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Pillar 1

Action 1

All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

China has consistently affirmed its full compliance with the NPT and its pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world (advocating the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons).

China has adhered to the policy of unconditional no-first-use of nuclear weapons (NFU).

China has adhered to the policy of providing unconditional negative security assurances (NSA) to non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) and nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs).

China has signed and ratified the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Protocols II and III to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia; shown support for the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia and similar efforts in the Middle East.

China has claimed to adhere to keeping its arsenal at the minimum level necessary for national security, though warhead numbers have grown and over 300 ICBM silos under construction have been discovered, raising concerns over China’s adherence especially when the calculation of “minimum level” is not explained.

China has often emphasized NPT’s importance as the “cornerstone” of the non-proliferation regime.

China has never threatened to use nuclear weapons against any country.

China has never deployed nuclear weapons on foreign territory, nor provided extended deterrence to any other state.

China has pushed hard to materialize the January 2022 P5 joint statement on preventing nuclear war and made extra efforts to add language such as “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and the reaffirmation that none of the nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other state.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

China has continued the above-mentioned commitment/policies, including the positive and negative ones:

  • China has proposed a P5-wide treaty or political statement on mutual NFU.
  • China has called for an international legal instrument on providing NSA to NNWS and NWFZs.
  • China has submitted working papers at the NPT PrepCom on all three pillars of the NPT.
  • China has made clear to take the lead in signing the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.
  • China has increased the number of nuclear weapons at a faster rate based on mainstream estimations, raising concerns over its commitment to keeping its arsenal at the minimum level necessary for national security.
  • The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party delivered a report claiming that China will “establish a strong system of strategic deterrence,” raising concerns over its commitment to keeping its arsenal at the minimum level necessary for national security.

Sources

Chinese Delegation. “Statement by the Chinese Delegation on Nuclear Disarmament at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” May 2, 2014.

People’s Republic of China. Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the People’s Republic of China. April 28–May 9, 2014.

United Nations. NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.30 on Risk Reduction; WP.33 on No First Use; WP.39 on Peace and Development. Working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

United Nations. “The Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Opens in New York.” April 30, 2019.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “外交部官员：中国为推动五核国发表联合声明作出重要贡献 [MFA Officials: China Made Important Contributions to Promoting the Joint Statement of the P5 States].” January 4, 2022.

Sun, Xiaobo. “Statement by the Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry of China at the General Debate of the First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference.” August 2023.

Geng, Shuang. “Remarks at the Thirteenth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” September 22, 2023.

Sun, Xiaobo. “Statement by the Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry of China at the General Debate of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference.” July 2024.

Sun, Xiaobo. “Statement by the Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry of China at the General Debate of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference.” April 2025.

Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China. “China Firmly Supports Establishment of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: Defense Spokesperson.” July 14, 2025.

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era. White paper. November 27, 2025. Chinese Communist Party. “Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.” October 25, 2022.

Kristensen, Hans M., Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle. “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2025.” 2025.

Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda. “Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2021.” November 15, 2021.

Kristensen, Hans M., Matt Korda, and Eliana Johns. “Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023.” March 13, 2023.

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

France acceded to the NPT on 2 August 1992, but indicated that it respected the prescription of the Treaty since its adoption in 1968.

It officially supported multilateral declarations promoting the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons in July 2009 (G8 statement).

At the national level, French President François Hollande endorsed this objective in 2015, with a caveat: “I therefore share the long-term goal of a total elimination of nuclear weapons, but, I would add, only when the strategic context allows.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

In the National Strategic Review of 2025, France reiterated its full support for the NPT and indicated that it will continue to work in favour of the centrality of the NPT in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament international architecture.

In official speeches and reports published between 2021 and 2025, France expresses its supports for the promotion of a realistic and progressive approach of nuclear disarmament. It indicated in 2025 at the Conference on Disarmament that it is fully committed to the creation of the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons.

In 2026, President Macron reiterated that France still shares the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, but announced the increase in the French arsenal and that the government would no longer communicate on its number of warheads.

