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Pillar 1

Action 5

The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:

(a) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;
(b) Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;
(c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;
(d) Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;
(e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;
(f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and
(g) Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the above undertakings to the Preparatory Committee at 2014. The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

For (a) (b) (c) and (d), China has continued the above-mentioned commitment/policies from Action 1 and 3, including positive and negative ones.

For (e), consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security, (f) reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons, and (g) further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence:

China has kept its nuclear forces at a low alert (de-mated storage);

China has concluded a China–Russia launch notification agreement for ballistic missiles and carrier rockets in 2009, extended to 2030 as a risk-reduction/confidence-building measure;

China has led the P5 Glossary working group, with the P5 explicitly identifying the Glossary and their common reporting framework as implementing Action 5(g);

China has published two White Papers on arms control and disarmament (1995 and 2005).

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

For (a) (b) (c) and (d), China has continued the above-mentioned commitment/policies from Action 1 and 3.

For (e), (f), and (g):

  • China has kept its nuclear forces at a moderate state of alert, a slight increase from the past;
  • China has provided missile pre-launch notification to relevant states before its September 2024 ICBM test;
  • China has published a White Paper named “China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era.”
  • China has submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.30) on nuclear risk reduction.
  • China has served as P5 coordinator again, working to promote greater communication about nuclear policies and strategic mutual trust among the five states.

Sources

Chinese Delegation. “Statement by the Chinese Delegation on Nuclear Disarmament at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” May 2, 2014.

Kile, Shannon N., and Hans M. Kristensen. “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2017.” 2017.

Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020.” 2020.

Kristensen, Hans M., Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle. “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2025.” 2025.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era. White paper. November 27, 2025.

People’s Republic of China. “Nuclear Risk Reduction.” Working paper submitted by China. August 2023.

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

(a) France has reduced its arsenal by a third since the end of the Cold War, with in particular the complete elimination of its ground-based forces which was completed in 1998, the downsizing by a third of the sea-based nuclear deterrent (from 6 ballistic nuclear submarines to four) and of the strategic air forces (from 3 squadrons dedicated to the nuclear mission to 2).

(b) France does not hold nuclear weapons in reserve. Disarmament measures have applied to the three different types of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles produced by France.

(c) France reiterated its conception of nuclear deterrence, which is strictly defensive, applicable only in extreme circumstances of self-defence and is based on the principle of strict sufficiency

(d) In his speech on nuclear matters, President Emmanuel Macron emphasised the role of France to promote work on strategic risk reduction, which aims at decreasing the risk of nuclear use. France has been promoting some of these measures as part of the P5 process (France took the lead on this issue within the P5) and within different groupings, but also by itself.

(e) France reduced the permanent alert level of its nuclear forces twice, in 1992 and 1996. These reductions were in both the response times of forces and the number of weapons systems on alert. Specifically, since 1996, France has kept only one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine permanently at sea and in 1997, France announced that all of its nuclear forces had been de-targeted. Since then, France has consistently reaffirmed that “[its] nuclear forces are not directed against any country”.

(f) The French legislation includes the notion of ‘governmental control’, which aims in part to make it impossible that any nuclear weapons may be used without a formal order from the French President.

(g) Among transparency and confidence-building measures, France lists the publication of its nuclear doctrine, through presidential speeches and in various forums and documents, the information relating to the number of nuclear weapons possessed, the pre-launch notification of ballistic missile tests and space launches through the Hague Code of Conduct against the proliferation of ballistic missiles (HCoC) and the publication of budgetary information regarding the nuclear weapon investments. In 2022, it presided over the adoption of the P5 statement according to which “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

(a) No new reduction since 2022. In March 2026, President Emmanuel Macron announced the upcoming increase in the French arsenal and that the government would no longer communicate on its number of warheads. This increase was justified by the improvement of potential adversaries’ missile defence systems, and by the fact that France may have to deter a combination of adversaries. The President specified that France still refuse the concept of arms race.

