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Pillar 2

Action 41

The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has taken measures consistent with Action 41 by applying international nuclear security instruments and IAEA physical-protection guidance in its domestic nuclear security regime. China acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in January 1989 and participated in negotiations on the 2005 Amendment, which expanded CPPNM’s scope to the domestic use, storage and transport of nuclear material and to nuclear facilities. China has applied, with reference to Annex II of the CPPNM Amendment and the requirements of INFCIRC/225, a graded approach to the physical protection of nuclear material and zoning of nuclear facilities, categorizing nuclear-material physical protection into three levels and grading facility protection according to the importance of the target and potential risk.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued to strengthen physical protection and nuclear security measures in line with relevant IAEA recommendations and international instruments. In its 2026 NPT national report, China reported upgrading physical protection systems for nuclear materials, improving nuclear security regulations and standards, strengthening nuclear security culture, building the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence, and enhancing capabilities for nuclear-material control, supervision, transport security and cybersecurity. China also continued cooperation with the IAEA on nuclear security, including through training platforms, expert support and participation in the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan process. These measures are consistent with the later INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 framework, which provides recommendations for developing, implementing and sustaining physical protection regimes for nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

Sources

Statement by Minister Counsellor Li Sen at the Conference of the Parties to the A/CPPNM under Agenda Item 12.i. Provisions on Physical Protection, Mar 2022

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

France implements the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5, IAEA Nuclear Security Series, No. 13). French regulations incorporate all the provisions of the IAEA circular and go even further in some cases. France hosted an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) peer review mission led by IAEA in November 2011 and a follow-up mission in 2018, which found that the French nuclear security regime was “robust and well established”.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

France has continued to implement recommendations and to update its regulation.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Relevant Russia’s national legislation adopted in 2014 reflected IAEA’s nuclear security recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Updated relevant Russia’s national legislation adopted in 2024 reflected IAEA’s nuclear security recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

Sources

Federal Environmental, Industrial And Nuclear Supervision Service Of Russia (Rostechnadzor). ‘State Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Safety in the Russian Federation’, April 2014

https://www.en.gosnadzor.gov.ru/publications/35CSS%20%20with%20irrs%202%20April.pdf

Requirements to Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Materials Storage Facilities (NP-083-15)

https://docs.secnrs.ru/catalog/FNP/NP_083_15/

Requirements to Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Materials Storage Facilities. (NP-083-23)

https://docs.secnrs.ru/catalog/FNP/NP_083_23/

Statement by the Russian Federation on measures taken by the Russian Federation as regards Actions 5, 20 and 21 contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 25 April 2014

https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n14/318/72/pdf/n1431872.pdf

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The United Kingdom participated actively in the Nuclear Security Summit process (2010–2016) through submission of national progress reports, supporting strengthened international nuclear security architecture, and promoting implementation of IAEA nuclear security recommendations.

The UK has supported international nuclear security capacity-building, for example through the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and training, peer review, and advisory missions, for example through International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions.

The UK states that it is the second largest Member State contributor to the IAEA’s extra-budgetary Nuclear Security Fund and has donated over £10 million to the fund over the past five years.

The UK shares expertise and best practice through a range of international fora including IAEA conferences and committees, the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (FTPRNT), the G7 Global Partnership and the Insider Threat Symposium.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom’s legislation on civil nuclear security (Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR)) and nuclear industry security requirements overseen by the UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation are explicitly aligned with the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225).

The ONR states that the UK was the first nuclear weapons state to receive an IPPAS mission in 2011 and the first to request a follow-up mission in 2016. The ONR supports and regularly contributes team leaders and experts to lead or participate in IPPAS missions to other countries, promoting the identification of good practices and facilitating mutual learning to improve standards internationally.

The ONR has produced Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) for the civil nuclear industry, replacing the earlier National Objectives, Requirements and Model Standards (NORMS). SyAPs continue the move to outcome-focused regulation for security and place more emphasis on mitigating emerging threats including cyber security and information assurance.

Sources

National Statement by the United Kingdom (2016). Nuclear Security Summit, Washington, D.C. April 1. https://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/national-statement-united-kingdom

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference/uk-national-report-pursuant-to-actions-5-20-and-21-of-the-treaty-on-the-npt-review-conference-2010-for-the-10th-npt-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>, p. 27.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), p. 27. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2024). IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions. https://www.onr.org.uk/working-with-others/international/iaea-international-physical-protection-advisory-service-ippas-missions

Office for Nuclear Regulation (2024). Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs). https://www.onr.org.uk/operational/security/syaps/

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The United States, and particularly the National Nuclear Security Administration, spearheaded the effort to update the IAEA’s recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities in 2011 from Revision 4 to Revision 5.

In addition, in 2010 the Obama administration the United States established the Nuclear Security Summit process. The Summits were designed to enhance, elevate, expand and empower this architecture of treaties, institutions, norms and practices to effectively address nuclear security threats. Four Summits took place between 2010 and 2016, including the first in Washington, DC. Throughout the Summit process, Summit participants made over 260 national security commitments in the first three Summits, more than three-quarters of which had been implemented by 2016. In 2016, participants made nearly 90 additional national commitments. These commitments included the removal or elimination of nuclear material, the ratification and implementation of treaties, the conversion of reactors, strengthening of regulations, the launch of “Centers of Excellence,” the upgrade and enhancement of technologies and capabilities, and other initiatives to improve nuclear security. Following the conclusion of the Summit process, the Nuclear Security Contact Group was established to facilitate further information cooperation on nuclear security issues.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Although the Summit process ended prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States has continued to emphasize and promote adherence to strict security standards for nuclear materials.

In 2022, at the first Review Conference for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment (A/CPPNM), the United States delegation delivered a statement in support of full implementation and universality of the A/CPPNM.

As part of that statement, the United States requested that the IAEA host the United States’ second International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission, and encouraged all other state Parties to take advantage of the program. It also announced that each of its nuclear power plants would be inspected every two years to ensure compliance with updated cyber security requirements. In addition, at the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2024, the United States co-sponsored an event to encourage states to improve the security of nuclear materials in transit.

Sources

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5).” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13. 2011. https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “IAEA Information Circular 225 Revision 5.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. March 22, 2012. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/186678.htm.

The White House. “Fact Sheets: The Nuclear Security Summits: Securing the World from Nuclear Terrorism.” March 29, 2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/29/fact-sheet-nuclear-security-summits-securing-world-nuclear-terrorism.

U.S. Department of State. “Nuclear Security Summit 2014: National Progress Report for the United States of America.” 2014. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/235470.pdf.

Nuclear Security Contact Group. “Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Security.” https://www.nscontactgroup.org/joint-statement.php.

U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. “A/CPPNM Review Conference: U.S. National Statement.” March 28, 2022. https://vienna.usmission.gov/a-cppnm-review-conference-u-s-national-statement/.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA calls attention to the security of nuclear materials in transit at International Conference on Nuclear Security.” U.S. Department of Energy, 23 May 2024. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-calls-attention-security-nuclear-materials-transit-international-conference.