Action 46 - NPT Monitor

China

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China established domestic regulatory controls for nuclear material, including licensing, nuclear-material accounting and control, physical protection, registration, inspection, inventorying and reporting requirements. Under China’s nuclear-material control regulations, licence holders are required to establish nuclear-material accounting and control systems, maintain strict security systems, take reliable security precautions, and report and respond to theft or loss of nuclear material. China also supported relevant IAEA safeguards programmes by joining the IAEA Member State Support Programme in 2007 and undertaking research and development on safeguards verification tools, methods and safeguards concepts, including work related to nuclear-material measurement uncertainty.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued to support IAEA programmes related to safeguards, nuclear-material control and capacity-building. In its 2026 NPT national report, China reported that it had submitted 30 nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, supported safeguards-related research and technical cooperation, joined the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories and undertook sample-analysis tasks, and worked with the IAEA to develop a safeguards approach for China’s high-temperature gas-cooled reactor demonstration project. China also continued to support safeguards training through the China-IAEA Joint Training Center on Nuclear Safeguards and Security, including training and technical support related to safeguards verification and nuclear-material accounting and control. These activities complement the IAEA’s own efforts to assist States in strengthening SSACs and SRAs, including through COMPASS, ISSAS advisory services, training courses, technical visits and the State Declarations Portal.

Sources

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

Activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency relevant to article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Feb 24 2026

The Legal and Regulatory Systems for Nuclear Security in China, Nov 2017

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

In April 2005, France signed an action plan with IAEA (renewed in 2013) to support IAEA nuclear and radiological security activities. France contributes to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. It took part to the funding of the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre in Seibersdorf (Austria).

France is contributing to the IAEA’s COMPASS initiative launched in 2020 to strengthen the national authorities supervising safeguards implementation and their State Systems for and Control of Nuclear Material.

As part of the EU, it also supports the IAEA’s activities in the areas of nuclear security.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

France continues to contribute to the IAEA’s COMPASS initiative to strengthen the national authorities supervising safeguards implementation and their State Systems for and Control of Nuclear Material.

As part of the EU, it renewed its support to the IAEA’s activities in the areas of nuclear security.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/1656/oj

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/656 of 19 February 2024 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of nuclear security, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32024D0656

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Russia provided political, financial and expert support to relevant IAEA programmes as part of its overall support for the activities of the Agency in the area of non-proliferation.

Russia provided training in nuclear material accounting and control to IAEA Secretariat staff and supported the Agency’s efforts to develop innovative measurement equipment that would allow for more accurate control of irradiated nuclear fuel.

Russia supported the pilot phase of IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for system of accounting for and control of nuclear material and safeguards implementation (COMPASS) which was launched in 2020.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Russia continued to provide political, financial and expert support to relevant IAEA programmes as part of its overall support for the activities of the Agency in the area of non-proliferation.

Russia noted the importance of and expressed support for IAEA’s efforts to improve the effectiveness of State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material.

Russia continued to support the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for system of accounting for and control of nuclear material and safeguards implementation (COMPASS) throughout its first phase which started in 2024.

Sources

Statement by Russia. ‘Safeguards Implementation Report for 2024’, IAEA Board of Governors Session (Vienna), 11 June 2025.

https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_the_delegation_of_the_russian_federation_on_the_agenda_item_6_c_of_the_session_of_the_i/

International Atomic Energy Agency. ‘The IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs’

https://www.iaea.org/es/node/87295

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The most significant prior-cycle development under Action 46 was the establishment of the UK’s own State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) following withdrawal from Euratom post-Brexit. In preparation for leaving Euratom, the ONR recruited and trained new safeguards staff, developed a regulatory framework for the new domestic regime, and developed a Safeguards Information Management and Reporting IT system to receive, process and submit nuclear material accountancy information from operators to the IAEA.

On 1 January 2021, the ONR became responsible for the UK’s new domestic safeguards regime, delivering the UK SSAC when the associated legislation came into force. Throughout 2020 to 2021, the ONR continued to develop and test its material accounting system and safeguards capability, met all of the UK’s qualifying nuclear material accountancy reporting obligations, and facilitated IAEA inspections and IAEA equipment installation.

The ONR’s implementation of the new regime was positively assessed, with the UK SSAC operating successfully and enabling the UK to meet all its international safeguards obligations and deliver all required reports on time under the UK’s Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/951) and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The IAEA’s annual safeguards review for UK safeguards implementation stated that ONR’s first year performance had exceeded their expectations.

The UK also supported the IAEA’s own safeguards programmes through its Safeguards Support Programme. The UK Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards 2016–2021 delivered training events to IAEA inspectors, analysts and senior staff, including courses utilising UK expertise and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle, and provided cost-free experts to the IAEA Department of Safeguards.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom is responsible for its own nuclear safeguards arrangements as a nuclear weapon State. It states that it has “an established and robust nuclear safeguards regime (UK SSAC), designed to meet our international obligations on safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation.” The SSAC was established after the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom and is designed to meet its obligations under the UK’s Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/951) and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The post-Brexit legal framework is set out in the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 and the Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

The UK reports that “in 2022, a French authority peer review of the UK SSAC found the UK safeguards legal and regulatory frameworks to be structured, comprehensive and coherent, noting several areas of good practice”.

The UK Safeguards Support Programme 2021-2024 continued to provide technical support to the IAEA in verifying the peaceful use of nuclear technology, delivering £5 million in in-kind and financial contributions to over 35 tasks within the IAEA Department of Safeguards Development and Implementation Support Programme.

Sources

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2020). Office for Nuclear Regulation annual report and accounts 2019 to 2020. 29 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2019-to-2020/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2019-to-2020.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2021). Office for Nuclear Regulation annual report and accounts 2020 to 2021. 13 July. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2020-to-2021/office-for-nuclear-regulation-annual-report-and-accounts-2020-to-2021.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2024). Office for Nuclear Regulation: post-implementation review 2022 – full report. 4 October. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-onr-post-implementation-review/office-for-nuclear-regulation-post-implementation-review-2022-full-report-html

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Department of Trade and Industry (2006). Explanatory Memorandum to the Export of Radioactive Sources (Control) Order 2006. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1846/pdfs/uksiem_20061846_en.pdf.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025). UK nuclear safeguards support programme: report on activities and progress 2021 to 2024. 21 January. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/678f8964c9c786c1eb788691/uk-support-programme-to-iaea-safeguards-2021-2024.pdf

United States

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