopted.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster II: Non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 May 2025. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_Conference_(2025)/Russia%E2%80%99s_Cluster_II_EN.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Agreement on application of safeguards between Russia and IAEA entered into force on 10 June 1985.

    In its National Report to the Tenth NPT Review Conference Russia stated that the list of facilities to which IAEA safeguards could be applied included more than 40 nuclear installations at more than 20 facilities

    Russia submitted annual reports to the IAEA detailing its stock of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel

    In October 2016, Russia suspended participation in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement with the United States, in which the parties agreed to eliminate 34 tonnes of excess weapon-origin plutonium

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Russia continued to submit annual reports to the IAEA regarding the stock of its civilian plutonium

    In 2025 Russia reported owning 66.1 thousand kg of civilian plutonium as of 31 December 2024

    In October 2025, Russia denounced the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement with the United States, in which the parties agreed to eliminate 34 tonnes of excess weapon-origin plutonium.

    Sources

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. INFCIRC/327/. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc327.pdf

    “Draft Law Suspending the Russia-US Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement Submitted to the State Duma,” President of Russia, October 3, 2016. http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/53009.

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Communication Received from the Russian Federation Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549/Add.9/27, 23 July 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a9-27.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    “The Law On Denunciation of the Intergovernmental Agreement with the United States On Plutonium Management and Disposition,” President of Russia, October 27, 2025. http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/78303

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Russia submitted national reports to the NPT Review Conference in 2015 and in 2020. The reports include general categories of issues concerning all three pillars of the Treaty under which the relevant information is reported: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Russia has not yet submitted a national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

    https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Russia played a role in negotiating a standard reporting form through the P5 dialogue process.

    Russia submitted national reports to the NPT Review Conference based on the common reporting framework in 2015 and in 2020

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Russia stated that the reporting framework remains relevant and needs no updating.

    Russia has not yet submitted a national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference.

    Russia participated in discussions on a new reporting framework under a working group on further strengthening the review process at the first session of the Preparatory Committee in July 2023. Russia criticised the discussions as an attempt to impose transparency and accountability measures on nuclear-weapon States and to convert the NPT review process into a means of oversight and coercion.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015. https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III Specific Issue on Strengthening the Review Process of the NPT. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Geneva), 30 July 2024

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Issues of transparency, reporting and accountability. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 7 May 2025

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Russia signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 2000. It came into force on 16 October 2007.

    Russia stated that it recognizes the importance of additional protocols to safeguards agreements and encouraged countries that have not yet signed an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible. Russia emphasized that this measure is strictly voluntary, and any coercion as to the signing of an additional protocol is completely inappropriate.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Russia continued to express support for universalization of the Additional Protocol, stressing the voluntary nature and inadmissibility of imposing it as a mandatory measure.

    Sources

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Protocol between the Russian Federation and the IAEA Additional to the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. INFCIRC/327/Add.1. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 22 January 2009.

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. General debate. 2023 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 August 2023. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1899782/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Russia is the biggest nuclear power technology provider in the world. Russia exports nuclear fuel, nuclear power reactors, and other nuclear materials and technologies to non-nuclear-weapon states, including developing countries

    Russia offers to non-nuclear-weapon states technical assistance, expertise and education on peaceful nuclear energy uses and non-energy applications of nuclear technologies, including in the construction of national centres of nuclear science and technology (CNST), as well as assistance and expertise in areas of public acceptance and personnel training in civilian nuclear industry.

    As of the end of the previous Review Cycle Russia was constructing/contracted to construct nuclear power in 12 countries, including Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Hungary, Iran and Türkiye.

    In 2007 Russia established the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk on the basis of agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan.

    In 2019, Russia supplied the first and second batches of low-enriched uranium to the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan.

    Prior to the current Review Cycle Russia signed agreements and/or memorandums of cooperation with a number of non-nuclear-weapon states that are developing countries, including in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Russia stated that its portfolio of NPP projects in foreign countries totalled 33 power units of high-capacity nuclear power plants in ten countries as of May 2025.