(b) Policy is unchanged on that matter since 2022, France does not hold any nuclear weapons in reserve and regard all nuclear weapons as strategic.

(c) The role of nuclear deterrence in France security policy has not changed since 2022.

(d) France has continued to discuss about strategic risk reduction as part of the P5, CEND, and in other forums. It repeated regularly its commitment to the adoption of concrete measures in its realm.

(e) No change of policy since 2022.

(f) No change of policy since 2022.

(g) France has kept pre-notifying its ballistic missile tests and space launches through the HCoC, and organised a visit of its space launch site in Kourou in December 2022. In November 2022, France committed not to test debris-creating anti-satellite missiles. In 2026, President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would no longer communicate the number of warheads it possesses in its arsenal.

Sources

National report submitted by France. National report pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2015–2022. NPT/CONF.2020/42. (New York), 20 December 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/42

Working paper submitted by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Strategic risk reduction. NPT/CONF.2020/WP.33. (New York), 7 December 2021, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/documents/WP33.pdf

2019 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. (Dinard and Saint Malo), 6 April 2019. https://www.elysee.fr/admin/upload/default/0001/05/2ffa826926cd72354b90a05f7de765bfcc9908b6.pdf

Emmanuel Macron. Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy. (Paris), 7 February 2020. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy

France Diplomacy. Nuclear disarmament. Accessed 22 September 2025. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/nuclear-disarmament/

Code de la Défense [Defence Code]. Article R*1411-8. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000006071307/LEGISCTA000006182875/

France Diplomacy. Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States On Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races (Paris), 3 January 2022, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/news/2022/article/joint-statement-of-the-leaders-of-the-five-nuclear-weapon-states-on-preventing

Statement by France. Conference on Disarmament – Statement by Camille PETIT, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 23 March 2023, https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Conference-on-Disarmament-Statement-by-Camille-PETIT-Ambassador-Permanent-2227

European Union. Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2022. C/2023/383. 20 October 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023XG00383

France Diplomacy. Spatial – Engagement de la France à ne pas conduire d’essais de missiles antisatellites destructifs à ascension directe. [Spatial – France’s commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests] 29 November 2022, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/securite-desarmement-et-non-proliferation/actualites-et-evenements-lies-a-la-securite-au-desarmement-et-a-la-non/2022/article/spatial-engagement-de-la-france-a-ne-pas-conduire-d-essais-de-missiles

Nuclear deterrence – Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, Ile Longue, 2 March 2026, https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-26067-en.pdf

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

For (a) and (b) Russia has engaged in reductions of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. (see Action 3)

For (c) Russia in official statements declared that it is consistently reducing the place and role of nuclear weapons in its defence policy.

Russia stated that the Military Doctrine of Russia gives priority to implementation of a set of diplomatic, military and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggression through non-nuclear means in the framework of the system of non-nuclear, including strategic, deterrence.

Russian military doctrine and the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence declare that the state policy on nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature. These documents stipulate that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if an attack on Russia, including a conventional aggression, threatens the very existence of the state.

For (d) Russia has engaged in dialogue on policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons in various formats.

Since 2010 Russia has participated in discussions on issues pertaining to transparency, confidence, nuclear risk reduction and nuclear doctrines under the auspices of the P5 Process.

As part of the P5 process Russia has contributed to the development of the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms which was first released in 2015.

In 2019-2020 Russia engaged in a series of talks with the USA on strategic stability and nuclear arms control.

In 2021 Russia and the USA issued a joint statement on strategic stability and held a series of meetings under Russia-US strategic stability dialogue

In 2020 Russia, for the first time, made the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence publicly available.

Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019

For (e) (f) and (g) Russia has undertaken a number of measures that reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

Russia stated that it acts in such a manner as to avert situations that could lead to dangerous aggravation of relations at the international and regional levels and to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war, and is also taking the necessary steps to reduce the nuclear threat.

