United States

The United States is one of five recognized nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), having signed in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. The U.S. commits to the treaty’s three pillars—non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and disarmament—while maintaining a modernized Nuclear Triad (land, air, and sea-based delivery systems) with an arsenal of approximately 5,000 warheads.

Disarmament
Non-Proliferation
Peaceful Uses

Disarmament

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

As one of the negotiating members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States’ has pledged to support the fundamental goals of the treaty since its inception. In line with these policies, the United States has led the world in reducing the size of its nuclear stockpile from its Cold War peak, achieving an approximately 85 percent reduction. However, successive administrations have interpreted, prioritized, and acted upon the NPT’s goals differently.

For example, in 2009, President Obama’s “Prague Speech” set the framework for US nuclear posture during the period between the 2010 and 2015 NPT Review Conferences, and particularly its commitment to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy while ensuring the credibility of its national and extended deterrence. In doing so, the Obama administration placed a particular premium on the disarmament pillar of the NPT that would not be echoed by its successor.

While the first Trump administration remained committed in principle to the NPT, it deemphasized disarmament in favor of the NPT’s first pillar––non-proliferation. Speeches and working papers delivered to the NPT’s Preparatory Committee during the first Trump administration stated that “non-proliferation is the cornerstone of the NPT,” and that “Neither meaningful international nuclear cooperation nor disarmament could succeed in the absence of strong non-proliferation guarantees.” Rather than pursuing disarmament objectives directly, the administration instead suggested that “all NPT Parties bear responsibility for working together to improve the geopolitical environment and create the conditions for nuclear disarmament.”

While the Biden administration preserved the Trump administration’s “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” initiative, it also rhetorically adopted a greater emphasis on disarmament, noting in its national action plan submitted to the 2020 Review Conference that the United States “seeks to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy;” “seeks the reduction of global nuclear stockpiles in a way that promotes international stability, peace, and security;” and that “U.S. policy is to maintain a credible deterrent […] with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with our current and future security requirements.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Since the 2020 Review Conference, both the Biden and second Trump administrations have reaffirmed their successive support for the NPT, although the general tone of U.S. statements has shifted from that of the previous decade.

The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) emphasized that “The United States will pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach that places renewed emphasis on arms control, non-proliferation, and risk reduction to strengthen stability, head off costly arms races, and signal our desire to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally.” In addition, President Biden offered rhetorical support for the NPT, announcing in 2022 that “the United States renews its commitment to the world to be a responsible steward of its nuclear arsenal, and to continue working toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

During the Biden administration, however, the emphasis on disarmament that was present during the Obama administration appeared to be diminished, with new warheads being introduced and a senior National Security Council official noting that “Absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required.”

While it remains early in the second Trump administration, its rhetoric appears to generally be in line with that of its predecessor. The Trump administration’s statements at the 2025 NPT Preparatory Committee emphasized the United States’ longstanding support for all three pillars of the NPT, noting that “The NPT remains in the national interest of the United States.” The statements also pushed back against criticism that the United States was not meeting its NPT commitments, and urged other countries, particularly Russia, China, Iran, Syria, and North Korea, to demonstrate their respective commitments to the Treaty. It also critiqued efforts to “seek shortcuts to nuclear disarmament,” instead promoting engagement on arms control.

Notably, the administration’s remarks relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy indicated a commitment “to unleashing a golden age of American energy and ushering in a nuclear energy resurgence,” and inviting all other nations to join the United States’ efforts.

Sources

Obama, Barack. Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague, as delivered. Washington, DC: The White House, April 5, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2015/38. Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, July 31-August 11, 2023. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.I_.04_-_04._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_U.S._National_Report_Update.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.

Biden, Joseph R., Jr. “President Biden Statement Ahead of the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” White House, August 1, 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/01/president-biden-statement-ahead-of-the-10th-review-conference-of-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/.

U.S. Department of State. “As Drafted Statement by the United States to the NPT Preparatory Committee: Cluster One Statement by Matthew Sharp.”May 1, 2025. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250501-NPT-PrepCom-2025-U.S.-National-Statement-on-Cluster-1_As-Delivered.pdf.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
The United States has long recognized that effective verification is a key principle of nuclear disarmament, and that it takes on heightened importance as nuclear stockpiles continue to reduce. To that end, between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences the United States led, contributed to, and participated in several initiatives designed to lay the groundwork for future breakthroughs in nuclear disarmament verification. These initiatives included:

The UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) to Consider the Role of Verification in Advancing Nuclear Disarmament, which met for three sessions in 2018-2019 and adopted a consensus report confirming the essential role of verification in nuclear disarmament.

The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), which has brought together more than 100 experts from 30 countries to collaboratively develop solutions to the technical challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification. Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the IPNDV’s work included the development of scientific papers, the development and execution of five field exercises designed to test capabilities like high explosive detection methods and Special Nuclear Material presence/absence verification.

The program of cooperation under the 1958 U.S.-U.K. Mutual Defense Agreement to evaluate verification-specific technologies and procedures, such as the managed-access procedures, storage protocols, and chain of custody at nuclear weapons facilities.

The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership with the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden to further investigate verification requirements for future arms control treaties, including the development of a multi-year plan of work based on lessons learned through exercises like the 2017 Quad Letterpress Exercise.

Unilateral U.S. research initiatives to develop datasets and capabilities to facilitate warhead dismantlement verification, including the establishment of a nuclear warhead and component signature set that can be leveraged to support future treaty verification activities, as well as the evaluation of the potential feasibility of radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags during inspection scenarios.

In addition, the United States released information about the size of its nuclear stockpile and its number of dismantled warheads on multiple occasions between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences; the latest disclosure during this period was in October 2021, covering the status of the stockpile through September 2020.

To enhance transparency, each year between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences the United States released its annual Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan to describe how the Department of Energy sustains the US nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. In addition, throughout this period, the United States hosted representatives from non-nuclear weapon States parties and Sandia National Laboratories, with the goal of providing additional transparency regarding the United States’ stockpile stewardship and management activities.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States released information about the size of its nuclear stockpile and its number of dismantled warheads through September 2023––the only Nuclear Weapon State to do so.

In 2024, the US-led International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification celebrated its ten-year anniversary. It is currently nearing the end of its third and final phase of work, and continues to build global capacity on nuclear disarmament monitoring and verification among its 30 partner countries. In particular, throughout the life cycle of IPNDV, the United States has led working groups focused on developing technological solutions for nuclear disarmament verification.

To enhance transparency via-à-vis the United States’ stockpile stewardship, the United States also released its annual Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan to describe how the Department of Energy sustains the US nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. In addition, journalists and civil society experts were invited to tour the Nevada National Security Site to view the United States’ stockpile stewardship capabilities, and representatives from NPT States parties were invited to Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory for transparency visits.

Sources

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

U.S. Department of State. “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” Fact Sheet. October 5, 2021. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Fact-Sheet_Unclass_2021_final-v2-002.pdf.

U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” U.S. Department of Energy. Accessed October 24, 2025. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/transparency-us-nuclear-weapons-stockpile.

International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. “Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Insights from a Decade of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.” June 2024. https://www.ipndv.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/IPNDV-Capstone_FINAL-1.pdf.

U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. “Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP).” U.S. Department of Energy. Accessed October 24, 2025. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/stockpile-stewardship-and-management-plan-ssmp.

Clark, Heather. “Sandia hosts first Nonproliferation Treaty Transparency Visit.” Sandia Lab News, April 17, 2015. https://www.sandia.gov/labnews/2015/04/17/15-17-04/.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “Two NNSA National Labs host Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty representatives from around the world for transparency visit.” July 21, 2022. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/two-nnsa-national-labs-host-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-representatives-around.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA demonstrates transparency during arms control and nonproliferation experts’ visit to Nevada.” December 1, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-demonstrates-transparency-during-arms-control-and-nonproliferation-experts-visit.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In the latter stages of the Cold War and immediately following its ending, the United States––both of its own volition and in concert with other countries––led the world in reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile. This led to an approximately 85 percent reduction from its Cold War peak. In particular, the United States also reduced its non-strategic nuclear arsenal by more than 90% since the end of the Cold War.

The United States’ 2010 Nuclear Posture Review included notable adjustments to US nuclear policy, including a strengthened negative security assurance to “not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations,” as well as commitments to fulfilling its deterrence objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and establishing conditions where a “sole purpose” policy could be safely adopted.

These policy shifts guided much of US nuclear policy throughout the first half of the period between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences. In February 2011 and January 2012, the Department of Defense released a new National Military Strategy and a corresponding new defense strategy, both of which reaffirmed plans to achieve US deterrence objectives with a smaller nuclear force that would reduce both the number of warheads in the US stockpile and their role in US national security strategy.

In 2013, the Obama administration announced the first revision of its nuclear weapons employment guidance since 2002, which directed the Department of Defense to align US nuclear missions with the guidance of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. This narrowed the scope of missions through which nuclear weapons could be employed, reduced the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, and directed the Department of Defense to examine and reduce the role of launch under attack in nuclear planning. The employment guidance also referenced a 2013 inter-agency review—which included the participation of the State Department, the Defense Department, the National Security Council, the intelligence community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Strategic Command, and the Office of the Vice President, which concluded that US deterrence requirements could be met by reducing US nuclear forces by up to one-third. Despite these actions, however, the Obama administration also initiated a large-scale nuclear modernization campaign and introduced a new gravity bomb to the arsenal––the B61-12.

The New START Treaty, to which the United States is a party, placed limits on deployments of strategic nuclear warheads and launchers. The United States met the treaty’s central limits by the deadline of February 2018. As part of the posture changes associated with New START, the United States de-MIRVed its intercontinental ballistic missile force such that each ICBM now carries only a single warhead, converted a portion of its nuclear-capable bomber force to conventional roles, and reduced the number of launch tubes on each ballistic missile submarine by four per boat.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review continued the nuclear modernization campaign that had been initiated under the Obama administration, but also added two supplementary capabilities: the low-yield W76-2 warhead for the ballistic missile submarine force, and a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). The deployment of the W76-2 did not result in an increase in the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, as its development involved modifying a small number of existing weapons.

Between fiscal years 1994 and 2020, the United States reduced its nuclear stockpile from 10,979 to 3,750, and dismantled approximately 9,100 warheads. However, the overwhelming majority of these reductions took place prior to 2010, and the pace of dismantlement dropped by approximately 53 percent after 2010, from an average of 547 warheads per year to 258 warheads per year after 2010. [1] During this period, entire classes of warhead where dismantled, including the dismantlement of all W62 warheads by August 2010, all B53 gravity bombs and all components associated with the W70 warhead by October 2011, and the W80-0 by the end of Fiscal Year 2012.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States’ Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition activities, which are conducted at the Pantex Plant, were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and resulted in a significantly slower warhead dismantlement rate after 2020 than in previous years. Between fiscal years 2020 and 2023, the United States’ nuclear stockpile remained stable at approximately 3,750 warheads, and during this time the Department of Energy dismantled approximately 589 warheads: approximately 135 warheads per year––an approximate 48 percent reduction in annual dismantlement pace from the 2010-2020 time period.

The Department of Energy had previously been on pace to complete the dismantlement of all warheads retired before Fiscal Year 2009 by the end of Fiscal Year 2022; however, due to delays partially related to the pandemic, the Department of Energy had not yet announced the completion of this milestone by the end of Fiscal Year 2025. Despite these delays, the Department of Energy completed the dismantlement of all planned W84 warheads by the end of FY 2025 and increased its staffing commitments to support other scheduled dismantlement requirements.

