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Pillar 2

Action 35

The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has established and progressively strengthened a comprehensive nuclear export control system aimed at ensuring that nuclear-related exports do not contribute to nuclear weapons development. China adopted a set of core export control principles, including: (1) peaceful use only, (2) mandatory application of IAEA safeguards, and (3) prohibition of re-transfer without prior authorization. These principles were institutionalized through national regulations and aligned with international non-proliferation norms. China introduced a licensing system and control lists covering nuclear materials, equipment, and dual-use items, incorporating elements from international export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee – both of which China has joined and whose guidelines are implemented. Examples of such regulations and lists include: Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Export (released in 1997, revised in 2006), Administrative Measures for Administration on Import & Export Licensing of Dual-use Items and Technologies (2005), Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited and Restricted from Export (released in 2001, revised in 2023). A full list is included in the below source section.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued to strengthen its export-control legislation and implementation, including through the Export Control Law and updated control-list practice. China continues to implement a strict licensing system for nuclear and nuclear dual-use exports, requiring end-use and end-user assurances, non-retransfer guarantees, and verification that recipient facilities are under IAEA safeguards.

China has updated and consolidated its export control framework, emphasizing risk-based controls, “catch-all” provisions, and enhanced regulatory oversight of dual-use items to prevent indirect proliferation pathways, reflecting efforts to make export controls more adaptive and comprehensive in response to evolving technological and proliferation risks.

At the international level, China continues to support and draw upon the guidelines and best practices of multilateral export control regimes, including the Zangger Committee (China has actively co-sponsored and submitted multiple working papers as a member of the Zangger Committee) and NSG, while maintaining that export controls should balance non-proliferation objectives with the legitimate right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

China has considered AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine cooperation and the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material, technology or equipment for military purposes to non-nuclear-weapon States as risks to the objectives and purposes of the NPT.

Sources

China’s Non-proliferation and Export Control Laws and Regulations, updated Aug 29 2025

China’s Views and Recommendations on Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security, updated April 24, 2022

China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures, updated: December 18, 2025

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons–Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2015/32, 17 April 2015

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2020/41, 28 January 2022

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, State Council Information Office, November 27, 2025

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

France has concluded several intergovernmental agreements related civil nuclear cooperation with third countries (Australia, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Mexico, Morocco, Mongolia, Morocco, Tunisia, Vietnam, Slovakia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Argentina, Switzerland….), which include clauses that make the materials, goods and equipment subject to IAEA safeguards. Civil nuclear cooperation with third countries is conditioned to their implementation of safeguards.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

France has continued to implement intergovernmental agreements related civil nuclear cooperation with third countries which include clauses that make the materials, goods and equipment subject to IAEA safeguards.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

National report submitted by France. National report pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2015–2022. NPT/CONF.2020/42. (New York), 20 December 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/42

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. Russian legislation requires its civilian nuclear cooperation partners to be Party to the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Russia reaffirmed that its national export control system is based on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and the export rules and control lists produced by them.

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The UK provides standing secretarial support to the Zangger Committee and regular technical expertise to the NSG through its Technical Experts Group. The UK participates fully in the NSG's information exchange groups and uses meetings of the NSG Consultative Group to share best practice and national experience in implementing the NSG guidelines.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom states that it continues to abide by its export control commitments under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in line with the NSG and ZC control lists. It continues to provide standing secretarial support to the Zangger Committee and regular technical expertise to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and uses meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Consultative Group to share best practice and national experience in implementing the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

The UK's national export control framework is underpinned by the Export Control Order 2008, which has been amended during the current cycle. The Export Control (Amendment) Regulations 2025, which came into force on 20 May 2025, amended the Export Control Order 2008 and the assimilated Dual-Use Regulation to update controls on nuclear materials, facilities and equipment in line with changes agreed under the NSG guidelines. A second set of amendments came into force on 16 December 2025.

This ensures that the UK's export control regime remains aligned with international non-proliferation standards to prevent UK exports from contributing to nuclear weapons programmes and supporting implementation of NPT Articles I, II and III, as envisaged by Action 35.

The UK Strategic Export Control List, derived from and routinely updated in line with changes to the control lists administered by the multilateral export control regimes including the NSG, was most recently updated in December 2025.

The UK has also fully implemented UNSCR 1540 since its unanimous adoption in 2004. As a vice-chair of the 1540 Committee, the UK works with states, the IAEA and the G7 Global Partnership to monitor and assist implementation.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 25. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document.

Department for Business and Trade (2025). UK Strategic Export Control Lists. December. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69415ba1f065108822537524/uk_export_control_list_2025.pdf

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2021). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The United States has been a member of all major multilateral non-proliferation regimes for decades, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The United States maintains control lists that correspond directly to those maintained by the aforementioned export control regimes, and also includes unilateral control imposed by the United States, such as the U.S. Munitions List. Exporters generally must submit a license request with the appropriate agency for any item on one of these lists. License requests typically go through an extensive review process, including review by interested U.S. government agencies, such as the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the intelligence community, and NASA, as well as interested bureaus within the Department of State. The U.S. export control system also relies on catch-all controls to ensure that dual-use exports, which are not otherwise subject to export controls, are capable of being tracked, discussed with the recipient government, or even denied as an export transaction.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States maintained its membership and adherence to all multilateral non-proliferation regimes of which it is a member, and continued to advocate for the institution of responsible nuclear export controls. Specifically, in a statement at the 2024 NPT PrepCom, U.S. officials noted that “Robust export controls are thoroughly consistent with, and in fact facilitate and enhance confidence in, the right of States Parties to develop and use nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. Though there is ample rhetoric to the contrary, there is no evidence that strategic trade controls, including the multilateral export control regimes, hamper the international exchange of technology for peaceful uses or hinder any country’s economic development.”

Sources

U.S. Department of State. “Overview of U.S. Export Control System.” https://2009-2017.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/index.htm.

Warden, Jim. “Statement to Cluster 2 of the 2024 NPT PrepCom.” U.S. Department of State. Jule 26, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/statement-to-cluster-2-of-the-2024-npt-prepcom/.