Action 2 - NPT Monitor

China

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has generally endorsed the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to nuclear disarmament and the implementation of NPT obligations.

China has supported step-by-step, consensus-based nuclear disarmament measures, including CTBT entry into force, FMCT negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament, and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

China has participated in P5 transparency and confidence-building efforts, including the P5 Glossary process and common reporting framework, but has not accepted detailed quantitative transparency regarding its own nuclear forces.

China has maintained that verification arrangements for nuclear disarmament should be negotiated multilaterally and should not prejudice national security interests.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued to endorse these principles in general terms while arguing that transparency and reporting cannot substitute for concrete nuclear disarmament by the States with the largest arsenals.

China has opposed what it views as selective or one-sided transparency requirements aimed mainly at China and has advocated applying transparency, reporting and accountability across all three NPT pillars and to all States parties.

China has reaffirmed its support for transparency, but noting that transparency in intentions and policies is of the most practical significance, meanwhile providing limited quantitative information.

Sources

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2015/32, 17 April 2015

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2020/41, 28 January 2022

White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, State Council Information Office, November 27, 2025

Statement on Strengthening the Review Process Specific Issues at the 3rd Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference, May 7, 2025

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

France has completed three disarmament steps in an irreversible manner: the dismantlement of its ground-based arsenal (Plateau d’Albion, achieved in 1998), the dismantlement of its nuclear test site in French Polynesia (1998) and the dismantlement of the facilities producing weapon-related fissile material (irreversible dismantlement completed in 2009).

Several international visits have been organised on the sites, especially of Marcoule and Pierrelatte.

French civilian nuclear sites are submitted to IAEA inspections since 1981 as part of its non-proliferation obligations and under the safeguards agreement concluded with the Agency.

France has supported the principle of transparency regarding its treaty obligations and has reported the implementation of its NPT obligation as part of its commitments under the 2010 Plan of Action. Prior to that date, it started to report its achievements and policies in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses under the 2000 Action Plan.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

France has kept implementing the aforementioned measures and has prepared a new national report for the 2025 Review Conference.

Sources

Working paper submitted by France. Dismantling of plants for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. NPT/CONF.2010/WP.37 (New York), 12 April 2010, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/documents/WP37.pdf

Working paper submitted by France. Dismantling of the Pacific Testing Centre, NPT/CONF.2010/WP.36 (New York), 12 April 2010, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/documents/WP36.pdf

François Hollande. Speech By The President Of The French Republic On The Nuclear Deterrent, Istres, 19 February 2015. https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/discours_pr_istres_anglais_19_02_15.pdf?870/3a785803c99292ba08e5a27936d6ccf2ad4a7dfe

International Atomic Energy Agency. The Text of the Agreement of 27 July 1978 between France, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in France. INFCIRC/290. December 1981. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1981/infcirc290.pdf

Working paper submitted by France. France’s action against proliferation. NPT/CONF.2010/WP.32 (New York), 14 April 2010. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/documents/WP32.pdf

Working paper submitted by France, Nuclear disarmament: France’s practical commitment. NPT/CONF.2010/WP.33. (New York), 14 April 2010, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/documents/WP33.pdf

Working paper submitted by France. Responsible development of nuclear energy: initiatives by France. NPT/CONF.2010/WP.34. (New York), 14 April 2010, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/documents/WP34.pdf

National report submitted by France. National report pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2015–2022. NPT/CONF.2020/42. (New York), 20 December 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/42

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Russia has historically undertaken efforts to reduce its nuclear forces under a series of arms control agreements with the United States. Although the treaties varied in their specific obligations and verification arrangements, they collectively developed an extensive bilateral framework for transparency, and verification through notifications, inspections, and data exchanges.

As part of the 2010 New START Treaty framework, Russia publicly released information on the aggregate numbers of its strategic offensive arms relevant to the central limits established by the treaty. Russia also provided an overview of the numbers of reductions in its nuclear forces in national reports to the NPT Review Conferences in 2015 and in 2022.

Additionally, Russia participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2018-2019.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

In 2023 Russia has suspended participation in the New START Treaty, including its transparency and verification regime.

In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference, Russia divulged information that quantitative indicators of Russia’s nuclear forces did not exceed the limits set by the expired New START Treaty as of March 2026.