In 2022, the United States’ Nuclear Posture Review identified specific nuclear capabilities that were considered superfluous to US deterrence requirements. These capabilities, and resulting efforts, included the cancellation of the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) and the retirement of the B83-1 gravity bomb––the last megaton-yield warhead in the US nuclear stockpile. Although a program of record for the SLCM-N has since been initiated through congressional intervention, the B83-1 is in the process of being retired.

In 2023, the Department of Defense announced the planned development of a new gravity bomb, the B61-13, but noted that it will not increase the overall number of weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

Sources

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA517286.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/NMS2011.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA554328.pdf.

U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 19, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states

U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 June 2013. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA590745.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21‑F‑0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 15 November 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/15/2003584623/-1/-1/1/REPORT-ON-THE-NUCLEAR-EMPLOYMENT-STRATEGY-OF-THE-UNITED-STATES.PDF.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. "Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." Washington, DC: Department of Energy, July 22, 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/U.S.%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Stockpile%20Transparency%207_22_24.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2023 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, April 2023. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/FY23%20SSMP_FINAL.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2024 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, November 2023. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/FY24SSMP_FINAL_NOVEMBER_2023_0.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2025 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, September 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/FY2025%20Stockpile%20Stewardship%20and%20Management%20Plan.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. “October 25, 2011 — Last B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantled.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, October 25, 2011. https://www.energy.gov/management/october-25-2011-last-b53-nuclear‑bomb-dismantled.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. “Press Release: W70 Dismantle 10/21/11.” Washington, D.C.: NNSA, October 21, 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20111024172603/http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/w70dismantle102111.

Pantex Final FY12 PER. Amarillo, TX: Pantex Plant / DOE/NNSA, 2012. Accessed via Nuclear Watch New Mexico. https://nukewatch.org/oldsite/importantdocs/resources/Pantex_Final_FY12_PER.PDF.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

To maintain compliance with the central limits of the New START Treaty, by February 2018 the United States had removed 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from their silos, made four launch tubes on each of the United States’ 14 SSBNs incapable of launching ballistic missiles, and converted 41 B-52 heavy bombers to conventional-only roles. In addition, the United States de-MIRVed its intercontinental ballistic missile force such that each ICBM now carries only a single warhead.

The United States fully abided by the treaty’s verification regime, which included more than 320 on-site inspections and the exchange of more than 23,000 data notifications relating to the treaty between the United States and Russia. In 2021, the United States worked with Russia to successfully extend the treaty by the maximum of five years, until February 2026.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the Review Cycle, the United States continued to fully abide by the central limits and inspection regime; however, in response to Russia’s violations of New START, the United States took lawful reciprocal countermeasures and ceased to provide its updated data as of 1 March 2023. On 1 June 2023, the United States also began to withhold treaty notifications regarding the status of treaty-accountable items.

The United States has repeatedly expressed that it is ready to negotiate a new arms control treaty to replace New START after its expiry in February 2026, provided that Russia engages in good faith. In September 2025, however, President Putin offered to voluntarily maintain the New START limits if the United States reciprocates, and as of December 2025 Russia stated that it had yet to receive a “formal answer” from the United States.

Sources

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

U.S. Department of State. 2024 Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, January 17, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/UNCLASS_NST-Implementation-Report_2024-FINAL-Updated-Accessible-01.17.2025.pdf.

Faulconbridge, Guy, and Lucy Papachristou. “Russia says it awaits an answer from the US on New START as nuclear treaty ticks down.” Reuters, December 10. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russia-says-it-awaits-an-answer-us-new-start-nuclear-treaty-ticks-down-2025-12-10/
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

a) See Action 3.

b) In 2010, the United States signed the bilateral New START Treaty with Russia, which placed limits on deployments of strategic nuclear warheads and launchers. The Treaty, however, did not cover non-strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, in 2019 the first Trump administration withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which had previously eliminated and prohibited an entire range-class of delivery system.

c) In 2013, the Obama administration announced the first revision of its nuclear weapons employment guidance since 2002, which directed the Department of Defense to align U.S. nuclear missions with the guidance of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. This narrowed the scope of missions through which nuclear weapons could be employed, reduced the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, and directed the Department of Defense to examine and reduce the role of launch under attack in nuclear planning.

The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and corresponding nuclear employment guidance indicated a change from previous policy, with the latter document noting that because “nuclear-armed potential adversaries chose not to follow the U.S. lead in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies […] it would be imprudent for the United States to reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally at this time or in the near future.”

The 2018 NPR also added a new role for US nuclear weapons: “hedging against an uncertain future,” which prompted the development of two “supplements” to the U.S. force structure: the low-yield W76-2 warhead and the new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile.

d) In an effort to increasingly engage with the disarmament community and with Non-Nuclear Weapon States, in 2015 the P5 invited NNSW and civil society to briefings and outreach events alongside the P5 Conference in London. This was the first time that non-nuclear weapon states were invited to a discussion session as part of a P5 Conference.

e) The United States boycotted the first two conferences addressing the human consequences of nuclear weapons in 2013 and 2014; however, it participated in the third conference in Vienna in 2014, promoting the need for progress on disarmament verification and monitoring as a means towards a nuclear-free world.

f) In 1992, the George H. W. Bush administration commissioned a report by the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Failsafe and Risk Reduction, which included dozens of concrete recommendations to reduce the risk of unauthorized, accidental, or mistaken nuclear use. However, the majority of these recommendations would require updating for the digital age, particularly as the next generation of nuclear systems will be reliant on networked infrastructure.

g) Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States formally met with other members of the P5 approximately ten times to discuss measures for promoting confidence-building and nuclear disarmament. The United States hosted the third and seventh such conferences in Washington, DC, in 2012 and 2016. The United States also participated in inter-sessional meetings at the working level. At each meeting, the United States––alongside its P5 partners––emphasized the continued importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, the 2010 Action Plan as a framework for achieving disarmament, and continued discussion on the issues of transparency, confidence-building, and verification.

To increase mutual understanding and confidence among the P5 and to facilitate discussions with and among Non-Nuclear Weapon States, the United States also participated in the Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which produced a glossary of 227 terms for submission to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

In addition, in 2010 the Obama administration unprecedentedly declassified the entire history of the US nuclear stockpile, including the annual stockpile size, the number of dismantled warheads since 1994, and the number of retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. The United States continued to disclose these data on an annual basis until the Trump administration denied successive declassification requests between 2019 and 2021, after which transparency was restored and the figures from the missing years were disclosed.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

a) See Action 3.

b) In 2022, the Biden administration articulated its arms control priorities––particularly vis-à-vis Russia––as needing address all nuclear weapons, rather than just strategic ones. Throughout both the Biden administration and second Trump administration, the United States continued to abide by the central limits of New START, which limits the deployment status of strategic warheads and launchers.

c) In January 2022, in a historic statement, the United States jointly affirmed alongside the P5 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and that nuclear weapons should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. Notably, the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) removed “hedging against an uncertain future” as a stated role for U.S. nuclear weapons. Mirroring the Obama administration’s previous language, the Biden administration’s NPR also noted that a “key goal” for the United States is “reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy.”

d) In its 2022 statement, the P5 declared that they “each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons,” and reaffirmed the practice of ensuring that “none of their nuclear weapons were targeted at each other or any other state.”

The Biden administration’s NPR also identified current and planned capabilities that “are no longer required to meet our deterrence needs”––specifically the B83-1 and the SLCM-N, and left the door open for future retirement of the W76-2 low-yield warhead following a re-evaluation of its deterrence value. Despite these actions, these capabilities had not been cancelled or retired by the end of 2025, and the SLCM-N has since been adopted into a program of record.

e) Although it participated in the third conference addressing the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons in 2014, the United States did not attend the fourth conference in 2022.

f) In light of advances in artificial intelligence and its incorporation into modern military systems, the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review stated that the United States will maintain a human “in the loop” “for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate and terminate nuclear weapon employment.”

As directed by Congress, in fiscal year 2022 the Department of Defense commissioned an independent review of the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons; the nuclear command, control, and communications infrastructure that underpins it; and the U.S. integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems that allow the U.S. to quickly and accurately characterize incoming threats.

g) Alongside the P5, the United States helped update the glossary of key nuclear-related terms for joint submission to the 2022 NPT Review Conference. Although the P5 Process has slowed substantially following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, throughout the Review Cycle the United States chaired and participated in several P5 meetings at the expert level, including in August 2022, October 2023, February 2023, and December 2024.

Following the Biden administration’s declassification of the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in 2021, it denied successive requests until 2024, during which it restored the previous years’ missing data. It appears that the United States is shifting towards disclosing these figures on an ad hoc, rather than annual, basis.

Following Russia’s unilateral suspension of New START in February 2023, the United States publicly disclosed one final set of deployment-related treaty data from March 2023, but subsequently has not released any deployment data since then.

Sources

U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 19, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states

U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 June 2013. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA590745.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, November 30, 2020. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf.

The White House. “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races.” Press release. January 3, 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/.

China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. Working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51. New York: United Nations, 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956428.

U.S. Department of Defense. “Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” Fact Sheet. May 3, 2010. Available via the Internet Archive. https://web.archive.org/web/20100528062643/http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. Response to Freedom of Information Act Request Dated October 1, 2018. April 5, 2019. Available via the Federation of American Scientists. https://sgp.fas.org/news/2019/04/stockpile-2018.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” Fact Sheet. October 5, 2021. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Fact-Sheet_Unclass_2021_final-v2-002.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” August 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/U.S.%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Stockpile%20Transparency%207_22_24.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “2024 Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty.” January 17, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/2024-report-to-congress-on-implementation-of-the-new-start-treaty/.

Stewart, Mallory. “Keynote Address for the Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Arms Control Association.” US Department of State, June 2, 2022. https://www.state.gov/keynote-address-for-the-commemoration-of-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-arms-control-association/

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.

Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, Republic of Austria. “Conference Report: Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.” 8-9 December 2014. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/ViennaConference_BMEIA_Web_final.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. “Final Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Failsafe and Risk Reduction (FARR) (U).” 1992. https://archive.org/details/FinalReportoftheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeonNuclearFailsafeandRiskReductionFARR/page/n1/mode/2up.

U.S. Department of State. “Joint Statement from the Nuclear-Weapon States at the London P5 Conference.” Press statement. February 5, 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237273.htm.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States has historically resisted including nuclear disarmament as an appropriate topic for formal treaty negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Instead, it has prioritized negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). However, the extreme application of the CD’s consensus-based rules of procedure has provided each member state with a de facto veto over the process.

In March 2018, the Conference on Disarmament decided on a substantive programme of work, and established subsidiary bodies on several core issues: (1) cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament; (2) prevention of nuclear war; (3) prevention of an arms race in outer space; and (4) assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons; however, the mandates for these bodies need to be renewed each year, and thus work once again stalled when that did not take place the following year.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the Biden administration, the United States proposed several measures to reduce the gridlock within the Conference on Disarmament. For example, given that the necessity of renewing the subsidiary bodies’ mandates each year has historically led to a lack of progress, in 2023 the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament submitted a “food for thought” paper proposing the automatic carrying over of a Programme of Work and observer statuses on an annual basis, rather than starting from zero each successive year. These proposed reforms, however, have not yet been adopted.