Russia exchanged notifications of ballistic missile launches under corresponding agreements with the USA (1988 U.S.-Soviet Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement) and China (2009 Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles). Russia extended the agreement with China in 2020.

Russia joined a P5 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought in 2022.

In 2001, China and Russia agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other or target strategic nuclear missiles against each other. Russia has signed a mutual de-targeting agreement with the USA in 1994.

Russia stated that it maintains the policy of non-deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons, keeping them at centralised storage facilities and not on delivery systems.

In 2020 Russia, for the first time, made the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence publicly available.

The doctrine outlines a list of conditions under which Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons

Russia states that the doctrine ensures the level of transparency and clearness with regard to the parameters of nuclear deterrence

Under exchange of data provisions of the New START Treaty, Russia shared information regarding its nuclear forces with the USA annually.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

For (a) and (b) (see Action 3)

For (c) Russia released an updated version of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence in 2024.

The revised document includes language asserting that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear attack or a conventional aggression that threatens the very existence of the state, but also to respond to a conventional aggression that creates a critical threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and Belarus.

Russia has reiterated the commitment to the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought in official statements.

For (d) Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts to further consider the nuclear disarmament verification issue in 2022-2023.

Russia served as chair of the P5 Process in 2023-2024.

For (e) (f) and (g) Russia continued to issue notifications on launches of ballistic missiles in accordance with relevant treaties.

In 2024 Russia released an updated version of its nuclear doctrine (Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence)

In 2025 Russia has released a joint statement with China on Global Strategic Stability in which the two sides emphasized special responsibility of nuclear-weapon states for international security and global strategic stability and called for building confidence to avoid dangerous miscalculations and refrain from actions that generate strategic risks.

Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty in 2023 but noted that it will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions under New START.

In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to.

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula’s problems, 4 July 2017. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1549360/

Statement by the Russian Federation. First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly at the Thematic Debate on «Nuclear Weapons» (New York), 5 November 2020. https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/05-11-2020_statement-by_7ea09b157a28d8894e30459b759a93a6/

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, 3 January 2022.

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67551

Statement by the Russian Federation. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 August 2022. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/8CmKgQeW0qnV_en.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s answer to a question from Kommersant newspaper about Russia’s assessments of its chairmanship in the group of five Nuclear Weapon States”, 26 July 2024.

https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963794/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, 3 December 2024.

https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/

Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I Specific Issue: Nuclear disarmament and security assurances. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/2013557/?lang=en

Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I: Nuclear disarmament. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability, 8 May 2025.

http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6310

China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf.

China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. Working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51. New York: United Nations, 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956428.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Moscow Declaration by President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin, Moscow, Russia, January 14, 1994

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

For (a) see previous section

For (b) the UK has not entered into bilateral or multilateral nuclear arms reduction discussions or processes. It has previously stated that UK nuclear weapons will be included in negotiations when the UK is satisfied with progress towards the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

The UK has not invited external verification of the unilateral reductions in its nuclear arsenal because of the absence of a wider arms control context involving reciprocal obligations from other nuclear states.

For (c) the UK made a number of changes to its declaratory policy in 2010 by strengthening its negative security assurance that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NPT NNWS unless the state is in material breach of its NPT non-proliferation obligations.

The UK declared in a joint P5 statement in 2022 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. However, UK governments have repeatedly stated that nuclear weapons remain an essential and “ultimate insurance” for national security.

For (d) the UK has condemned the DPRK’s continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and supported UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094.

The UK has participated in the E3+3 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme; supported six UNSCRs on Iran’s nuclear programme, and negotiated the JCPOA is implementation.

The UK made a major contribution to the G8 Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction and, as part of the UK’s G8 Presidency in 2013.

The UK has also expanded its work on nuclear disarmament verification through the QUAD, IPNDV and UN GGEs.