Additionally, Russia again participated in the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2022-2023

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation, 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The UK stated that it strives for the greatest level of transparency in its nuclear doctrines, policies and capabilities consistent with national security and non-proliferation responsibilities, and that a world without nuclear weapons will require a multilateral framework founded on the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility.

The United Kingdom has made significant investments in a programme of work on nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) and irreversibility in nuclear disarmament (IND) with a number of partners, including the US Department of State, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The work of the United Kingdom on transparency has included discussions among the nuclear-weapon States and with non-nuclear weapon States on strategic risk reduction, to develop collective understanding.

The UK actively participated in the “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” initiative and welcomed the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament. It has funded projects with academia and think tanks, including the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the University of Birmingham exploring States’ conceptions of their responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons. The UK has also hosted round tables and strategic dialogues to develop greater trust, confidence and transparency between States in relation to nuclear weapons and foster a more self-reflective and constructive global dialogue on progressing nuclear disarmament, including the sixth P5 Conference in London in February 2015, taking further steps on transparency.

The UK provides annual updates to Parliament on the progress of the Dreadnought Class nuclear-armed submarine programme and other related defence nuclear enterprise programmes. The United Kingdom has also published information on holdings of civil separated plutonium every year since 1986. In 1997, the UK voluntarily agreed to also publish additional information on holdings of high enriched uranium and depleted, natural and low enriched uranium in the civil nuclear cycle from 1998.

The UK reiterated at the 2022 Review Conference that “We must pursue serious work on transparency, verification and irreversibility, the three principles which underpin our collective work on disarmament. The UK has submitted working papers on each of these issues including recommendations for the Review Conference.”

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom has played an active role in initiatives such as the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership with Norway, Sweden and the United States.

The UK reiterated the central importance of applying the agreed principles of transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility to any nuclear disarmament efforts, and towards the sustainability of all pillars of the NPT. It stated it remains supportive of enhanced dialogue among States parties to build a common understanding of the application of irreversibility, in its technical, legal, normative and political dimensions.

The connections between verification and irreversibility were set out by the UK in a paper for the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification in 2018. This was followed by a series of working papers and joint statements over the 2018-2022 NPT review cycle and a series of conferences funded by the UK and Norway on irreversibility and nuclear disarmament at Wilton Park at which research on the subject funded by the UK and Norway was presented. The connections between transparency, verification, irreversibility and responsibility were set out in more detail in the UK’s ‘Imagining a world without nuclear weapons: a food for thought paper’ submitted to the 2026 NPT Review Conference.

However, there are limits to UK transparency shaped by two factors: 1) a political commitment to demonstrate what it considers to be a responsible approach to its NPT commitments as a Nuclear Weapon State; and 2) a strategic commitment to protecting the operational secrecy of a small, single-system nuclear arsenal.

The UK increased its level of transparency on warhead ceilings, warhead reductions and the number of SLBMs held or deployed after the Cold War. This trend reversed in the 2021 Integrated Review marking a shift towards reduced transparency, justified by the government as necessary in a deteriorating security environment. The UK discloses very little about strategic or ‘sub-strategic’ warhead yields.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2024). Conference on Disarmament Statement by the United Kingdom. 28 May. <https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_%282024%29/UK_nuclear_disarmament_statement.pdf>

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014). Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London).

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2022). Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 5 August. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/5Aug_MCI_UK.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). UK National Report for the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. February. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69a03520532c9ad91ebbcd60/UK-National-Report-for-the-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2023). First Preparatory Committee for 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 1 issues. 11 August. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/first-preparatory-committee-for-2026-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference-uk-statement-on-cluster-1-issues

Joint statement by Australia, Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Norway the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, and the United Kingdom (2024). Joint Statement on Irreversibility. 2024 NPT Preparatory Committee. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/24July_JointIrreversibility.pdf

Joint statement by UK, Norway and Mexico (2023). The principle of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament. 2023 NPT Preparatory Committee; https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom23/statements/3Aug_Irreversibility.pdf

Working Paper submitted by the UK and Norway (2021). Irreversibility in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: recommendations for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. 2020 NPT Review Conference NPT/CONF.2020/WP.16. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3949960?ln=en&v=pdf

Wilton Park (2024). Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament 2024 – Report. https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/reports/irreversibility-in-nuclear-disarmament-2024-report/