Sources

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva. "United Nations General Assembly First Committee." Statement by the U.S. Delegation. October 6, 2010. https://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/10/06/unga-first-committee/.

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva. "The Obama Administration's Second Term Priorities for Arms Control and Nonproliferation." Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament. March 20, 2013. https://geneva.usmission.gov/2013/03/20/the-obama-administrations-second-term-priorities-for-arms-control-and-nonproliferation/.

Conference on Disarmament. Decision. CD/2119. February 16, 2018. https://docs.un.org/en/cd/2119.

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva. “U.S. Ambassador Bruce Turner’s Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament on Revitalization.” June 20, 2023. https://geneva.usmission.gov/2023/06/20/u-s-ambassador-bruce-turners-remarks-to-the-conference-on-disarmament-on-revitalization/.

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva. “U.S. Ambassador Bruce Turner’s Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament on the Program of Work Decision.” March 16, 2023. https://geneva.usmission.gov/2023/03/16/u-s-ambassador-bruce-turners-remarks-to-the-conference-on-disarmament-on-the-program-of-work-decision/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 6.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 6.

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In 1995, President Clinton issued a negative security assurance to non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with the sole exception “in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.”

In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), in response to the changing security environment, the United States introduced new language that it “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations,” and noted that “any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response.” The document also noted that “In the case of countries not covered by this assurance – states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations – there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners.” It did include a hedge, however, that the United States “reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.”

The formulation that was included in the 2010 NPR was also echoed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, although the document and statements from Trump administration officials at the time also appeared to indicate that the United States could consider a nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack “that was strategic in nature, that imposed substantial impacts to our infrastructure, to our people.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States utilized the same formulation to describe its negative security assurances as in its 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews, that it “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” It did not include the caveat that had been included in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, however, that nuclear weapons could be used to deter strategic non-nuclear attacks.

Sources

"Clinton Issues Pledge to NPT Non-Nuclear Weapon States." Declaration by President Clinton regarding America's commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 1995. Available from the Federation of American Scientists’ archive, https://nuke.fas.org/control/npt/docs/940405-nsa.htm.

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA517286.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.

Rood, J. “News Briefing on the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.” U.S. Department of Defense, February 2, 2018. https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1431945/news-briefing-on-the-2018-nuclear-posture-review/.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Of the five major Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ), the United States has only ratified the protocols of one: the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which banned nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty, the Pelindaba Treaty, and the Semipalatinsk Treaty. The Obama administration submitted the protocols for all three treaties to the Senate in 2011 and 2015; however, they all remain stalled with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The United States, like the other Nuclear Weapon States, has not signed the Bangkok Treaty.

Negotiations over a Middle East WMD-Free Zone have been stalled, in part due to the United States’ insistence upon regional consensus and resistance of language that it believes would single out Israel. This issue was one of the key reasons why the 2015 Review Conference did not achieve consensus on an outcome document.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States continued to advocate publicly for regional nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ), noting in a statement that they “provide the most expeditious and practical way to extend legally binding negative security assurances.” Despite its public advocacy, the United States Senate has not achieved success in ratifying any of the three NWFZ protocols under consideration during the current Review Cycle.

Sources

U.S. Department of State (Obama Administration). “Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/anwfz/index.htm

United Nations. “2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 27 April–22 May 2015. https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/.

Turner, Bruce. “Statement by the United States to the NPT Preparatory Committee: Cluster One Specific Issue Statement.” U.S. Department of State, July 25, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/statement-by-the-united-states-to-the-npt-preparatory-committee-cluster-one-specific-issue-statement/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

During his 2009 “Prague Speech,” President Obama announced that the United States would “immediately and aggressively” pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and enshrined it as a key priority for his administration’s non-proliferation agenda. That same year, Secretary of State Clinton attended the CTBT Article XIV Conference––the first time in nearly a decade that the United States had participated at the conference at that level of representation––and emphasized that “we will work in the months ahead both to seek the advice and consent of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, and to secure ratification by others so that the treaty can enter into force.” Ultimately, the Obama administration was unsuccessful in securing ratification during its tenure.

The Trump administration reversed its predecessor’s policies with respect to the CTBT. In its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump administration explicitly stated that it “will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” It did note, however, that it would “not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and call[ed] on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing.”

Throughout this period, the United States extensively supported the development of the CTBT’s on-site inspection protocols and detection capabilities to create the ultimate conditions for universal ratification and entry into force. In a demonstration of support for the spirit of the treaty, the United States attended the International Day Against Nuclear Testing event hosted by Kazakhstan and the CTBT Article XIV Conference in 2021.

.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

As it has done since 1992, the United States has continued to abide by its moratorium on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. In addition, during her tenure the Biden administration’s NNSA Administrator reiterated on multiple occasions that there was no technical need for the United States to resume nuclear testing. In a demonstration of transparency, in 2022 and 2023 journalists and civil society experts were invited to tour the Nevada National Security Site to view the United States’ stockpile stewardship capabilities, and representatives from NPT States parties were invited to Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory for transparency visits.

The second Trump administration appears to be attempting to reverse these longstanding U.S. policy positions. In October and November 2025, President Trump made numerous statements indicating that he would begin the process of resuming U.S. nuclear testing. However, it remains unclear whether President Trump was referring to the actual testing of nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable delivery systems.

Sources

Obama, Barack. Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague, as delivered. Washington, DC: The White House, April 5, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered

Clinton, Hillary R. Remarks at CTBT Article XIV Conference. New York, NY: September 24, 2009. https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/Documents/240909_US.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

Kimball, Daryl G., and Carol Giacomo. “Managing an Arsenal Without Nuclear Testing: An Interview With Jill Hruby of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration.” Arms Control Today, December 2023. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-12/interviews/managing-arsenal-without-nuclear-testing-interview-jill-hruby-us-national.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “Two NNSA National Labs host Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty representatives from around the world for transparency visit.” July 21, 2022. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/two-nnsa-national-labs-host-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-representatives-around.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA demonstrates transparency during arms control and nonproliferation experts’ visit to Nevada.” December 1, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-demonstrates-transparency-during-arms-control-and-nonproliferation-experts-visit.

Brumfiel, Geoff. “Step Inside the Secret Lab Where America Tests Its Nukes.” January 29, 2025, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2025/01/29/nx-s1-5276315/atomic-bomb-nuclear-weapons-lab-nevada.

Trump, Donald (@realDonaldTrump). “The United States has more Nuclear Weapons than any other country. This was accomplished, including a complete update and renovation of existing weapons, during my First Term in office. Because of the tremendous destructive power, I HATED to do it, but had no choice! Russia is second, and China is a distant third, but will be even within 5 years. Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately. Thank you for your attention to this matter! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP.” Truth Social, October 29, 2025. https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115460423936412555.

O’Donnell, Norah. “President Trump on nuclear testing, the government shutdown, immigration, tariffs and U.S.-China relations.” CBS News, November 2, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-on-nuclear-testing-government-shutdown-immigration-tariffs-china-60-minutes-transcript/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Between 1945 and 1992, the United States conducted 1054 nuclear test explosions, with its final test occurring on September 23, 1992. That year, the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment to the fiscal year 1993 energy appropriations bill was passed into law, which established a limited moratorium on nuclear testing and stated that “no underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless a foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted.” The United States has continued to abide by the moratorium following the conclusion of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), although it ultimately did not ratify the treaty and thus has not facilitated its entry into force.

To sustain the United States’ nuclear arsenal without returning to testing, the Clinton administration established the Stockpile Stewardship Program to obtain technical information about the stockpile through subcritical experiments, computer simulations, and diagnostic tests.

Although it continued to abide by the testing moratorium, the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review explicitly stated that it “will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Throughout the review period, the United States continued to observe its moratorium on zero-yield nuclear explosive testing and did not conduct a nuclear explosive test.

Biden administration officials, including the NNSA Administrator, reiterated on multiple occasions that there was no technical need for the United States to resume nuclear testing. In a demonstration of transparency, in 2022 and 2023 journalists and civil society experts were invited to tour the Nevada National Security Site to view the United States’ stockpile stewardship capabilities, and representatives from NPT States parties were invited to Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory for transparency visits. These transparency visits were largely intended to indicate that the United States can continue to sustain its nuclear arsenal without resorting to nuclear testing.

The second Trump administration appears to be attempting to reverse these longstanding U.S. policy positions. In October and November 2025, President Trump made numerous statements indicating that he would begin the process of resuming U.S. nuclear testing. State Department officials subsequently clarified that the President was referring to explosive low-yield nuclear testing, similar to the experiments that the United States had accused Russia and China of conducting. As of April 2026, the United States had not conducted a nuclear explosive test.

Sources

National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office. “United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992.” U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/NV—209-REV 16, September 2015. https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/DOE_NV-209_Rev16.pdf.

“Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1993.” Public Law No. 102-377. https://www.congress.gov/102/statute/STATUTE-106/STATUTE-106-Pg1315.pdf.

Nevada National Security Sites. “Stockpile Stewardship.” National Nuclear Security Administration. https://nnss.gov/mission/stockpile-stewardship-program/.

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.

Kimball, Daryl G., and Carol Giacomo. “Managing an Arsenal Without Nuclear Testing: An Interview With Jill Hruby of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration.” Arms Control Today, December 2023. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-12/interviews/managing-arsenal-without-nuclear-testing-interview-jill-hruby-us-national.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “Two NNSA National Labs host Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty representatives from around the world for transparency visit.” July 21, 2022. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/two-nnsa-national-labs-host-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-representatives-around.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA demonstrates transparency during arms control and nonproliferation experts’ visit to Nevada.” December 1, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-demonstrates-transparency-during-arms-control-and-nonproliferation-experts-visit.

Brumfiel, Geoff. “Step Inside the Secret Lab Where America Tests Its Nukes.” January 29, 2025, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2025/01/29/nx-s1-5276315/atomic-bomb-nuclear-weapons-lab-nevada.

Trump, Donald (@realDonaldTrump). “The United States has more Nuclear Weapons than any other country. This was accomplished, including a complete update and renovation of existing weapons, during my First Term in office. Because of the tremendous destructive power, I HATED to do it, but had no choice! Russia is second, and China is a distant third, but will be even within 5 years. Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately. Thank you for your attention to this matter! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP.” Truth Social, October 29, 2025. https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115460423936412555.

O’Donnell, Norah. “President Trump on nuclear testing, the government shutdown, immigration, tariffs and U.S.-China relations.” CBS News, November 2, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-on-nuclear-testing-government-shutdown-immigration-tariffs-china-60-minutes-transcript/.

Gordon, Michael, and Robbie Gramer. “U.S. Accuses China of Secretly Conducting Nuclear Tests.” Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2025. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/u-s-accuses-china-of-secretly-conducting-nuclear-tests-fd728b6e.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States continued to abide by its nuclear testing moratorium following President Clinton’s signature of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); however, in 1999 the U.S. Senate did not provide its advice and consent for ratification. The successful arguments against the treaty largely centred around a perceived lack of confidence in the continued safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile without the ability to conduct explosive tests. As a result of the non-ratification of the United States, among others, the CTBT did not enter into force during this period.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States has not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Sources

United States Senate. “Roll Call Vote 106th Congress – 1st Session.” 13 October 1999. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1061/vote_106_1_00325.htm.