For (e) the UK de-targeted its submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons in 1994 and ‘de-alerted’ its nuclear weapons in 1998 Strategic Defence Review to several days’ notice to fire.

For (f) the UK states that its nuclear weapon command and control system is fully independent, and that the UK has full operational control over its use and only the Prime Minister can authorise the use of UK nuclear weapons.

In 1992 the UK government declared the Holbrook warhead design for its Trident SLBMs as one-point safe meaning the warhead will not produce a nuclear yield if accidentally detonated by an explosion at a single point in its conventional high explosive system.

The UK hosted the ninth P5 Conference on 12-13 February 2020 in London and led a number of expert-level P5 working groups on nuclear doctrines and risk reduction and in 2021 declared it will “champion strategic risk reduction and seek to create dialogue among states possessing nuclear weapons…to increase understanding and reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation.”

For (g) the UK has funded projects on nuclear-armed states’ conceptions of their responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons.

It provides annual updates to Parliament on the progress of the Dreadnought Class submarine programme.

The UK publishes annual information on holdings of civil separated plutonium, HUE, LEU and natural uranium in the civil nuclear cycle.

The UK asked Parliament to vote in 2016 on the principle of maintaining a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence (CASD) posture and continuing with the programme to build four new SSBNs to maintain the UK’s nuclear weapons programme and won by a significant majority (472 to 117).

The UK hosted the sixth P5 Conference in London in February 2015 on further steps on transparency.

The UK has reduced transparency in 2021 by no longer providing figures for the operational stockpile, deployed warheads or deployed missile numbers “Given the changing security and technological environment.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

For (a) the UK has not undertaken any further reductions in its nuclear arsenal.

For (b) the UK has not addressed the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process.

For (c) the UK further clarified the negative security assurance set out in 2010 and reiterated in 2021, stating that it regards a material breach as referring to a State developing or attempting to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, not safeguards or procedural issues.

The UK released a joint statement in 2022 with France and the United States further reaffirming its NPT-related positive and negative security assurances.

The UK has not taken any further steps to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.

Instead, the UK has continued the modernisation of the nuclear weapons complex and submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons system (see Action 3).

The current Labour government has repeated that nuclear weapons are an essential insurance and “our ultimate insurance policy that protects our freedoms and our way of life”.

The UK has increased the role and significance of nuclear weapons through its commitment in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review to purchase 12 F-35A fighter jets in order to join NATO’s dual capable aircraft nuclear mission.

For (d) the UK reiterated in a statement in 2024 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

The UK initiated a programme of work with NNWS and civil society on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament and participated in discussions with NWS and NNWS on strategic risk reduction.

It continued its work on nuclear disarmament verification through the QUAD, IPNDV and UN GGEs.

The UK continued to condemn the DPRK’s continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and supported relevant UNSCRs. It also continued to call on Iran to abide by its safeguards obligations under the NPT, fully cooperate with the IAEA and seek a diplomatic solution to concerns about its nuclear programme.

For (e) the UK has not taken any further steps to reduce the operational status of its nuclear weapons systems.

For (f) the UK has not reported specific new measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons. When asked if the UK intended to commission an independent ‘failsafe’ review of the safety, security, and reliability of its nuclear weapons, nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), and integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems following the example of the US Department of Defence, the UK Minister of State replied “We have absolute confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, but for the purpose of safeguarding national security, we will not provide detailed comment on arrangements for its assurance.”

The UK submitted a joint working paper with the US and France to the 2022 NPT Review Conference on ‘Principles and responsible practices for Nuclear Weapon States’ that set out a number of steps on risk reduction to which the UK is committed.

The UK intends to use its chairing of the P5 process from mid-2025-mid-2026 to “convene substantive discussions on nuclear doctrine between the P5 states, and discuss nuclear risk reduction”.

For (g) the UK has reiterated the central importance of applying the principles of transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility to any nuclear disarmament efforts.

