Action 19 - NPT Monitor

China

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has supported cooperation on nuclear disarmament verification primarily through intergovernmental and UN mechanisms. It participated constructively in the United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification established pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 71/67 and 74/50, contributing to their consensus reports and discussions on the political and technical challenges of verification.

China has actively participated in P5 engagement, including:

Leading the P5 Glossary Key Nuclear Terms, which serves as a confidence-building measure intended to reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation among the nuclear-weapon States;
Pushing hard to materialize the January 2022 P5 joint statement on preventing nuclear war and made extra efforts to add language such as “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and the reaffirmation that none of the nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other state.

China has actively engaged with the IAEA, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, UN processes, and regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone mechanisms.

China’s engagement with civil society and independent verification initiatives has been more limited than its intergovernmental engagement, but Chinese experts have participated in Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues, including those organized by European, U.S., Japanese NGOs and think tanks.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued the above policies and practice.

China has supported the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the framework of the CD.

From August 2024 to August 2025, China again served as coordinator of the P5 process and promoted communication on nuclear policies and strategic mutual trust among the five nuclear-weapon States.

Sources

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons–Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2015/32, 17 April 2015

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2020/41, 28 January 2022

White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, State Council Information Office, November 27, 2025

Statement on Strengthening the Review Process Specific Issues, May 7, 2025

Statement on Nuclear Disarmament by Sun Xiaobo, May 2, 2025

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

President Macron listed the verification of nuclear disarmament as one of the four priorities of France regarding nuclear disarmament in 2020.

France has taken part to the work of the IPNDV on this issue.

It partnered with Germany in 2019 and 2022 to organise a practical exercise on nuclear disarmament verification (NuDiVe).

It supported UNGA resolutions creating Groups of Governmental Experts on this issue and took part in the work of the GGEs.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

France took part in the 2nd GGE on nuclear disarmament verification that handed its report in June 2023.

It voted in favour of the UNGA resolution 79/240 creating a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification in December 2024.

Sources

Emmanuel Macron. Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy. (Paris), 7 February 2020. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019 and participated in activities of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) as observer in 2015-2017.

However, Russia clarified that, in its view, verification procedures should be considered should be considered in the context of specific agreements on arms reduction and limitation and they should be aligned with the subject and scope of the restrictions set out therein.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2022-2023

Russia reaffirmed that it opposes initiatives that attempt to develop ‘universal’ verification procedures and technologies in isolation from actual negotiations on specific international agreements.

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The United Kingdom has worked with Norway, the United States, and Sweden, UN GGEs, as well as the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and with a range of civil society organisations and academics to develop technologies and methodologies for nuclear disarmament verification and irreversibility.

The UK played an active role in the UN Group of Governmental Experts on verification, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership. The Quad, established in 2015 between Norway, Sweden, the UK and the United States, conducted the LETTERPRESS multilateral nuclear disarmament verification exercise in October 2017, the first ever live play exercise involving both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states in nuclear disarmament verification. Lessons from LETTERPRESS informed the Quad’s subsequent workstreams on verification strategies and technologies.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership has continued its work during the current cycle, with one workstream focused on developing verification strategies and another on specific technological challenges. The UK reported that it continues to work within the Quad, the IPNDV and with civil society and academia on nuclear disarmament verification.

The UK has initiated a programme of work with non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament. At the first NPT Preparatory Committee in August 2023, the UK and Norway delivered a joint statement on the principle of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament. At the second NPT Preparatory Committee in August 2024, a joint statement on irreversibility was delivered by Australia, Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand and the UK.

The UK, in partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, funded a series of Wilton Park dialogues on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament in 2022, 2023 and 2024, bringing together states parties, civil society and academics to develop shared understanding of what irreversibility means in practice in the context of nuclear disarmament.

The UK assumed the chair of the P5 Process in September 2025 and has facilitated, promoted UK participation in and funded an accompanying track II dialogue for civil society and academia from all P5 states as part of the P5 dialogue process to engage non-proliferation and disarmament experts. The government said that it was supporting two “accompanying non-government dialogues, the Expert-Level Track (ELT) and Young Professionals’ Network (YPN). The purpose of these dialogues is to engage non-proliferation and disarmament experts and early career professionals from academia and think tanks in P5 countries, with the aim of generating new ideas to support the government-level process.”

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>; Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2015). Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: irreversibility statement. 11 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/first-preparatory-committee-for-the-2026-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference-irreversibility-statement

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, p. 19. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

House of Lords (2025). Nuclear Disarmament. Question for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. HL9730. 1 August. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-07-22/HL9730/

United States

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