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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has developed a multi-agency regulatory framework, involving authorities such as the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and the National Nuclear Safety Administration, to oversee licensing, inspection, and enforcement of nuclear security requirements.

At the operational level, China has implemented strict physical protection measures, including access control, surveillance systems, material accounting, and graded protection requirements based on risk levels. It has also adopted a design basis threat approach, requiring facilities to regularly assess evolving threats and adjust protection systems accordingly.

China has further strengthened international alignment by ratifying and implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, which legally requires states to maintain appropriate physical protection regimes for nuclear materials and facilities.

In parallel, China has actively cooperated with the IAEA, including hosting International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions and contributing to the development of international nuclear security standards and training programs.

China has established nuclear security training and demonstration platforms, including the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence.

China has strengthened laws, regulations and technical standards for nuclear security and nuclear material control.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued to strengthen nuclear security capacity-building and international cooperation. In its 2026 NPT national report, China reported upgrading physical protection systems for nuclear materials, improving nuclear security regulations and standards, strengthening nuclear security culture, building the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence, and enhancing capabilities for nuclear-material control, supervision, transport security and cybersecurity.

China has continued cooperation with the IAEA: in 2025, China stated that it would actively participate in developing the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2026–2029, continue contributing to the Nuclear Security Fund, strengthen China–IAEA–third-party exchanges and cooperation, and provide experts and technical solutions for IAEA nuclear security activities.

China has been updating its relevant guidelines, laws and regulations.

China has continued to organize national level Storm Series Nuclear Security Exercises to test its coordination and response capabilities of nuclear security and emergency forces, thereby enhancing its preparedness for various nuclear terrorism threats.

China has taken emerging technological threats, including artificial intelligence and drones, into account in its nuclear security approach.

Sources

Chinese Delegation’s Statement at the March Board of Governors meeting of the IAEA under the Agenda item: Nuclear Security: Nuclear Security Review 2025, Mar 18, 2025

IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in China, Sep 8 2017

National Progress Report on Nuclear Security of the People's Republic of China, April 1, 2016

Nuclear Security Summit 2014: National Progress Report China

Statement by Minister Counsellor Li Sen at the Conference of the Parties to the A/CPPNM under Agenda Item 12.i. Provisions on Physical Protection, Mar 2022

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons–Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2015/32, 17 April 2015

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2020/41, 28 January 2022

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, November 27, 2025

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

France is a Party to all relevant international instruments in this area since ratifying the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, on 1 February 2013, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, on 11 September 2013. In 2020, France updated and translated into English its national report on the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

France has continued to implement relevant international instruments regarding the security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. At the 2024 NPT Review Conference, it presented a working paper on Nuclear safety and security.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

Nuclear safety and security serving the development of nuclear energy and its applications Working paper submitted by France, NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/WP.10, 29 May 2024, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/documents/WP10.pdf

Nuclear safety and security, France Diplomacy, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/peaceful-uses-of-nuclear-energy/article/nuclear-safety-and-security

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Prior to the current Review Cycle Russia ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment

At the 2015 NPT Review Conference Russia has reported that all nuclear materials, their storage sites and corresponding facilities in its territory, as well as the transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances, are provided with the necessary security measures, including physical protection, in compliance with legal and statutory instruments, and with a view to the IAEA recommendations.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

At the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reaffirmed that all nuclear material, storage locations and related facilities in Russia, as well as the transport of nuclear material and radioactive substances, are subject to the necessary security measures.

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

At the 3rd IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in February 2020, the UK stated that it remained entirely committed to the highest standards of nuclear security at home and around the world, strongly supported the IAEA’s role in coordinating global efforts, and confirmed a further contribution of £1.6 million to the Nuclear Security Fund. The UK confirmed that its detection architecture prevents the trafficking of radioactive materials and that it was trialling and using the latest detection technologies at its borders and inland.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom states that it maintains the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities through a security regime for its civil nuclear industry that is “recognised as world leading – it is robust, effective and meets international standards”.

The UK also reports that it has supported nine successful IAEA Resolutions relating to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the threat to nuclear safety and security posed by Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

The ONR Corporate Plan 2025-26 confirmed that priorities for cyber security are aligned to the 2022 Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy, with the ONR maintaining enhanced focus on cyber security and completing in-depth assessment of the industry’s risk management and cyber protection capabilities.

Sources

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2020). UK national statement to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security. 10 February. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-national-statement-to-the-iaea-international-conference-on-nuclear-security

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 31. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2025). Corporate Plan 2025 to 2026. June. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-for-nuclear-regulation-corporate-plan-2025-to-2026/office-for-nuclear-regulation-corporate-plan-2025-to-2026

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

See Action 41.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

See Action 41.

Sources

See Action 41.