The UK also published the Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper in 2024, which it says provides the fullest account of the UK’s Defence Nuclear Enterprise.

The UK has refused to confirm whether or not US B61-12 nuclear bombs have been deployed to RAF Lakenheath, stating that “remains a long-standing UK and NATO policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location”.

Sources

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P3 Joint Statement on Security Assurances, 4 August 2022. https://2021-2025.state.gov/p3-joint-statement-on-security-assurances/

Getting to a world without nuclear weapons: a food-for-thought paper. 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NPT/CONF.2020/WP.35 (United Nations, New York). December 10 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/WP.35

Principles and responsible practices for Nuclear Weapon States. Working paper submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NPT/CONF.2020/WP.70 (United Nations, New York). 29 July 2022. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/npt_conf.2020_e_wp.70.pdf

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

a) See Action 3.

b) In 2010, the United States signed the bilateral New START Treaty with Russia, which placed limits on deployments of strategic nuclear warheads and launchers. The Treaty, however, did not cover non-strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, in 2019 the first Trump administration withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which had previously eliminated and prohibited an entire range-class of delivery system.

c) In 2013, the Obama administration announced the first revision of its nuclear weapons employment guidance since 2002, which directed the Department of Defense to align U.S. nuclear missions with the guidance of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. This narrowed the scope of missions through which nuclear weapons could be employed, reduced the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, and directed the Department of Defense to examine and reduce the role of launch under attack in nuclear planning.

The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and corresponding nuclear employment guidance indicated a change from previous policy, with the latter document noting that because “nuclear-armed potential adversaries chose not to follow the U.S. lead in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies […] it would be imprudent for the United States to reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally at this time or in the near future.”

The 2018 NPR also added a new role for US nuclear weapons: “hedging against an uncertain future,” which prompted the development of two “supplements” to the U.S. force structure: the low-yield W76-2 warhead and the new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile.

d) In an effort to increasingly engage with the disarmament community and with Non-Nuclear Weapon States, in 2015 the P5 invited NNSW and civil society to briefings and outreach events alongside the P5 Conference in London. This was the first time that non-nuclear weapon states were invited to a discussion session as part of a P5 Conference.

e) The United States boycotted the first two conferences addressing the human consequences of nuclear weapons in 2013 and 2014; however, it participated in the third conference in Vienna in 2014, promoting the need for progress on disarmament verification and monitoring as a means towards a nuclear-free world.

f) In 1992, the George H. W. Bush administration commissioned a report by the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Failsafe and Risk Reduction, which included dozens of concrete recommendations to reduce the risk of unauthorized, accidental, or mistaken nuclear use. However, the majority of these recommendations would require updating for the digital age, particularly as the next generation of nuclear systems will be reliant on networked infrastructure.

g) Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States formally met with other members of the P5 approximately ten times to discuss measures for promoting confidence-building and nuclear disarmament. The United States hosted the third and seventh such conferences in Washington, DC, in 2012 and 2016. The United States also participated in inter-sessional meetings at the working level. At each meeting, the United States––alongside its P5 partners––emphasized the continued importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, the 2010 Action Plan as a framework for achieving disarmament, and continued discussion on the issues of transparency, confidence-building, and verification.

To increase mutual understanding and confidence among the P5 and to facilitate discussions with and among Non-Nuclear Weapon States, the United States also participated in the Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which produced a glossary of 227 terms for submission to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

In addition, in 2010 the Obama administration unprecedentedly declassified the entire history of the US nuclear stockpile, including the annual stockpile size, the number of dismantled warheads since 1994, and the number of retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. The United States continued to disclose these data on an annual basis until the Trump administration denied successive declassification requests between 2019 and 2021, after which transparency was restored and the figures from the missing years were disclosed.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

a) See Action 3.