Wilton Park (2023). Moving forward on Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament. https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/app/uploads/2023/09/WP3125-Report.pdf

Wilton Park (2022). Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament. https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/app/uploads/2021/12/WP2019-Report.pdf.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026. Imagining a world without nuclear weapons: a food for thought paper. W0rking Paper 16. NPT/CONF.2026/WP.16 . 17 March. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n26/055/82/pdf/n2605582.pdf

Cabinet Office (2021). Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The United States has long recognized that effective verification is a key principle of nuclear disarmament, and that it takes on heightened importance as nuclear stockpiles continue to reduce. To that end, between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences the United States led, contributed to, and participated in several initiatives designed to lay the groundwork for future breakthroughs in nuclear disarmament verification. These initiatives included:

- - The UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) to Consider the Role of Verification in Advancing Nuclear Disarmament, which met for three sessions in 2018-2019 and adopted a consensus report confirming the essential role of verification in nuclear disarmament.
  - The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), which has brought together more than 100 experts from 30 countries to collaboratively develop solutions to the technical challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification. Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the IPNDV’s work included the development of scientific papers, the development and execution of five field exercises designed to test capabilities like high explosive detection methods and Special Nuclear Material presence/absence verification.
  - The program of cooperation under the 1958 U.S.-U.K. Mutual Defense Agreement to evaluate verification-specific technologies and procedures, such as the managed-access procedures, storage protocols, and chain of custody at nuclear weapons facilities.
  - The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership with the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden to further investigate verification requirements for future arms control treaties, including the development of a multi-year plan of work based on lessons learned through exercises like the 2017 Quad Letterpress Exercise.
  - Unilateral U.S. research initiatives to develop datasets and capabilities to facilitate warhead dismantlement verification, including the establishment of a nuclear warhead and component signature set that can be leveraged to support future treaty verification activities, as well as the evaluation of the potential feasibility of radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags during inspection scenarios.

In addition, the United States released information about the size of its nuclear stockpile and its number of dismantled warheads on multiple occasions between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences; the latest disclosure during this period was in October 2021, covering the status of the stockpile through September 2020.

To enhance transparency, each year between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences the United States released its annual Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan to describe how the Department of Energy sustains the US nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. In addition, throughout this period, the United States hosted representatives from non-nuclear weapon States parties and Sandia National Laboratories, with the goal of providing additional transparency regarding the United States’ stockpile stewardship and management activities.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States released information about the size of its nuclear stockpile and its number of dismantled warheads through September 2023––the only Nuclear Weapon State to do so.

In 2024, the US-led International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification celebrated its ten-year anniversary. It is currently nearing the end of its third and final phase of work, and continues to build global capacity on nuclear disarmament monitoring and verification among its 30 partner countries. In particular, throughout the life cycle of IPNDV, the United States has led working groups focused on developing technological solutions for nuclear disarmament verification.

To enhance transparency via-à-vis the United States’ stockpile stewardship, the United States also released its annual Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan to describe how the Department of Energy sustains the US nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. In addition, journalists and civil society experts were invited to tour the Nevada National Security Site to view the United States’ stockpile stewardship capabilities, and representatives from NPT States parties were invited to Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory for transparency visits.

Sources

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. “Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America.” NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

U.S. Department of State. “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” Fact Sheet. October 5, 2021. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Fact-Sheet_Unclass_2021_final-v2-002.pdf.

U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.” U.S. Department of Energy. Accessed October 24, 2025. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/transparency-us-nuclear-weapons-stockpile.

International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. “Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Insights from a Decade of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.” June 2024. https://www.ipndv.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/IPNDV-Capstone_FINAL-1.pdf.

U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. “Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP).” U.S. Department of Energy. Accessed October 24, 2025. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/stockpile-stewardship-and-management-plan-ssmp.

Clark, Heather. “Sandia hosts first Nonproliferation Treaty Transparency Visit.” Sandia Lab News, April 17, 2015. https://www.sandia.gov/labnews/2015/04/17/15-17-04/.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “Two NNSA National Labs host Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty representatives from around the world for transparency visit.” July 21, 2022. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/two-nnsa-national-labs-host-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-representatives-around.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA demonstrates transparency during arms control and nonproliferation experts’ visit to Nevada.” December 1, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-demonstrates-transparency-during-arms-control-and-nonproliferation-experts-visit.