Sources

French Government. Plan de maîtrise des armements et de désarmement présenté par la présidence de la République. [Arms control and disarmament plan presented by the Presidency of the Republic] 3 June 1991. https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/128712-plan-de-maitrise-des-armements-et-de-desarmement-presente-par-la-preside

G8. L’Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation. (L’Aquila: 2009). https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2009/statement.pdf

François Hollande. Speech By The President Of The French Republic On The Nuclear Deterrent, Istres), 19 February 2015. https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/discours_pr_istres_anglais_19_02_15.pdf?870/3a785803c99292ba08e5a27936d6ccf2ad4a7dfe

SGDSN. Revue Nationale Stratégique 2025 [National Strategic Review] (Paris: 2025), https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/2025-08/20250713_NP_SGDSN_Actualisation_2025_RNS_FR.pdf

Statement by France. Conference on Disarmament – Fourth statement by Ambassador Camille Petit in Subsidiary Body 1 [Legal framework and other legal instruments related to advancing the nuclear disarmament process] (Geneva), 27 May 2025. https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Conference-on-Disarmament-Fourth-statement-by-Ambassador-Camille-Petit-in

Nuclear deterrence – Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, Ile Longue, 2 March 2026, https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-26067-en.pdf

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Russia is one of three depositories of the NPT– it has consistently expressed support for the NPT and advocated for strengthening and universalizing the Treaty.

Russia has expressed commitment towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and identified the promotion of international efforts aimed at achieving this goal ‘as soon as possible’ as one of priorities of Russian foreign policy.

Furthermore, Russia has pursued a range of actions in support of the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons prior to the current Review Cycle:

Arms control

  • Since 2010 Russia has reduced numbers of deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear forces under the New START Treaty with the United States. Russia met the treaty’s central limits by February 2018. In 2021 Russia and the USA concluded an agreement to extend New START until 5 February 2026.
  • Russia has unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear forces to less than 25 percent of their 1991 level according to its official statements
  • Following US withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russia made a unilateral commitment in 2019 not to deploy medium-range or shorter-range ground-launched missiles in certain regions unless similar missiles manufactured by the USA were deployed there. Russia reiterated the commitment to the moratorium in October 2020.
  • In 2019-2020 Russia engaged in a series of talks with the USA on strategic stability and nuclear arms control.
  • In 2021 Russia and the USA issued a joint statement on strategic stability and held a series of meetings under Russia-US strategic stability dialogue
  • In 2020 Russia, for the first time, made the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence publicly available.
  • Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019
  • Russia joined a P5 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought in 2022.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties

  • Russia has signed and ratified relevant protocols to the following NWFZ Treaties:
  • Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia in 2014
  • African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 2011
  • Russia previously signed and ratified relevant protocols to Treaty of Rarotonga in 1988 and Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1979.
  • Russia has expressed support for the establishment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East as one of the designated co-convenors of the conference on the Zone. Since 2019 Russia participated as an observer in the UN Conferences on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Regional issues

  • Russia participated in negotiation and implementation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme.
  • Russia has taken a part in finding a political and diplomatic settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. Russia has developed and promoted a roadmap towards the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula together with China in 2017.

Other instruments

  • Russia has maintained a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1991. It signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified the treaty in 2000. Russia has expressed support for the treaty’s entry into force. Russia is the second-largest host country of International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities after the USA.
  • Russia ceased production of fissile materials for military purposes in 1994. Russia has expressed support for and engaged in the work on a possible Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), including in the Group of Governmental Experts established under the Resolution 67/53 of the UN General Assembly in 2014-2015 and in the FMCT High Level Expert Preparatory Group established under the Resolution 71/259 of the UN General Assembly in 2017-2018.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Over the current Review Cycle Russia has:

  • Reiterated support for the NPT as a cornerstone of the international security architecture
    Reiterated commitment to nuclear-weapon-free world as the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.
  • Highlighted that the nuclear disarmament process is integrally linked to the general and complete disarmament as envisaged by the NPT provisions.
  • Noted that nuclear disarmament process cannot exist outside the context of international security situation and the state of the relations between nuclear-weapon States
  • Reiterated commitment to the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
  • Participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issue in 2022-2023.
  • Served as chair of the P5 Process in 2023-2024.
  • Withdrawn its ratification of the CTBT in 2023 but continued to be a signatory to the CTBT and participates in the work of CTBTO.
  • In 2024 Russia completed its segment of the International Monitoring System (IMS).
  • Suspended its participation in New START Treaty in 2023 but noted that it will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions under New START.
  • In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to New START limits for one year after the treaty expires in February 2026.
  • In 2024 released an updated version of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.
  • In 2025 Russia has released a joint statement with China on Global Strategic Stability

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015. https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula’s problems, 4 July 2017. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1549360/

Statement by Vladimir Putin on Additional Steps to De-Escalate the Situation in Europe in the Wake of the Termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), President of Russia, October 26, 2020. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64270.

Statement by the Russian Federation. First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly at the Thematic Debate on «Nuclear Weapons» (New York), 5 November 2020. https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/05-11-2020_statement-by_7ea09b157a28d8894e30459b759a93a6/

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, 3 January 2022. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67551

Statement by the Russian Federation. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 August 2022. https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/14.0447/20220802/d9cjQBjtSPPR/8CmKgQeW0qnV_en.pdf

“Foreign Ministry Statement in Connection with the Russian Federation Suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START),” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, February 21, 2023, https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/1855184/?lang=en.

