Action 4 - NPT Monitor

China

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

N/A: Action 4 is addressed specifically to the Russian Federation and the United States. China is not a party to New START and has not participated in U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction negotiations. China has nevertheless repeatedly called on the States with the largest nuclear arsenals to undertake further drastic and substantive reductions and to create conditions for broader multilateral disarmament.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

N/A: Action 4 is addressed specifically to the Russian Federation and the United States. China is not a party to New START and has not participated in U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction negotiations. Besides maintain that above-mentioned stance, since the deterioration of the U.S.-Russia relations, China has urged these two countries to resume the implementation of the New START Treaty and conclude follow-up arrangements to further significantly and substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals. Following the expiration of New START, China has expressed regret, concern, and urged the United States to resume strategic stability dialogue with Russia and respond positively to the Russian proposal.

Sources

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons–Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2015/32, 17 April 2015

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2020/41, 28 January 2022

White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, State Council Information Office, November 27, 2025

Statement on Nuclear Disarmament by Sun Xiaobo, Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry of China, at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, May 2, 2025

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on February 6, 2026, Feb 6, 2026

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

N/A – Article 4 does refer to the entry into force and implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New Start Treaty) by the United States and Russia. France is not a party to this treaty and has not been involved either in its conclusion, implementation or in the discussions linked to a possible follow-up treaty. Consequently, and as the action specifically refers to the United States and Russia, it does not apply to France.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

N/A

Sources

N/A

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) between Russia and the United States entered into force on 5 February 2011. Russia met the treaty’s central limits by February 2018 and continued to observe them in the following years.

In 2017-2020 and in 2020-2021 Russia engaged in strategic stability talks with the United States where the sides discussed, among other issues, potential follow-on arms control measures.

In 2021 Russia and the United States concluded an agreement to extend New START Treaty until 5 February 2026.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

In 2023 Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty but noted that it will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions under the treaty.

In September 2025 Russia proposed to the USA to mutually adhere to New START limits for one year after the treaty’s expiration date

After the treaty expired in February 2026, Russia released a statement indicating that it remains open to ‘seeking political and diplomatic ways to comprehensively stabilize the strategic situation on the basis of equal and mutually beneficial dialogue-based solutions, should the right conditions for such cooperation arise’.

Russia stated that, as of March 2026, it has not exceeded the central limits under New START

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Foreign Ministry statement in connection with the Russian Federation suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), 21 February 2023

https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1855184/

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The United Kingdom is not a party to the New START treaty and has no obligations or responsibilities under the treaty. However, the UK welcomed the New START treaty and encouraged all states with nuclear weapons to continue their efforts to reduce the size of the nuclear arsenals, but especially those with the largest numbers.

More broadly, the UK government recognised the contribution New START has made to international security and strategic stability by increasing transparency and mutual confidence among the two largest Nuclear Weapons States, and supported an extension of New START to 2026 in the hope and expectation that a successor agreement would be negotiated. Ultimately, this did not happen.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom encouraged Russia to return to compliance with its obligations under the treaty following Russia’s decision to suspend participation in New START verification measures in 2023. Following the demise of New START in February 2026, the Labour government stated that any replacement treaty “is a matter for the US and Russia” but that the UK continues to raise nuclear arms control with the USA and Russia through the P5 process.

The G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement of August 2025 noted concern at Russia’s suspension of its New START obligations while the treaty was in force, stated the G7’s desire to seek Russia’s return to full compliance with the Treaty, and called for follow-on nuclear arms control measures and reciprocal transparency regarding nuclear forces, doctrines and delivery systems.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

House of Lords Debates (2020). 28 October. cW. Russia and USA: Arms Control

https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2020-10-14.HL9204.h&s=%22New+Start%22+russia#gHL9204.r0

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2023). Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties To The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: First Session Cluster 1 Issues. 3 August.

House of Commons (2026) New START Treaty. Question for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 79349. 22 October. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-10-10/79349.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, 20 August 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-20-august-2025/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-20-august-2025

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

To maintain compliance with the central limits of the New START Treaty, by February 2018 the United States had removed 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from their silos, made four launch tubes on each of the United States’ 14 SSBNs incapable of launching ballistic missiles, and converted 41 B-52 heavy bombers to conventional-only roles. In addition, the United States de-MIRVed its intercontinental ballistic missile force such that each ICBM now carries only a single warhead.

The United States fully abided by the treaty’s verification regime, which included more than 320 on-site inspections and the exchange of more than 23,000 data notifications relating to the treaty between the United States and Russia. In 2021, the United States worked with Russia to successfully extend the treaty by the maximum of five years, until February 2026.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

During the Review Cycle, the United States continued to fully abide by the central limits and inspection regime; however, in response to Russia’s violations of New START, the United States took lawful reciprocal countermeasures and ceased to provide its updated data as of 1 March 2023. On 1 June 2023, the United States also began to withhold treaty notifications regarding the status of treaty-accountable items.

The United States has repeatedly expressed that it is ready to negotiate a new arms control treaty to replace New START after its expiry in February 2026, provided that Russia engages in good faith. In September 2025, however, President Putin offered to voluntarily maintain the New START limits if the United States reciprocates, and as of December 2025 Russia stated that it had yet to receive a “formal answer” from the United States.

Sources

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

U.S. Department of State. 2024 Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, January 17, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/UNCLASS_NST-Implementation-Report_2024-FINAL-Updated-Accessible-01.17.2025.pdf.

Faulconbridge, Guy, and Lucy Papachristou. “Russia says it awaits an answer from the US on New START as nuclear treaty ticks down.” Reuters, December 10. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russia-says-it-awaits-an-answer-us-new-start-nuclear-treaty-ticks-down-2025-12-10/