United States Senate. “Privilege Of The Floor (Executive Session);” Congressional Record Vol. 145, No. 136. 8 October 1999. https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-145/issue-136/senate-section/article/S12264-1.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States continued to abide by its nuclear testing moratorium following President Clinton’s signature of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); however, in 1999 the U.S. Senate soundly rejected to provide its advice and consent for ratification. The successful arguments against the treaty largely centred around a perceived lack of confidence in the continued safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile without the ability to conduct explosive tests. As a result of the non-ratification of the United States, among others, the CTBT did not enter into force during this period.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States has not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Sources

United States Senate. “Roll Call Vote 106th Congress – 1st Session.” 13 October 1999. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1061/vote_106_1_00325.htm.

United States Senate. “Privilege Of The Floor (Executive Session);” Congressional Record Vol. 145, No. 136. 8 October 1999. https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-145/issue-136/senate-section/article/S12264-1.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States made the largest annual financial contribution to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, paying more than 22 percent of the Commission’s annual budget and voluntarily funding elements of the International Monitoring System.

In particular, the United States contributed more than $63 million to CTBTO projects, including the reengineering of the International Data Centre’s analysis software, and the repair and rebuilding of IMS stations HA08 (Diego Garcia) and HA04 (Crozet Island). It also continued to provide data from the IMS stations under its purview. In addition, the United States convened meetings of technical experts and contributed equipment, expertise, and research towards developing the on-site inspection element of the CTBT’s verification regime, including as part of the largest ever on-site expective exercise in Jordan in December 2014.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the review period, the United States has continued to provide substantial contributions to the development and maintenance of the CTBTO’s verification regime. In particular, the United States has been one of the leaders in the effort to modernize and re-engineer the International Data Centre, which collects and analyses data to share with the Member States. In addition, the United States has made contributions in kind to the International Noble Gas Experiment, which is designed to optimize the capability of the International Monitoring System in detecting signals from nuclear explosions against the global background of natural and human-made radionuclides.

Sources

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. "Crozet Islands: Installing Our Last Hydroacoustic Station." April 18, 2016. https://www.ctbto.org/news-and-events/news/crozet-islands-installing-our-last-hydroacoustic-station.

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Background Document Prepared for the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT (New York, 2025). CTBT-Art.XIV/2025/3. Vienna: CTBTO, August 19, 2025. https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/CTBT-Art.XIV-2025-3.pdf.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States participated in two United Nations initiatives relating to a proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: a 2014-2015 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and a 2017-2018 High-Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group.

The Group of Governmental Experts consensus report, which was published in May 2015, represented the most thorough intergovernmental assessment to-date of the nature and characteristics of an FMCT. The GGE considered a variety of topics, including treaty objectives, scope, definitions, verification, legal and institutional arrangements, duration, and withdrawal clauses, among many others.

Building on the findings of the GGE, the High Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group sought to lay the groundwork for future treaty negotiations by developing a menu of potential treaty elements that could eventually be incorporated into a treaty structure. These included considerations of how each of the above topics explored in the GGE could be institutionalized within a treaty framework. As the Preparatory Group sought to capture a wide range of views rather than to actually negotiate a treaty by narrowing the list of options, the menu is highly expansive and contains divergences between national positions. As such, this effort represents a model for inclusive multilateral engagement constructive deliberation.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the Review Cycle, the United States joined and actively participated in the new Friends of FMCT initiative, a cross-regional group with participation from both Nuclear-Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that aims to enhance political attention on and contribute support to the negotiation of an FMCT. As part of this initiative, in September 2024 the United States issued a joint statement with Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom in support of an FMCT in accordance with CD/1299. The statement also expressed support for all voluntary actions taken by states in support of the spirit of an FMCT, including moratoria on fissile material production, the dismantlement or conversion of fissile material production facilities, reporting on domestic stockpiles of civil plutonium, and the development of substantive proposals for the negotiation of an FMCT.

In addition, the United States repeatedly called upon the Conference of Disarmament to agree upon a program of work that prioritizes the negotiation of an FMCT, and specifically noted that the growing nuclear programs of other nuclear-armed states makes this effort even more necessary.

Sources

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

Turner, Bruce. "Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty." Remarks delivered by Ambassador Bruce Turner, United States Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, March 12, 2024. https://geneva.usmission.gov/2024/03/12/remarks-to-the-conference-on-disarmament-on-a-fissile-material-cutoff-treaty/.

United Nations General Assembly. Group of Governmental Experts to Make Recommendations on Possible Aspects That Could Contribute to but Not Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices: Note by the Secretary-General. A/70/81. New York: United Nations, May 7, 2015. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n15/133/37/pdf/n1513337.pdf.

United Nations General Assembly. High-Level Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group: Note by the Secretary-General. A/73/159. New York: United Nations, July 13, 2018. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n18/223/57/pdf/n1822357.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.” Press Statement, 23 September 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) annual declarations of its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel in excess of military requirements, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549). These declarations did not include declarations relating to highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Of hundreds of eligible facilities, only one U.S. facility––the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site––has been under IAEA safeguards for decades and continued to remain under safeguards during the review period.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States’ most recent declaration of its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel under INFCIRC/549 was transmitted to the IAEA in 2023. The declaration noted holdings of less than 0.05 metric tons of unirradiated separated plutonium produced during the course of manufacture or fabrication, 4.6 metric tons of plutonium contained in unirradiated MOX fuel, and 44.6 metric tons of unirradiated separated plutonium held elsewhere––all of which are roughly the same as the previous year’s figures.

During the current Review Cycle, the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site has remained under IAEA safeguards.

Sources

United States of America. Communication Received from the United States of America Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. INFCIRC/549/Add.6-25. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2023. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a6-25.pdf.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In 1996, in partnership with Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States began a cooperative effort known as the “Trilateral Initiative,” with the goal of exploring the feasibility of a verification system for monitoring nuclear warheads and/or fissile material. Throughout the six years of the initiative, technical experts from Russia, the United States, the IAEA, and other countries were hosted at different facilities with the goal of exploring technical measures that could be applied to verification.

One of the key deliverables of the Trilateral Initiative was the development of an iterative draft Model Verification Agreement to ensure that any fissile material subject to IAEA verification under the agreements remained removed from nuclear weapon programmes. In particular, the agreement was designed to allow for a verification mechanism that would not reveal any classified information while simultaneously permitting the IAEA to verify that the material being verified was of a particular nature. The final report on the results of the Trilateral Initiative concluded that the progress made during the initiative––particularly the draft Model Verification Agreement––would provide the building blocks needed for the pursuit of bilateral verification agreements with the IAEA; however, changes in political leadership in both the United States and Russia, as well as the rise of subsequent disagreements and geopolitical tensions, eroded the landscape for continued progress on the Trilateral Initiative.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The International Atomic Energy Agency regularly issues task requests to countries with which it has a Member State Support Program (MSSP), allowing the IAEA to take advantage of different capabilities and expertise across a range of countries to resolve deficiencies in research and development relating to safeguards and verification, including trainings, environmental sampling and analysis, the procurement of new equipment, and other initiatives. The United States accepts by far the largest number of task requests (105 in 2022, compared to the European Commission’s second-largest number of 35), and allows the IAEA to task specific national labs.

In addition, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation conducts safeguards-related research and development on its own initiative, the results of which are regularly demonstrated to the IAEA for potential incorporation into IAEA verification mechanisms. The Government Accountability Office reported in 2024 that “if IAEA’s safeguards program determines that an NNSA-developed technology or tool could be applicable to a current safeguards challenge or has potential to address an emerging challenge, IAEA could create a task request to the USSP to further develop the technology.” Such a task request occurred in 2013 following a proposal in 2007 for the development of an unattended verification system for cylinders containing uranium for enrichment; in February 2022, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory delivered its prototype to the IAEA.

Sources

Shea, Thomas E., ‘IAEA Verification of Weapon-Origin Fissile Material in the Russian Federation and the United States: The Trilateral Initiative ‘, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-SM-367/9/01 (2001). https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20files/Session%209/Paper%209-01.pdf

Shea, Thomas E., and Rockwood, Laura. ‘Nuclear Disarmament: The Legacy of the Trilateral Initiative.’ Deep Cuts Working Paper, No. 4 (March 2015), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/192450/DeepCuts_WP4_Shea_Rockwood_UK.pdf

Government Accountability Office. ‘Efforts Are Underway to Address Factors Affecting the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Safeguards Program’. GAO-24-106296 (May 2024), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106296.pdf.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Many of the United States’ fissile material production facilities were largely shuttered during or immediately after the Cold War.

The United States maintained two plutonium production complexes during the Cold War: the Hanford Site in Washington and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Other sites, including Rocky Flats in Colorado, were responsible for the fabrication of plutonium pits rather than the production of the material itself and are therefore not covered by this Action.

The Hanford plutonium production reactors, which manufactured the plutonium that was used in the majority of US nuclear weapons during the Cold War, were shut down between 1964 and 1971, with Hanford’s dual-purpose N Reactor eventually shutting down in 1987. Following the decommissioning of the Hanford Site, the United States initiated a significant environmental clean-up effort to mitigate harms related to nuclear waste generated by the site. The Savannah River Site reactors, which were also used to manufacture plutonium and tritium for military use, were shut down by 1988. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States would no longer produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States largely completed the process of dismantlement or conversion of fissile material production facilities prior to the current Review Cycle.

During the current Review Cycle, the United States has continued with environmental remediation and cleanup efforts at its historic fissile material production facilities, including at the Hanford Site, where by the end of 2024 workers had finished removing more than 3 million gallons of radioactive waste.

While the United States is not producing new plutonium for weapons programs, it intends to significantly upscale its capability to fabricate plutonium pits using reserve plutonium at two sites: Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Savannah River Site. Between these two sites, the United States intends to produce no fewer than 80 pits per year once construction and modernization at the two facilities is complete.

In addition, the United States continues to produce tritium at the Watts Bar Nuclear Power Station––a civilian reactor that has produced tritium for the U.S. nuclear programme since 2004. Moreover, in 2026 the Trump administration announced the commitment of $2.7 billion to support U.S.-based uranium enrichment.

Sources

U.S. Department of Energy. ‘The Hanford Site: Understand the PAST’. https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/understandPAST.

U.S. Department of Energy. ‘The Hanford Site: Discover the PRESENT’. https://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/discoverPresent.

U.S. Department of Energy. ‘Savannah River Site History 1950-1989’. https://www.energy.gov/srs/savannah-river-site-history-1950-1989.

Bush, George H. W., ‘Statement on Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts: 13 July 1992,’, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, Book I, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1992-book1/html/PPP-1992-book1-doc-pg1110-2.htm.

U.S. Department of Energy. ‘Plutonium Pit Production at SRS’. National Nuclear Security Administration. https://www.srs.gov/general/news/factsheets/SRS_SRPPF_Fact%20Sheet_r8.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. ‘U.S. Department of Energy Awards $2.7 Billion to Restore American Uranium Enrichment’. 5 January 2026. https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-department-energy-awards-27-billion-restore-american-uranium-enrichment.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 2.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 2.

Sources

See Action 2.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

To enhance engagement and consultation across the P5, in 2014 the Nuclear-Weapon States adopted a national reporting framework with respect to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document and encouraged other NPT States Party to submit national reports using a similar framework.

The United States’ national reports include actions taken by the United States to advance the 64-point Action Plan, including measures relating to nuclear reductions, alert status, arms control, stockpile transparency, fissile material reductions, confidence-building measures, safeguards, export controls, nuclear security, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The United States’ first national report was submitted to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and its second report was submitted to the 2020 NPT Review Conference in 2022.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In 2023, the United States submitted an update to its 2020 national report with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which included the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

The United States is currently preparing its national report for the next NPT Review Conference in 2026.