“Law Revoking the Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” President of Russia, November 2, 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/72635.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s answer to a question from Kommersant newspaper about Russia’s assessments of its chairmanship in the group of five Nuclear Weapon States”, 26 July 2024. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1963794/

“Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” November 19, 2024, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/

Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I Specific Issue: Nuclear disarmament and security assurances. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/2013557/?lang=en

Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster I: Nuclear disarmament. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/2013105/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Joint statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability, 8 May 2025. http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6310

“Meeting with Permanent Members of the Security Council,” President of Russia, September 26, 2025. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78051.

China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf.

China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. Working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51. New York: United Nations, 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956428.

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The United Kingdom has pursued a range of actions in support of the disarmament objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.:

  • Announced reductions in its nuclear arsenal by the mid-2020s set out in its 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review:
    • Reduce the number of warheads onboard each of our submarines from 48 to 40
    • Reduce the requirement for operationally available warheads to no more than 120
    • Reduce the number of operational missiles on the Vanguard class submarines to no more than 8
    • Reduce our overall nuclear weapons stockpile to no more than 180.
  • Promoted Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: provide expert advice in seismology and radiochemistry to help establish a viable verification regime, ready for entry into force; maintained the United Kingdom National Data Centre and hosted 13 facilities spread across the United Kingdom and our Overseas Territories, which support the International Monitoring System
  • Pushed for negotiations to start on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and took an active role in the 2014–2015 Group of Governmental Experts and the 2017–2018 high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group.
  • Stated in a joint P5 statement in 2022 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
  • Pursued nuclear disarmament verification through UK-Norway Initiative on nuclear disarmament verification since 2007 and a second decade of an active partnership with the United States on monitoring and verification research
  • Signed a Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia (2014)
  • Been an active member of the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV); established a unique ‘Quad’ nuclear verification partnership in 2015 between two Non-Nuclear Weapon States and two Nuclear Weapon States; conducted the first-ever multilateral nuclear disarmament verification exercise known as LETTERPRESS to investigate real-life considerations related to the inclusion of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in nuclear disarmament verification
  • Actively participating in the “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” initiative and welcoming the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament.
  • Funded projects with academia and think tanks, including the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the University of Birmingham exploring States’ conceptions of their responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons.
  • Hosted round tables and strategic dialogues to develop greater trust, confidence and transparency between NPT states in relation to nuclear weapons and to foster constructive global dialogue on progressing nuclear disarmament.
  • Supported a Middle East free of Weapons of Mass Destruction as co-convenor of the conference on the Zone.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Over the current Review Cycle the United Kingdom has

  1. Reiterated in a 2024 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
  2. Supported the Pact of the Future, adopted by world leaders in October 2024, which contains the first multilateral recommitment to nuclear disarmament in over a decade.
  3. Initiated a programme of work with NNWS and civil society on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament
  4. Expanded its work on nuclear disarmament verification through the QUAD, IPNDV and UN GGEs.
  5. Failed to reach agreement necessary to ratify the Protocol to the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone.

Sources

Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrence. Cm 6994 (London: 2006).

Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2014 Update to Parliament (London, 2014).

Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2017 Update to Parliament (London, 2017).

Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2019 Update to Parliament (London, 2019).The United Kingdom’s future nuclear deterrent: the 2020 update to Parliament

Ministry of Defence.The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2022 Update to Parliament (London, 2022).

Cabinet Office. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm, 7948 (London, 2010).

Cabinet Office. National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom. Cm 9161 (London, 2015)

Cabinet Office. Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103 (London), 2021.

Ministry of Defence. Defence Nuclear Enterprise: 2025 Annual Update to Parliament (London, 2025).

Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 3 May 2012.

Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 7 May 2012.

Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster II: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 9 May 2012.

Ambassador Jo Adamson. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 24 April 2013.

Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 26 April 2013.

Ambassador Jo Adamson. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 April 2013.

Ambassador Matthew Roland. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2014.

Ambassador Matthew Roland. Cluster II: Non-proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 1 May 2014.

Ambassador Matthew Roland. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 5 May 2014.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document (London: 2014).

Statement by the United Kingdom. General Debate. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 27 April 2015.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 1 May 2015.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee II. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 4 May 2015.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee III. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 May 2015.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 4 May 2017.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 May 2017.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 3 May 2017.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Middle East WMD Free Zone. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 April 2018.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 26 April 2018.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 30 April 2018.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 1 May 2018.

Statement by the United Kingdom. NPT Preparatory Committee Verification Statement on behalf of ‘the Quad’ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United States .United Kingdom Delegation at the 2019 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2019.

