China has supported IAEA efforts to assist States in concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.
China has encouraged universalization of safeguards and additional protocols, while maintaining that AP universalization should not be imposed in a discriminatory manner or used to restrict peaceful-use rights.
China has continued the above policies and practice.
Statement on Nuclear Non-proliferation by Delegation of China at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, May 5, 2025
Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026
France has called for the universalisation of comprehensive safeguards agreements. The European Union has conducted outreach dialogue on this aspect, especially towards states which have not yet modified their original Small Quantities Protocols (SQP) to their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.
France and the EU have reiterated it supports the universalisation of the IAEA comprehensive safeguard agreements. France was one of the the countries providing direct contributions to launch the 2024-2026 COMPASS project, an initiative designed to help states build capacity for nuclear safeguards.
EU Statement on Agenda item 7(a): The conclusion of safeguards agreements and of additional protocols IAEA Board of Governors Vienna, 1-5 March 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/7a._eu_statement_on_iaea_safeguards_final.pdf
National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2
EU Statement at the General Debate 68th Regular Session of the General Conference International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Vienna, 16-20 September 2024, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/09/hungary-on-behalf-of-eu-gc68.pdf
Working paper submitted by France. France’s support for the International Atomic Energy Agency. NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.11. 5 March 2025. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n25/060/12/pdf/n2506012.pdf#:~:text=France%20is%20one%20of%20the,Technical%20Cooperation%20Fund%20in%202025.
Russia supported the work of the IAEA to assist States parties in concluding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols through its national safeguards support programme.
Russia continued to support the work of the IAEA to assist States parties in concluding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols through its national safeguards support programme.
National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.
https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf
National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1
National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14
The 10th Review Conference national report confirmed that the UK considers a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement plus an Additional Protocol, and where relevant a modified Small Quantities Protocol, to be the universal verification standard. The UK welcomed the entry into force of Additional Protocols in Benin, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the adoption of modified Small Quantities Protocols in Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Haiti and Sudan during this period, and stated that it takes every opportunity to call upon all states that have not yet done so to bring an AP or modified SQP into force as soon as possible, and was developing a support programme for states interested in doing so.
The United Kingdom has continued to encourage NPT States parties without a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to bring one into force as soon as possible. The UK supports safeguards through direct assistance to the IAEA’s Department for Safeguards through its Member State Support Programme and bilateral assistance to any state seeking to sign, implement and ratify a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.
The UK states that it provides support to states seeking to bring an Additional Protocol or modified Small Quantities Protocol into force through IAEA initiatives and direct bilateral support, including with experts from the NGO VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre). While there is clear evidence that the UK funds and participates in these activities, publicly available evidence linking UK assistance to specific state adoptions of APs or mSQPs remains limited.
The UK has reiterated that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement plus an Additional Protocol is the universal verification standard under the NPT that the UK wants to see universalised during the current cycle, and stated that it will remain one of the largest IAEA extrabudgetary contributors on safeguards to this end.
At the 69th IAEA General Conference in September 2025, the UK called on all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with an Additional Protocol as the NPT verification standard, and to update or rescind their Small Quantities Protocols.
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great . Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 21. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>. For example, VERTIC (2024). TECHNICAL WORKSHOP ON PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS IN LAO PDR. January. https://www.vertic.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/VM34-Safeguards-Legislation-Case-Studies-Lao-PDR.pdf.
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 2 issues. 11 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/first-preparatory-committee-for-the-2026-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-2-issues
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). 69th IAEA General Conference: UK national statement. 15 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/iaea-general-conference-2025-climate-minister-speech
As a Nuclear Weapon State, the United States is not required to agree to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Instead, it maintains a Voluntary Offer Agreement and its Additional Protocol came into force in 2009, granting the IAEA expanded rights to obtain a much fuller picture of the United States’ nuclear program and fuel cycle.
Prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States’ National Nuclear Security Administration conducted targeted engagement with US partner countries to provide assistance with safeguards implementation. In 2008, the NNSA established the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) “to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges.” As part of NGSI, NNSA’s Office of International Nuclear Safeguards coordinates collaborations with international partners to jointly advance safeguards technologies through the International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement (INSEP) program.
Prior to the current Review Cycle, some of these international engagements included:
During the current Review Cycle, the United States’ National Nuclear Security Administration continued to conduct targeted engagement with US partner countries to provide assistance with safeguards implementation.
Some of these engagements included:
U.S. Department of Energy. “Office of International Nuclear Safeguards.” National Nuclear Security Administration, https://www.energy.gov/documents/nnsas-next-generation-safeguards-initiative-brochure.
Baldwin, George, and Mongiello, Risa. “International Nuclear Safeguards Cooperation.” Sandia National Laboratories. SAND 2011-XXXX. January 2011. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1110551.
U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. "2024 NNSA Year in Review: Making Our Vision a Reality." December 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/2024%20NNSA%20Year%20in%20Review_508.pdf.
U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. "2023 NNSA Year in Review: Making Our Vision a Reality." February 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/NNSA%202023%20Year%20In%20Review_0.pdf.