Sources

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, July 31-August 11, 2023. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.I_.04_-_04._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_U.S._National_Report_Update.pdf.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In 2012, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted a working paper at the 2013 NPT Preparatory Commission proposing a standardized format for the Nuclear-Weapon States to provide enhanced transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals, and to report on actions taking in support of the 2010 Action Plan. Building upon this proposal, in 2014 the Nuclear-Weapon States adopted a national reporting framework with respect to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document.

Although each of the NWS’ national reports includes varying levels of detail, the reporting framework is organized as follows:

Section I: Reporting on national measures relating to disarmament
Nuclear security policies, doctrine and activities associated with nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control (including nuclear disarmament) and verification
Transparency and confidence-building measures
Other related issues

Section II: Reporting on national measures relating to non-proliferation
Safeguards
Export controls
Nuclear security
Nuclear-weapon-free zones
Compliance and other issues
Other contributions to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Section III: Reporting on national measures relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
Promoting peaceful uses
Technical assistance through the IAEA to its member states
Nuclear safety and civil nuclear liability
Other related issues.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States is currently preparing its national report for the next NPT Review Conference in 2026, which will presumably utilize the same reporting framework as its previous submissions.

Sources

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates). Transparency of Nuclear Weapons: The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative: Working Paper. NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12. New York: United Nations, 2012. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

Action 22: All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States did not formally submit any data to the Secretary-General’s annual A/57/124 implementation reports until 2024; however, prior to the current Review Cycle it supported several initiates relating to disarmament and non-proliferation education, including next-generation education.

For example, since the introduction of UNODA’s Disarmament Fellowship in 1978, numerous U.S. Government leaders/experts have addressed and supported the Fellows, and fourteen American representatives participated in the program as Fellows. In addition, the US-led International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) includes several resources related to disarmament education.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
In its submission to the A/57/124 implementation report for the 2022-2024 period, the United States reported the following efforts in support of increasing access to disarmament and non-proliferation education:

‘Supporting global education and professional development through the United States-Black Sea Nonproliferation Professionals Exchange, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies Visiting Fellows, the Black Sea Women in Nuclear Network, the P5 Young Professionals’ Network and networks in other regions.

Promoting the participation of underrepresented groups, including women, in non-proliferation and disarmament education efforts.

Hosting the Timbie Forum to engage representatives from universities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and the Government on pressing challenges facing the disarmament and non-proliferation architectures.

Co-sponsoring multiple United Nations resolutions that promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, fellowships and training, and awareness-raising.

Supporting efforts to increase transparency, information-sharing and accountability as part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process, including by holding interactive discussions of national reports.

Conducting extensive outreach to NGOs, universities and other public institutions, participating in dozens of public events each year to support education and awareness-raising, and promoting nuclear disarmament verification research by non-Government and Government experts.

Engaging and providing mentorship to interns, university and graduate students, and early-career NGO experts.

Participating in and supporting the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme of the Office for Disarmament Affairs.’
Sources

United Nations General Assembly. ‘Disarmament and non-proliferation education: Report of the Secretary-General’. 2 July 2024. https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/114.

United States of America. ‘U.S. Views on Promoting Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education’. Reply received from the United States pursuant to resolution 77/52. 12 June 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/General_Assembly_First_Committee_-Seventy-Ninth_session_(2024)/77-52-US-EN.pdf.

International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. https://www.ipndv.org/

Non-Proliferation

View non-proliferation actions for all countries

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

US efforts were instrumental in bringing the Non-Proliferation Treaty to near-universal adherence, and President Clinton made the negotiation of an indefinite extension to the NPT a central priority of his administration. These efforts continued in successive administrations; in 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John S. Wolf stated that ‘US support for the goal of universal NPT adherence remains undiminished. We do not support any change to the NPT that would accord a different status to states currently outside the Treaty.’

In 2005, however, the Bush administration reached an agreement with India on a deal that would lift the moratorium on US nuclear trade with India and provide US assistance to India's civilian nuclear energy program. Critics of the agreement suggested that this agreement undermined the United States’ support for the universality of the NPT, given that it normalized India’s status as a nuclear weapon state outside the bounds of the NPT.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States has continued to stress the importance of the universalization of the NPT. In its 2025 report assessing compliance with arms control and non-proliferation agreements, the United States stated that it ‘supports universal adoption of the AP by States Parties to the NPT.’

During the second Trump administration, however, the United States has undertaken actions that critics suggest could undermine its previous support for core tenets of NPT. For example, the Trump administration has proposed several avenues for U.S.-Saudi nuclear energy cooperation, which could potentially include the forgoing of Saudi safeguards and nonproliferation requirements as a prerequisite to a deal. While the conclusion of such a deal would not require either country to withdraw from the NPT, it could undermine the spirit of the treaty depending on its exact parameters.

Sources

Clinton, Bill, C. Statement on Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Posted online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/221301.

Wolf, John S. 'The Time for Business As Usual Is Over'. 28 April 2003. Accessible via Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. https://acronym.org.uk/old/archive/npt/03us.htm.

Kerr, Paul K. ‘U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service. RL33016. 26 June 2012. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33016/RL33016.68.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. 2025 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2025. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Arms-Control-Treaty-Compliance-Report_Final-Accessible.pdf.

Blanchard, Christopher M., and Kerr, Paul K. ‘Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation’. Congressional Research Service. IF10799. 11 March 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10799.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

As a Nuclear Weapon State, the United States is not required to agree to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Instead, it maintains a Voluntary Offer Agreement and has signed the Additional Protocol.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

As a Nuclear Weapon State, the United States is not required to agree to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Instead, it maintains a Voluntary Offer Agreement and has signed the Additional Protocol.

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

As a Nuclear Weapon State, the United States is not required to agree to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Instead, it maintains a Voluntary Offer Agreement and has signed the Additional Protocol.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

As a Nuclear Weapon State, the United States is not required to agree to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Instead, it maintains a Voluntary Offer Agreement and has signed the Additional Protocol.

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States’ annual "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies its own compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. In every annual Compliance Report published prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States has self-certified full compliance with its NPT and broader arms control and non-proliferation obligations.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States’ annual "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies its own compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. In every annual Compliance Report published during the current Review Cycle, the United States has self-certified full compliance with its NPT and broader arms control and non-proliferation obligations.

Sources

U.S. Department of State. "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments." [Annual reports index page.] https://www.state.gov/adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States’ annual "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies other countries’ non-compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

Prior the current Review Cycle, the United States pushed for activating formal noncompliance mechanisms with regards to Iran, Syria, and North Korea. On certain occasions, the United States pushed for referral of these respective cases to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council.

In 2018, however, the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Iran subsequently stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA on a step-by-step basis until, on 23 February 2021, it stopped implementing them altogether, including the Additional Protocol. This disruption has made it significantly more challenging to assess the complete nature of Iran’s non-compliance.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States’ annual "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies other countries’ non-compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

During the current Review Cycle, the United States has coordinated joint statements stressing the necessity that Iran and Syria return to compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, and urging both countries to cooperate with the IAEA. The United States has also co-sponsored or supported several IAEA Board of Governors resolutions calling on Iran to provide the IAEA with the information needed to address undeclared nuclear material.

Sources

U.S. Department of State. "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments." [Annual reports index page.] https://www.state.gov/adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/.

Poblete, Yleem D. S. “A Crisis of Compliance: The Cases of Syria and Iran." U.S. Department of State, 2018. https://2017-2021.state.gov/a-crisis-of-compliance-the-cases-of-syria-and-iran/.

Clinton, Hillary Rodham. "Remarks at the Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." U.S. Department of State, May 3, 2010. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/05/141424.htm.

International Atomic Energy Agency, Director General. "Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)." Report to the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, GOV/2025/50. IAEA, September 3, 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2025-50.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. "The IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on Iran." June 10, 2022. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-iaea-board-of-governors-resolution-on-iran/.

U.S. Department of State, France, Germany, United Kingdom. "Quad Joint Statement on the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on Iran." November 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/quad-joint-statement-on-the-iaea-board-of-governors-resolution-on-iran.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States’ Additional Protocol came into force in 2009, granting the IAEA expanded rights to obtain a much fuller picture of the United States’ nuclear program and fuel cycle. This was done in part to assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that signing the Additional Protocol would not place them at a commercial disadvantage.

The Additional Protocol requires the United States to submit declarations to the IAEA regarding research and development not involving nuclear materials; fuel cycle related manufacturing and production activities; uranium mines and concentration plants and thorium concentration plants; site declarations for some nuclear facilities; and, on a quarterly basis, the export of certain nuclear facilities and equipment. The United States’ Additional Protocol is limited to civilian nuclear facilities and exempts those directly related to national security.

Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States actively encouraged the establishment of the Additional Protocol standard as a precondition for exports of nuclear technical information and cooperation between states.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Throughout the current Review Cycle, the United States continued to submit declarations to the IAEA in compliance with its Additional Protocol.

After Iran announced in February 2021 that it would stop implementing its Additional Protocol, the United States has since repeatedly called upon Iran to return to verifiable implementation of its commitments. In addition, the United States has supported five IAEA Board of Governors resolutions censuring Iran for failing to comply with its safeguards obligations and investigations.

Sources

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

U.S. Department of State. "Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (and Protocol Thereto)." Signed at Vienna, November 18, 1977. Entered into force December 9, 1980. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5209.htm.

International Atomic Energy Agency. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America. INFCIRC/288/Add.1. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, April 2, 2009. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1981/infcirc288a1.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. 2025 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2025. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Arms-Control-Treaty-Compliance-Report_Final-Accessible.pdf.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
As a Nuclear Weapon State, the United States is not required to agree to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Instead, it maintains a Voluntary Offer Agreement and its Additional Protocol came into force in 2009, granting the IAEA expanded rights to obtain a much fuller picture of the United States’ nuclear program and fuel cycle.

Prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States’ National Nuclear Security Administration conducted targeted engagement with US partner countries to provide assistance with safeguards implementation. In 2008, the NNSA established the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) “to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges.” As part of NGSI, NNSA’s Office of International Nuclear Safeguards coordinates collaborations with international partners to jointly advance safeguards technologies through the International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement (INSEP) program.

Prior to the current Review Cycle, some of these international engagements included:

Developing a video surveillance system to support unannounced inspections for the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

Establishing a secure link to engage in regional cooperation in remote monitoring between Sandia National Laboratories, Idaho National Laboratory, and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute.

Testing the security of various communication links in collaboration with the European Joint Research Centre.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
During the current Review Cycle, the United States’ National Nuclear Security Administration continued to conduct targeted engagement with US partner countries to provide assistance with safeguards implementation.

Some of these engagements included:

In 2023, leading the first demonstration of Wide Area Environmental Sampling, which could support the IAEA in verifying the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.

In 2024, launching an IAEA Centre of Excellence for Safeguards and Non-Proliferation at a Urenco facility in the United Kingdom with NNSA support.

In 2024, expanding partnerships with with U.S. advanced nuclear developers to integrate international nuclear safeguards and security considerations into their designs.
Sources

U.S. Department of Energy. “Office of International Nuclear Safeguards.” National Nuclear Security Administration, https://www.energy.gov/documents/nnsas-next-generation-safeguards-initiative-brochure.