Statement by the United Kingdom. General Debate. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 1 August 2022.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 August 2022.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee II. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 8 August 2022.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee III. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 8 August 2022.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 3 August 2023.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 4 August 2023.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 August 2023.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 26 July 2024.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 July 2024.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 1 May 2025.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.

Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 6 May 2025.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2015.

Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. 3 January 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61d308ffe90e071971e25654/Joint_Statement_Of_the_Leaders_of_the_Five_Nuclear-Weapon_States_On_Preventing_Nuclear_War_and_Avoiding_Arms_Races.pdf

United Nations. Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the UN Security Council meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. ‘Nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought: UK statement at the UN Security Council’ (New York). 18 March 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nuclear-war-cannot-be-won-and-must-not-be-fought-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council#:~:text=We%20reaffirm%20the%20P5%20leaders,maintain%20a%20minimum%20credible%20deterrent.

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

As one of the negotiating members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States’ has pledged to support the fundamental goals of the treaty since its inception. In line with these policies, the United States has led the world in reducing the size of its nuclear stockpile from its Cold War peak, achieving an approximately 85 percent reduction. However, successive administrations have interpreted, prioritized, and acted upon the NPT’s goals differently.

For example, in 2009, President Obama’s “Prague Speech” set the framework for US nuclear posture during the period between the 2010 and 2015 NPT Review Conferences, and particularly its commitment to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy while ensuring the credibility of its national and extended deterrence. In doing so, the Obama administration placed a particular premium on the disarmament pillar of the NPT that would not be echoed by its successor.

While the first Trump administration remained committed in principle to the NPT, it deemphasized disarmament in favor of the NPT’s first pillar––non-proliferation. Speeches and working papers delivered to the NPT’s Preparatory Committee during the first Trump administration stated that “non-proliferation is the cornerstone of the NPT,” and that “Neither meaningful international nuclear cooperation nor disarmament could succeed in the absence of strong non-proliferation guarantees.” Rather than pursuing disarmament objectives directly, the administration instead suggested that “all NPT Parties bear responsibility for working together to improve the geopolitical environment and create the conditions for nuclear disarmament.”

While the Biden administration preserved the Trump administration’s “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” initiative, it also rhetorically adopted a greater emphasis on disarmament, noting in its national action plan submitted to the 2020 Review Conference that the United States “seeks to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy;” “seeks the reduction of global nuclear stockpiles in a way that promotes international stability, peace, and security;” and that “U.S. policy is to maintain a credible deterrent […] with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with our current and future security requirements.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Since the 2020 Review Conference, both the Biden and second Trump administrations have reaffirmed their successive support for the NPT, although the general tone of U.S. statements has shifted from that of the previous decade.

The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) emphasized that “The United States will pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach that places renewed emphasis on arms control, non-proliferation, and risk reduction to strengthen stability, head off costly arms races, and signal our desire to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally.” In addition, President Biden offered rhetorical support for the NPT, announcing in 2022 that “the United States renews its commitment to the world to be a responsible steward of its nuclear arsenal, and to continue working toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

During the Biden administration, however, the emphasis on disarmament that was present during the Obama administration appeared to be diminished, with new warheads being introduced and a senior National Security Council official noting that “Absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required.”

While it remains early in the second Trump administration, its rhetoric appears to generally be in line with that of its predecessor. The Trump administration’s statements at the 2025 NPT Preparatory Committee emphasized the United States’ longstanding support for all three pillars of the NPT, noting that “The NPT remains in the national interest of the United States.” The statements also pushed back against criticism that the United States was not meeting its NPT commitments, and urged other countries, particularly Russia, China, Iran, Syria, and North Korea, to demonstrate their respective commitments to the Treaty. It also critiqued efforts to “seek shortcuts to nuclear disarmament,” instead promoting engagement on arms control.

Notably, the administration’s remarks relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy indicated a commitment “to unleashing a golden age of American energy and ushering in a nuclear energy resurgence,” and inviting all other nations to join the United States’ efforts.

Sources

Obama, Barack. Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague, as delivered. Washington, DC: The White House, April 5, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2015/38. Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, July 31-August 11, 2023. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.I_.04_-_04._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_U.S._National_Report_Update.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.

Biden, Joseph R., Jr. “President Biden Statement Ahead of the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” White House, August 1, 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/01/president-biden-statement-ahead-of-the-10th-review-conference-of-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/.

U.S. Department of State. “As Drafted Statement by the United States to the NPT Preparatory Committee: Cluster One Statement by Matthew Sharp.”May 1, 2025. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250501-NPT-PrepCom-2025-U.S.-National-Statement-on-Cluster-1_As-Delivered.pdf.