b) In 2022, the Biden administration articulated its arms control priorities––particularly vis-à-vis Russia––as needing address all nuclear weapons, rather than just strategic ones. Throughout both the Biden administration and second Trump administration, the United States continued to abide by the central limits of New START, which limits the deployment status of strategic warheads and launchers.

c) In January 2022, in a historic statement, the United States jointly affirmed alongside the P5 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and that nuclear weapons should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. Notably, the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) removed “hedging against an uncertain future” as a stated role for U.S. nuclear weapons. Mirroring the Obama administration’s previous language, the Biden administration’s NPR also noted that a “key goal” for the United States is “reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy.”

d) In its 2022 statement, the P5 declared that they “each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons,” and reaffirmed the practice of ensuring that “none of their nuclear weapons were targeted at each other or any other state.”

The Biden administration’s NPR also identified current and planned capabilities that “are no longer required to meet our deterrence needs”––specifically the B83-1 and the SLCM-N, and left the door open for future retirement of the W76-2 low-yield warhead following a re-evaluation of its deterrence value. Despite these actions, these capabilities had not been cancelled or retired by the end of 2025, and the SLCM-N has since been adopted into a program of record.

e) Although it participated in the third conference addressing the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons in 2014, the United States did not attend the fourth conference in 2022.

f) In light of advances in artificial intelligence and its incorporation into modern military systems, the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review stated that the United States will maintain a human “in the loop” “for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate and terminate nuclear weapon employment.”

As directed by Congress, in fiscal year 2022 the Department of Defense commissioned an independent review of the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons; the nuclear command, control, and communications infrastructure that underpins it; and the U.S. integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems that allow the U.S. to quickly and accurately characterize incoming threats.

g) Alongside the P5, the United States helped update the glossary of key nuclear-related terms for joint submission to the 2022 NPT Review Conference. Although the P5 Process has slowed substantially following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, throughout the Review Cycle the United States chaired and participated in several P5 meetings at the expert level, including in August 2022, October 2023, February 2023, and December 2024.

Following the Biden administration’s declassification of the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in 2021, it denied successive requests until 2024, during which it restored the previous years’ missing data. It appears that the United States is shifting towards disclosing these figures on an ad hoc, rather than annual, basis.

Following Russia’s unilateral suspension of New START in February 2023, the United States publicly disclosed one final set of deployment-related treaty data from March 2023, but subsequently has not released any deployment data since then.

Sources

U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 19, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states

U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 June 2013. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA590745.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, November 30, 2020. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf.

The White House. “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races.” Press release. January 3, 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/.

China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. Working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51. New York: United Nations, 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956428.

U.S. Department of Defense. “Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” Fact Sheet. May 3, 2010. Available via the Internet Archive. https://web.archive.org/web/20100528062643/http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. Response to Freedom of Information Act Request Dated October 1, 2018. April 5, 2019. Available via the Federation of American Scientists. https://sgp.fas.org/news/2019/04/stockpile-2018.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” Fact Sheet. October 5, 2021. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Fact-Sheet_Unclass_2021_final-v2-002.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” August 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/U.S.%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Stockpile%20Transparency%207_22_24.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “2024 Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty.” January 17, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/2024-report-to-congress-on-implementation-of-the-new-start-treaty/.

Stewart, Mallory. “Keynote Address for the Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Arms Control Association.” US Department of State, June 2, 2022. https://www.state.gov/keynote-address-for-the-commemoration-of-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-arms-control-association/

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.

Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, Republic of Austria. “Conference Report: Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.” 8-9 December 2014. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/ViennaConference_BMEIA_Web_final.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. “Final Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Failsafe and Risk Reduction (FARR) (U).” 1992. https://archive.org/details/FinalReportoftheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeonNuclearFailsafeandRiskReductionFARR/page/n1/mode/2up.

U.S. Department of State. “Joint Statement from the Nuclear-Weapon States at the London P5 Conference.” Press statement. February 5, 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237273.htm.