Baldwin, George, and Mongiello, Risa. “International Nuclear Safeguards Cooperation.” Sandia National Laboratories. SAND 2011-XXXX. January 2011. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1110551.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. "2024 NNSA Year in Review: Making Our Vision a Reality." December 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/2024%20NNSA%20Year%20in%20Review_508.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. "2023 NNSA Year in Review: Making Our Vision a Reality." February 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/NNSA%202023%20Year%20In%20Review_0.pdf.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

As part of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the United States provides the IAEA with a list of all of its civil nuclear facilities, excluding only facilities with direct national security significance. In 1980, the United States submitted a list of more than 200 eligible facilities, and the IAEA is notified whenever a change to the list takes place. In 2009, the United States made its list public, but following public controversy, removed it from official government websites.

Of hundreds of eligible facilities, only one U.S. facility––the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site––has been under IAEA safeguards for decades and continued to remain under safeguards during the review period.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

As part of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the United States provides the IAEA with a list of all of its civil nuclear facilities, excluding only facilities with direct national security significance.

Of hundreds of eligible facilities, only one U.S. facility––the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site––has been under IAEA safeguards for decades and continued to remain under safeguards during the review period.

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5209.htm.

Obama, Barack. “The List of Sites, Locations, Facilities, and Activities Declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Message from the President transmitting the U.S. Additional Protocol declaration to Congress, House Document 111–37, 111th Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Government Printing Office, May 6, 2009. https://fissilematerials.org/library/us09.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “The International Atomic Energy Agency.” https://2021-2025.state.gov/iaea/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In 2018, the United States modified the small quantities protocol that covered its Caribbean territories.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Following its amendment to the small quantities protocol covering the U.S. Caribbean territories, the IAEA conducted its first inspection in 2022 under the auspices of the modified protocol.

Sources

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. U.S. statement as delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate. IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Agenda Item 8(b): Safeguards Implementation Report for 2021. June 8, 2022. https://vienna.usmission.gov/on-the-2021-safeguards-implementation-report/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States has historically been a strong supporter of ensuring that the IAEA’s safeguards protocols are evolving to meet new geopolitical challenges. For example, prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States supported the IAEA’s transition to the State-Level Concept for safeguards, which encouraged holistic, country-specific assessments rather than facility-by-facility accounting.

In addition, the United States is by far the largest financial supporter of the IAEA’s activities. The Government Accountability Office assessed that from 1998 through 2004, U.S. voluntary cash contributions, on average, were 83 percent of the total of all such member states’ contributions.

In particular, the United States contributed significant extrabudgetary funding towards IAEA’s safeguards work prior to the current Review Cycle. For example, in 2006, the United States donated approximately three-quarters of the IAEA’s entire pot of extrabudgetary funding for safeguards activities. The United States also initiated and helped corral support for a 20 percent increase in the IAEA’s budget.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States has historically been a strong political and financial supporter of ensuring that the IAEA’s safeguards protocols are evolving to meet new geopolitical challenges. In its comments in support of the Safeguards Implementation Reports during the current Review Cycle, the United States has encouraged states to conclude and strengthen their safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and to modify or rescind outdated small quantitates protocols, and has put significant financial resources towards engaging with partner countries to aid them in this transition.

Sources

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. "Safeguards Implementation at the State Level." September 10, 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20190824161944/https://vienna.usmission.gov/130910sg/.

Ford, Christopher Ashley. "Nonproliferation Lessons Learned." U.S. Department of State, 2018. https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/nonproliferation-lessons-learned/.

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. U.S. statement as delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate. IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Agenda Item 8(b): Safeguards Implementation Report for 2021. June 8, 2022. https://vienna.usmission.gov/on-the-2021-safeguards-implementation-report/.

Government Accountability Office. “IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed.” GAO-06-93. October 2005. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-93.pdf.

Ford, Christopher, A. “Cluster 2: Implementing Provisions of the NPT Related to the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” U.S. Department of State, May 9, 2007. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/npt/122644.htm.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Actions 29-32.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Actions 29-32.

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In 1977, the United States established the United States Support Program (USSP) at Brookhaven National Laboratory to fund research and development activities on behalf of the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards. The USSP responds to official requests for assistance from the IAEA and has assisted the Agency across a broad spectrum of disciplines, including non-destructive analysis of nuclear material, containment/surveillance capabilities, environmental monitoring techniques, remote monitoring, and information collection, processing and analysis.

In 2008, the NNSA established the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) “to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges.” As part of NGSI, NNSA’s Office of International Nuclear Safeguards coordinates collaborations with international partners to jointly advance safeguards technologies through the International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement (INSEP) program.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States has continued to respond to the IAEA’s tasking requests through the United States Support Program (USSP) and has engaged with other Member States through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative.

Due to ongoing advancements in small modular reactor technologies, the United States has been a leading proponent of the “safeguards by design” concept. For example, in December 2024, Oak Ridge National Laboratory hosted the IAEA’s Interregional Workshop on Safety, Security and Safeguards by Design in Small Modular Reactors, which welcomed 76 attendees representing 15 countries, three U.S. national labs, domestic and international industry partners, as well as IAEA officers.

During the second Trump administration, support for international institutions, including the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency, has declined. In particular, the Trump administration suspended two programs designed to provide American aid to the international nuclear inspection regime: a scientific and technical recruitment programme based at Brookhaven National Laboratory, and an illicit nuclear detection program based at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. At least one of these programs was ultimately reinstated following political and public outcry.

Sources

U.S. Department of Energy. U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards. Brookhaven National Laboratory. https://www.bnl.gov/ispo/ussp.php.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Office of International Nuclear Safeguards.” National Nuclear Security Administration, https://www.energy.gov/documents/nnsas-next-generation-safeguards-initiative-brochure.

Baldwin, George, and Mongiello, Risa. “International Nuclear Safeguards Cooperation.” Sandia National Laboratories. SAND 2011-XXXX. January 2011. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1110551.

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Safeguards By Design.” https://www.iaea.org/topics/assistance-for-states/safeguards-by-design.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory. “ORNL leads international community on safeguards, security for advanced reactors.” December 2, 2024. https://www.ornl.gov/news/ornl-leads-international-community-safeguards-security-advanced-reactors.

Broad, William J. ‘Atomic Detectives Who Inspect Iran Sites Are Affected by Trump’s Aid Freeze.” New York Times, 8 March 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/08/science/trump-nuclear-inspectors-aid-freeze.html.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States has been a member of all major multilateral non-proliferation regimes for decades, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The United States maintains control lists that correspond directly to those maintained by the aforementioned export control regimes, and also includes unilateral control imposed by the United States, such as the U.S. Munitions List. Exporters generally must submit a license request with the appropriate agency for any item on one of these lists. License requests typically go through an extensive review process, including review by interested U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the intelligence community, and NASA, as well as interested bureaus within the Department of State. The U.S. export control system also relies on catch-all controls to ensure that dual-use exports, which are not otherwise subject to export controls, are capable of being tracked, discussed with the recipient government, or even denied as an export transaction.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States maintained its membership and adherence to all multilateral non-proliferation regimes of which it is a member, and continued to advocate for the institution of responsible nuclear export controls. Specifically, in a statement at the 2024 NPT PrepCom, U.S. officials noted that “Robust export controls are thoroughly consistent with, and in fact facilitate and enhance confidence in, the right of States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. Though there is ample rhetoric to the contrary, there is no evidence that strategic trade controls, including the multilateral export control regimes, hamper the international exchange of technology for peaceful uses or hinder any country’s economic development.”

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “Overview of U.S. Export Control System.” https://2009-2017.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/index.htm.

Warden, Jim. “Statement to Cluster 2 of the 2024 NPT PrepCom.” U.S. Department of State. Jule 26, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/statement-to-cluster-2-of-the-2024-npt-prepcom/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 35.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 35.

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established a legally binding framework for the United States to establish significant peaceful nuclear cooperation with other countries. 123 Agreements legally mandate the U.S. partner country’s adherence to nine non-proliferation criteria, including legal obligations for U.S. partners to maintain strong standards with regard to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In addition, the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision prohibiting the President from submitting a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement to Congress “with respect to a proposed cooperation agreement with any country that has not signed and implemented an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States concluded 123 Agreements with five new countries: Singapore, the Philippines, Armenia, Thailand, Mexico.

In November 2025, the Trump administration finalized a series of agreements covering nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia that could potentially undermine the United States’ longstanding non-proliferation policy priorities, given that Saudi Arabia has not adopted the Additional Protocol. The Trump administration has reportedly issued a waiver to Congress granting the President the ability to circumvent the provision in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act; however, Congress has not yet made a decision as to whether it will approve the agreement.

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “123 Agreements: Fact Sheet.” July 2025. https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/releases/2025/01/123-agreements.

U.S. Government Publishing Office. Sec. 1264: Limitation on Production of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements, in National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Public Law 116-92. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-116publ92/html/PLAW-116publ92.htm.

Kerr, Paul K., and Nikitin, Mary Beth D. “Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer.” Congressional Research Service. RS22937. February 10, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS22937.

U.S. Embassy in Armenia. “Joint Statement on the Completion of Negotiations on an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Armenia.” February 10, 2026. https://am.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-the-completion-of-negotiations-on-an-agreement-for-peaceful-nuclear-cooperation-between-the-united-states-of-america-and/.

The White House. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Solidifies Economic and Defense Partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” November 18, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-solidifies-economic-and-defense-partnership-with-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia/.

Schwartz, Lowell, H. “How Congress Should Judge a Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.” Just Security. February 12, 2026. https://www.justsecurity.org/131259/congress-judge-saudi-nuclear-cooperation/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 39

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 39

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States has voiced significant support for Article IV of the NPT, noting in a fact sheet released by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Nonproliferation in 2000 that “The United States takes this commitment very seriously and has strongly supported peaceful nuclear cooperation both through international organizations and bilaterally.” The fact sheet concluded that “Clearly, the United States is fulfilling its obligations under Article IV of the NPT in many ways around the world.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States has consistently maintained that its export control policies do not impose “undue constraints” on states seeking peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In a statement at the 2024 NPT PrepCom, U.S. officials noted that “Robust export controls are thoroughly consistent with, and in fact facilitate and enhance confidence in, the right of States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. Though there is ample rhetoric to the contrary, there is no evidence that strategic trade controls, including the multilateral export control regimes, hamper the international exchange of technology for peaceful uses or hinder any country’s economic development. Without export controls in place, governments of these exporting states would determine that the risk of nuclear supply was too high and would ban, rather than control, many exports.”

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “Article IV of the NPT: U.S. Support for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.” Fact Sheet. April 1, 2000. https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/arms/bureau_np/000401_articleiv.html.

Warden, Jim. “Statement to Cluster 2 of the 2024 NPT PrepCom.” U.S. Department of State. Jule 26, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/statement-to-cluster-2-of-the-2024-npt-prepcom/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 41

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 41

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States, and particularly the National Nuclear Security Administration, spearheaded the effort to update the IAEA’s recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities in 2011 from Revision 4 to Revision 5.