    In the current review cycle Russia was constructing NPPs in the following non-nuclear-weapon states: Bangladesh, Hungary, Egypt, Iran, and Türkiye.

    In 2024 Russia signed the world’s first export contract for the construction of a small modular reactor in Uzbekistan.

    In 2024 Russia established a BRICS Nuclear Energy Platform designed to develop partnerships with key companies of members of BRICS in the nuclear industry. Russia is working on developing a BRICS nuclear medicine cooperation platform.

    In 2025 Russia won a tender to provide conversion and enrichment services for domestically produced uranium in Brazil

    In 2025, Rosatom was selected to lead an international consortium for the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant

    In 2025 Rosatom signed a memorandum of understanding On Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with ASEAN Centre For Energy

    In 2025 Russia reported that it has established Obninsk global centre for international nuclear training. Rosatom’s Technical Academy has trained over 2,500 professionals from 95 countries. In addition, over 5,000 members of operational staff for the nuclear power plants that Russia is building abroad have been trained.

    In the current Review Cycle Russia signed new or additional agreements and/or memorandums of cooperation with a number of non-nuclear-weapon states, including:

    • 9 countries in Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Mexico)
    • 9 countries in Africa (Egypt, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mali, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Guinea)
    • 2 countries in South Asia (Vietnam, Myanmar)

    As well as Syria, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia

    Sources

    Mycle Schneider et. al. “World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2025”, 26 November 2025. https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-2025-HTML-version

    ‘History of cooperation’, Rosatom, accessed 5 January 2026. https://www.rosatomafrica.com/en/rosatom-in-country/history-of-cooperation/

    Rosatom. Key Operating Results of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom 2023 (Moscow), 2024. https://www.report.rosatom.ru/go_eng/go_rosatom_eng_2023/rosatom_key_2023_eng.pdf

    Rosatom. Key Operating Results of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom 2024 (Moscow), 2025. https://www.report.rosatom.ru/go_eng/go_rosatom_eng_2024/rosatom_key_2024_eng.pdf

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 29 July 2024

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 August 2023

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Russia provides political, financial and expert support to the Agency’s activities to IAEA’s Technical Cooperation (TC) programme.

    Russia reported that it has supported the implementation of the 2017 IAEA initiative to develop the nuclear energy infrastructure of newcomer countries

    74 training events for over 1200 foreign experts were organized in 2017-2023 within the framework of this initiative.

    Russia reported that in 2019, Russia made a supplementary contribution to the Agency’s ReNuAL+ project to modernize its research laboratories in Seibersdorf.

    In 2016, Russia joined the Agency’s Programme of Action for Cancer Treatment (PACT). Under this programme a number of training events organized by PACT have been held in Russia and funded from Russian contributions.

    Russia is the initiator and leading sponsor of IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Russia continued to provide political, financial and expert support to the Agency’s activities to IAEA’s Technical Cooperation (TC) programme.

    Russia reported that it remains one of the main donors to the Technical Cooperation Programme in terms of financial support and the provision of expertise for capacity building in other Member States.

    Russia noted that in terms of trained specialists from foreign countries, Russia is among the top three leaders.

    Russia reported that it has provided assistance to the IAEA in terms of the formation of nuclear infrastructure in countries developing nuclear energy, as well as through the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy and the IAEA Director General’s Rays of Hope initiative.

    Russia reported that it has joined has work within the framework of the interregional project on small modular reactors.

    Russia reported that in these areas annual extra-budgetary contributions to the IAEA from Russia exceed 720 thousand euros in financial receipts and 380 thousand euros in kind.

    Sources

    National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 August 2023

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 29 July 2024

    Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

    Statement by the Russian Federation. «Strengthening Agency’s Technical Cooperation Activities: Technical Cooperation Report for 2024». IAEA Board of Governors, (Vienna), 9 June 2025. https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_the_delegation_of_the_russian_federation_on_the_agenda_item_3_of_the_session_of_the_iae

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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