In addition, in 2010 the Obama administration the United States established the Nuclear Security Summit process. The Summits were designed to enhance, elevate, expand and empower this architecture of treaties, institutions, norms and practices to effectively address nuclear security threats. Four Summits took place between 2010 and 2016, including the first in Washington, DC. Throughout the Summit process, Summit participants made over 260 national security commitments in the first three Summits, more than three-quarters of which had been implemented by 2016. In 2016, participants made nearly 90 additional national commitments. These commitments included the removal or elimination of nuclear material, the ratification and implementation of treaties, the conversion of reactors, strengthening of regulations, the launch of “Centers of Excellence,” the upgrade and enhancement of technologies and capabilities, and other initiatives to improve nuclear security. Following the conclusion of the Summit process, the Nuclear Security Contact Group was established to facilitate further information cooperation on nuclear security issues.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Although the Summit process ended prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States has continued to emphasize and promote adherence to strict security standards for nuclear materials.

In 2022, at the first Review Conference for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment (A/CPPNM), the United States delegation delivered a statement in support of full implementation and universality of the A/CPPNM.

As part of that statement, the United States requested that the IAEA host the United States’ second International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission, and encouraged all other state Parties to take advantage of the program. It also announced that each of its nuclear power plants would be inspected every two years to ensure compliance with updated cyber security requirements. In addition, at the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2024, the United States co-sponsored an event to encourage states to improve the security of nuclear materials in transit.

Sources

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5).” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13. 2011. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “IAEA Information Circular 225 Revision 5.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. March 22, 2012. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/186678.htm.

The White House. “Fact Sheets: The Nuclear Security Summits: Securing the World from Nuclear Terrorism.” March 29, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/29/fact-sheet-nuclear-security-summits-securing-world-nuclear-terrorism.

U.S. Department of State. “Nuclear Security Summit 2014: National Progress Report for the United States of America.” 2014. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/235470.pdf.

Nuclear Security Contact Group. “Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Security.” https://www.nscontactgroup.org/joint-statement.php.

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. “A/CPPNM Review Conference: U.S. National Statement.” March 28, 2022. https://vienna.usmission.gov/a-cppnm-review-conference-u-s-national-statement/.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA calls attention to the security of nuclear materials in transit at International Conference on Nuclear Security.” U.S. Department of Energy, 23 May 2024. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-calls-attention-security-nuclear-materials-transit-international-conference.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
The United States signed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on March 3, 1980, and was ratified on December 13, 1982. The 2005 Amendment was ratified by the United States on July 31, 2015.

Under the auspices of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment (A/CPPNM), the United States undertook several actions prior to the current Review Cycle, including:

Completing inspections under the U.S. Nuclear Power Plant Cyber Security Programs to verify that facilities had fully implemented their cyber security requirements.

Removing excess plutonium from the IAEA’s Nuclear Material Laboratory as part of its broader, decades-long campaign to permanently dispose of excess civilian highly enriched uranium and plutonium around the world.

Contributing nearly $245 million to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) since its inception, to include over $22.5 million in 2021.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In 2022, at the first Review Conference for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment (A/CPPNM), the United States delegation delivered a statement in support of full implementation and universality of the A/CPPNM.

As part of that statement, the United States requested that the IAEA host the United States’ second International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission, and encouraged all other state Parties to take advantage of the program. It also announced that each of its nuclear power plants would be inspected every two years to ensure compliance with updated cyber security requirements.

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. March 3, 1980. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5079.htm.

U.S. Department of State. “Multilateral (16-508) – Agreement Amending the Convention of October 26, 1979 on the Protection of Nuclear Material.” Office of Treaty Affairs. May 8, 2016. https://www.state.gov/16-508/.

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. “A/CPPNM Review Conference: U.S. National Statement.” March 28, 2022. https://vienna.usmission.gov/a-cppnm-review-conference-u-s-national-statement/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

With the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the United States adopted the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Import-Export Guidance in their entirety and enhanced domestic licensing and export-import licensing controls for high activity radioactive sources. The regulations were amended in 2006.

As part of its commitment to the Code of Conduct, the United States has implemented the National Source Tracking System, which tracks state-regulated Category 1 and Category 2 radioactive sources from the time of their manufacture or import through the time of their disposal, export, or decay.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In 2023, the United States, as part of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, issued a statement encouraging further political commitments and implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance.

Sources

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. “Treaties and Conventions.” https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/treaties-conventions.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. “Amendments to the Export and Import Regulations for Nuclear Equipment and Byproduct Material.” March 12, 2020. https://www.nrc.gov/security/byproduct/export-import/rules.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. “National Source Tracking System (NUREG/BR-0472).” March 2010. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0472/index.

U.S. Department of State. “Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. April 17, 2023. https://2021-2025.state.gov/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration established the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program––its flagship program to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Prior to the current Review Cycle, the program had deployed nearly international 800 radiation detection systems; transitioned responsibility for the long-term operation and maintenance of more than 620 systems deployed to international partners; and engaged with 15 international partners to increase global nuclear forensics capabilities.

The United States also co-founded the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2006––a voluntary partnership of 89 nations and six international organizations that are committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. The United States served as co-chair of the GICNT alongside Russia.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the National Nuclear Security Administration continued to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials through its Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program. Through this program, NSDD collaborates with international organizations including INTERPOL, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Commission, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Customs Organization, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. NSDD also partners with Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Finland, among other partner countries to fund joint capacity building efforts around the globe.

The United States served as co-chair of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism alongside Russia; however, in 2022 the GICNT paused all official meetings of the GICNT and its working groups indefinitely.

Sources

National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA marks 20th anniversary of the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program.” May 21, 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20210516092731/https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-marks-20th-anniversary-nuclear-smuggling-detection-and-deterrence-program.

U.S. Department of State. “The Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-global-initiative-to-combat-nuclear-terrorism/.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “Countering Nuclear Smuggling.” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/countering-nuclear-smuggling.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on September 14, 2005; U.S. ratification was deposited on September 30, 2015; and the Convention entered into force for the United States on October 30, 2015.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The Convention entered into force for the United States prior to the current Review Cycle.

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “Multilateral (15-1030) – International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” Office of Treaty Affairs. October 30, 2015. https://www.state.gov/15-1030/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 44

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 44

Sources

See Action 44

Peaceful Uses

View peaceful uses actions for all countries

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 49

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 49

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 49

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 49

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, under the auspices of the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) the United States made several notable financial and diplomatic contributions to expand access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy to States parties. Several of these contributions were specifically aimed to address the needs of non-nuclear weapon states and developing countries, including:

The establishment of the American Assured Fuel Supply to function as a backup fuel supply for U.S. domestic or international partners;

The contribution of nearly $50 million to the establishment and operationalization in 2019 of the IAEA’s Low Enriched Uranium Bank;

The reallocation of €10 million to activities under the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy and technical cooperation projects managed by the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology and the Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean;

The signing of five Nuclear Cooperation Memoranda of Understanding with Bulgaria, Ghana, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia to boost nuclear cooperation and support between the United States’ and these countries’ nuclear sectors.

The collaboration between the U.S. Department of Energy and their counterparts in more than 100 countries––including many low- and medium-income countries––to promote regulation, oversight, and accessibility of peaceful uses projects.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

At the NPT Review Conference in 2022, the United States, in partnership with the United Kingdom and with the political support of 29 other countries, launched the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses (SDPU). The SPDU is particularly focused on how the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can help further progress on the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals, particularly for those who are economically and socially vulnerable. The scope of the SPDU was shaped by subject matter experts and practitioners from the Global South and has spawned projects supporting water security in the MENA region; access to nuclear medicine in West Africa; sustainable financing to improve women’s health outcomes; food security in the context of climate change; and several others.

Under the auspices of the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program, the United States has provided more than $20 million in voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s Rays of Hope initiative, which aims to provide cancer care to regions that lack sufficient funding or facilities for radiation treatment. The United States has also supported the IAEA’s flagship Nuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution initiative using irradiation to develop new recycling techniques, as well as Atoms4Food, which supports food security efforts through nuclear science.

In addition, in 2020 the United States announced that it would contribute another $50 million in voluntary contributions to the IAEA through 2024, to support the IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI), bringing the total US contribution to the PUI to more than $117 million. As of June 2026, the second Trump administration had not made an announcement indicating a significant financial contribution to the PUI.

Sources

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Norway, Paraguay, Romania, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States. "Facilitating Dialogue to Support Enhanced Peaceful Uses Cooperation as Envisioned under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." Working Paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.46/Rev.2. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/WP.46/Rev.2.

U.S. Department of State. "Year One: Building a Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses for the NPT and a Brighter Future." Accessed October 24, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/year-one-building-a-sustained-dialogue-on-peaceful-uses-for-the-npt-and-a-brighter-future/.

U.S. Department of State. "The United States Contributes Up to $4 Million in Funding to the International Atomic Energy Agency to Support the Rays of Hope Initiative." December 14, 2022. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-united-states-contributes-up-to-4-million-in-funding-to-the-international-atomic-energy-agency-to-support-the-rays-of-hope-initiative/.

International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical Cooperation Report for 2024. GC(69)/INF/6. 69th Regular Session of the General Conference. Vienna: IAEA, 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc69-inf6.pdf.

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva. “United States announces $50 million commitment to IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative.” November 10, 2020. https://vienna.usmission.gov/press-release-united-states-announces-50-million-commitment-to-iaeas-peaceful-uses-initiative/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, under the auspices of the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) the United States made several notable financial and diplomatic contributions to expand access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy to States parties. Several of these contributions were specifically aimed to address the needs of non-nuclear weapon states and developing countries, including:

The establishment of the American Assured Fuel Supply to function as a backup fuel supply for U.S. domestic or international partners;

The contribution of nearly $50 million to the establishment and operationalization in 2019 of the IAEA’s Low Enriched Uranium Bank;

The reallocation of €10 million to activities under the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy and technical cooperation projects managed by the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology and the Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean;

The signing of five Nuclear Cooperation Memoranda of Understanding with Bulgaria, Ghana, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia to boost nuclear cooperation and support between the United States’ and these countries’ nuclear sectors.

The collaboration between the U.S. Department of Energy and their counterparts in more than 100 countries––including many low- and medium-income countries––to promote regulation, oversight, and accessibility of peaceful uses projects.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

At the NPT Review Conference in 2022, the United States, in partnership with the United Kingdom and with the political support of 29 other countries, launched the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses (SDPU). The SPDU is particularly focused on how the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can help further progress on the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals, particularly for those who are economically and socially vulnerable. The scope of the SPDU was shaped by subject matter experts and practitioners from the Global South and has spawned projects supporting water security in the MENA region; access to nuclear medicine in West Africa; sustainable financing to improve women’s health outcomes; food security in the context of climate change; and several others.

Under the auspices of the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program, the United States has provided more than $20 million in voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s Rays of Hope initiative, which aims to provide cancer care to regions that lack sufficient funding or facilities for radiation treatment. The United States has also supported the IAEA’s flagship Nuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution initiative using irradiation to develop new recycling techniques, as well as Atoms4Food, which supports food security efforts through nuclear science.

Sources

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Norway, Paraguay, Romania, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States. "Facilitating Dialogue to Support Enhanced Peaceful Uses Cooperation as Envisioned under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." Working Paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.46/Rev.2. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/WP.46/Rev.2.

U.S. Department of State. "Year One: Building a Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses for the NPT and a Brighter Future." Accessed October 24, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/year-one-building-a-sustained-dialogue-on-peaceful-uses-for-the-npt-and-a-brighter-future/.

U.S. Department of State. "The United States Contributes Up to $4 Million in Funding to the International Atomic Energy Agency to Support the Rays of Hope Initiative." December 14, 2022. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-united-states-contributes-up-to-4-million-in-funding-to-the-international-atomic-energy-agency-to-support-the-rays-of-hope-initiative/.

International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical Cooperation Report for 2024. GC(69)/INF/6. 69th Regular Session of the General Conference. Vienna: IAEA, 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc69-inf6.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 49

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 49

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 53

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 53

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
Prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States provided more than $390 million in voluntary contributions to support technical cooperation projects, a figure which includes $60 million above and beyond projects funded directly through the Technical Cooperation Fund.

Through these contributions, the United States directly supported a variety of projects across the globe, including, among others:

Implementing methods to trace oil and plastic pollution in marine waters;

Building capacity to detect, quantify, and reduce the adverse impacts of harmful algal toxins on seafood safety;

Continued development of a sustainable zone free of the tsetse fly in the Niayes region of Senegal;

Improvement of veterinary laboratory capacities in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa;

Strengthening food security worldwide by increasing crop production and soil fertility using nuclear techniques;

Advancement of education and training in nuclear medicine;

Enhancement of national capabilities to respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies in Africa;

Enhancement of the capacity of national monitoring teams in Africa to ensure early detection of zoonotic diseases;

Study of the possible impact of radioactive releases following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident;

Improvement of the control of radioactive sources in Africa and the Mediterranean region;

The provision of COVID-19 diagnostic testing kits.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Over two years between 2022 and 2024, the United States provided more than $50 million in voluntary contributions to support technical cooperation projects––approximately 25% of the total target share for technical cooperation during that time.

The funds provided by the United States have helped support the IAEA’s technical cooperation projects, including the Rays of Hope initiative––which aims to provide cancer care to regions that lack sufficient funding or facilities for radiation treatment––and the Nuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution initiative, which leverages irradiation to develop new recycling techniques, as well as Atoms4Food, which supports food security efforts through nuclear science.

Sources

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical Cooperation Report for 2024. GC(69)/INF/6. 69th Regular Session of the General Conference. Vienna: IAEA, 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc69-inf6.pdf.

International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical Cooperation Report for 2023: Supplement. GC(68)/INF/7/SUPPLEMENT. 68th Regular Session of the General Conference. Vienna: IAEA, 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc68-inf7_supplement.pdf.

International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical Cooperation Report for 2023. GC(68)/INF/7. 68th Regular Session of the General Conference. Vienna: IAEA, 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc68-inf-7.pdf.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 53

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 53

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Action 53

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Action 53

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States contributed more than $100 million to the Peaceful Uses Initiative, which helped to fund projects that strengthen the control of radioactive sources and radioactive waste, upgrade radiation protection infrastructures, support human resource development in nuclear security, and strengthen national capabilities for responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In 2020 the United States announced that it would contribute another $50 million in voluntary contributions to the IAEA through 2024, to support the IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI), bringing the total US contribution to the PUI to more than $117 million. These contributions directly support human resource development in nuclear security and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As of June 2026, the second Trump administration had not made an announcement indicating a significant financial contribution to the PUI.

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “The IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative and the NPT.” https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/releases/2025/01/the-iaea-peaceful-uses-initiative-and-the-npt.

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva. “United States announces $50 million commitment to IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative.” November 10, 2020. https://vienna.usmission.gov/press-release-united-states-announces-50-million-commitment-to-iaeas-peaceful-uses-initiative/.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

See Actions 29-37 and 41-46

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

See Actions 29-37 and 41-46

Sources

N/A
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, he emphasized U.S. support for an international fuel bank to allow countries to access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. In 2019, the United States contributed nearly $50 million to the establishment and operationalization of the IAEA’s Low Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In 2023, the United States, alongside Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom, established the Sapporo 5 group to support the stable supply of reactor fuels and to reduce global reliance on Russian supply chains by increasing the availability of commercial free-market alternatives in the supply of civil nuclear technologies. At COP28, these leaders pledged $4.2 billion in government-led investments “to establish a resilient global uranium supply market free from Russian influence.”

Sources

The White House. “Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered.” Office of the Press Secretary. April 5, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered.

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Statement on Civil Nuclear Fuel Cooperation Between the United States, Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom.” April 17, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-civil-nuclear-fuel-cooperation-between-united-states-canada-france-japan-and.

U.S. Department of Energy. “At COP28, U.S., Canada, France, Japan, and UK Announce Plans to Mobilize $4.2 Billion for Reliable Global Nuclear Energy Supply Chain.” December 7, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/articles/cop28-us-canada-france-japan-and-uk-announce-plans-mobilize-42-billion-reliable-global.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States became a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in July 1999; a party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in October 1988; a party to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in October 1988; a party to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in July 2003; a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in September 2015; a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in February 1987; and a party to the CPPNM’s amendment in May 2016

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States became a party to all of the above-named agreements before the current Review Cycle.

Sources

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Convention on Nuclear Safety.” 25 April 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/23/09/cns_status.pdf

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.” 17 September 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/23/11/not_status.pdf

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.” 17 September 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/cacnare_status.pdf

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.” 5 March 2026. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/jointconv_status.pdf

United Nations. “International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” 6 April 2026. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-15&chapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.” 18 September 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/cppnm_status.pdf

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.” 25 April 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/cppnm_amend_status.pdf
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s International Nuclear Security

for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR) program partners with the U.S. advanced nuclear reactor industry, as well as nascent nuclear power countries, to improve the security of future U.S. advanced reactor exports through early integration of security by design; build nuclear security capacity in countries embarking on new nuclear power programs; and strengthen the global nuclear security regime to develop international guidelines and resources on evolving security considerations posed by advanced and small modular reactors.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States has continued to engage the U.S. advanced nuclear reactor industry and nascent nuclear power countries through its INSTAR program. Through this program, INSTAR funds national laboratory experts to engage directly with vendors and act as a resource on physical security, target set identification, nuclear material accounting, insider threat, cyber security, transport security, and sabotage mitigation capabilities. Experts are available to provide technical guidance to companies on security concepts; regulatory approaches; current and emerging technologies; Security by Design considerations; and theft and sabotage risk mitigation.

The United States also regularly engaged with international partners and the domestic nuclear industry to share best practices on nuclear safety and security. For example, in 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the United Kingdom Office for Nuclear Regulation on increasing collaboration on the technical reviews of advanced reactor and small modular reactor technologies.

Sources

U.S. Department of Energy. “International Nuclear Security for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR).” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/international-nuclear-security-advanced-reactors-instar-fact-sheet.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Nuclear Nexus: International Nuclear Security.” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nuclear-nexus-international-nuclear-security.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. “Memorandum of Cooperation Between the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), the United Kingdom Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), and the NRC.” March 12, 2024. https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/who-were-working-with/international-cooperation/nrc-cnsc-moc.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In 1978, the Department of Energy established the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program to help minimize civilian use of highly enriched uranium. The U.S. Government’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative and subsequent 2016 reorganization into the NNSA’s Office of Material Management and Minimization continued these efforts. Since 1978, at least 109 research reactors and medical isotope facilities worldwide were either converted to LEU or confirmed shutdown.

Prior to the current Review Cycle, the NNSA also achieved success in helping Mo-99 production facilities in converting to high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) and supports the establishment of domestic supplies of Mo-99 without the use of proliferation-sensitive HEU. The NNSA’s progress on this issue prompted a joint certification in 2021 by the Secretaries of Energy and Health and Human Services that there was now enough worldwide supply of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 made without using HEU to meet the needs of patients in the United States, thus triggering a congressionally mandated ban on exports of HEU for foreign medical isotope production.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the current Review Cycle, the NNSA’s Office of Material Management and Minimization developed, designed, and tested a new LEU fuel (uranium-molybdenum monolithic) that as of 2026 was in the final stages of fuel demonstrations before applying for regulatory approval for use. In addition to this new first of a kind monolithic fuel, M3 has partnered with the European HERACLES consortium of reactors and fuel manufacturers to develop, design, test, and qualify new high-density LEU fuels including a new uranium-molybdenum dispersion fuel, as well as a higher-density uranium-silicide dispersion fuel. These new LEU fuels will be used to convert research reactors in the United States and abroad.

In addition, in 2023, the NNSA’s Mo-99 Program achieved a major milestone when it helped Belgium’s National Institute of Radioelements convert their medical isotope production facility from HEU to LEU; as a result, all major global molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) production facilities now use LEU targets.

Sources

U.S. Department of Energy. “RERTR-2024 International Meeting.” October 27-31, 2024. https://rertr.nse.anl.gov/international-meetings/2024-meeting/.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Qualification of New LEU Fuels for Research Reactors.” April 23, 2026. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/qualification-new-leu-fuels-research-reactors.

U.S. Department of Energy. “U.S. Secretaries of Energy and Health and Human Services Jointly Certify Sufficient Worldwide Supply of Critical Medical Isotope.” December 20, 2021. https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-secretaries-energy-and-health-and-human-services-jointly-certify-sufficient-worldwide.

U.S. Department of Energy. “NNSA helps global health industry achieve major nuclear nonproliferation milestone.” March 28, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-helps-global-health-industry-achieve-major-nuclear-nonproliferation-milestone.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The transportation of radioactive and nuclear materials within the United States is primarily regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. Department of Transportation. These regulations are based upon standards developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the review period, the United States has pushed for the universalization of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, which is the primary legally binding international instrument related to the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, including during transport.

In addition, at the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2024, the United States co-sponsored an event to encourage states to improve the security of nuclear materials in transit.

Sources

U.S. National Archives. Code of Federal Regulations: Title 49 CFR Part 171. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/subtitle-B/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-171.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA calls attention to the security of nuclear materials in transit at International Conference on Nuclear Security.” U.S. Department of Energy, 23 May 2024. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-calls-attention-security-nuclear-materials-transit-international-conference.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United States’ domestic civil nuclear liability regime is governed by the 1957 Price-Anderson Act, which accords with U.S.-specific tort law. The United States did not did not sign the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention, nor is it party to the underlying Vienna Convention or to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, because those conventions do not take into account the U.S. system of tort liability.

The United States did, however, become party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 2008, noting that its national law complied with the provisions of the Annex to the Convention. The treaty entered into force in April 2015.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In January 2026, the Conference to Consider and Adopt Proposed Amendments to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage––with a U.S. representative acting as President––adopted by consensus an amendment that removes the requirement for States with no nuclear reactors to contribute public funds to the Convention. The amendment has not yet entered into force.

Sources

U.S. Department of Energy. “Price-Anderson Act: Report to Congress.” January 2023. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-02/PAA%20Report%20January%202023_0.pdf.

United States Senate. “Convention on Supplementary Compensation on Nuclear Damage.” Text – Treaty Document: Senate Consideration of Treaty Document 107-21. 3 August 2006. https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/107th-congress/21/document-text

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.” 3 October 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/supcomp_status.pdf.

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Amendment to Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage Adopted by Consensus.”14 January 2026. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/amendment-to-convention-on-supplementary-compensation-for-nuclear-damage-adopted-by-consensus.
What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States did not conduct or threaten armed attacks against any civilian nuclear installations.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

U.S. military action against Iran in 2025––particularly its strikes against the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, all three of which were under IAEA safeguards––directly contravened GC(53)/DEC/13. The fact that Iran was itself in breach of its safeguards obligations does not mitigate the prohibition on armed attack under the GC decision, nor does the decision offer exceptions for pre-emptive or preventatives strikes.

Sources

United States

Disarmament

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

Non-Proliferation

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Sources

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?