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Pillar 1

Action 15

All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

China has expressed official support for the goal of FMCT and for early FMCT negotiations.

China has actively participated in the useful discussions held by the relevant subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament on issues related to FMCT.

China has participated in the UN preparatory group of high-level experts on such a treaty.

China has organized a non-formal discussion on the FMCT during its Presidency in the CD.

China has participated in the P5 coordination and the dialogue process of P5 with relevant countries.

China is reportedly to have last produced HEU in 1989 and last produced separated plutonium in 1991.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

China has continued its support in principle and participation.

Sources

Chinese Delegation. “Statement by the Chinese Delegation on Nuclear Disarmament at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” May 2, 2014.

People’s Republic of China. Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the People’s Republic of China. April 28–May 9, 2014.

People’s Republic of China. Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China. January 1–28, 2022.

Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China.

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

France has expressed its full support for the beginning of negotiation on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299).

France proposed a draft treaty at the NPT Review Conference in 2015.

It participated in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the FMCT in 2014-2015, the High-Level Preparatory Group (HLPG) in 2017-2018, and the Subsidiary Body for the Prevention of Nuclear War at the Conference on Disarmament.

Through the European Union, France supports Action 7 of the United Nations Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament, which calls for ‘the early opening and conclusion of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons and other nuclear explosive devices' (Council Decision 2017/2284). This project allowed for the organisation of workshops and discussion on a potential FMCT in the African, the Asia-Pacific and the Latin America and Caribbean regions.

France also supports the FMCT in the P5 context. At the highest level, President Macron supported the opening of negotiation on the FMCT as one of the four French priorities with regards to disarmament.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

At the Conference for Disarmament, France expressed its support for the opening of negotiation on a FMCT Treaty in various allocutions, in particular within Subsidiary organ 2 [prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters]. The objectives of the Treaty and the process supported by France was recalled in particular in interventions in 2023, 2024 and 2025.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

Emmanuel Macron. Speech of the President of the Republic on the Defense and Deterrence Strategy. (Paris), 7 February 2020. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy

Conference on Disarmament. Draft Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices Submitted by France. 9 April 2015. https://fissilematerials.org/library/france15e.pdf

Statement by France. Conference on Disarmament – Subsidiary organ 2 [prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters] – Statement by the Ambassador, M. Yann Hwang (Geneva), 17 March 2022. https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Conference-on-Disarmament-Subsidiary-organ-2-prevention-of-nuclear-war

Statement by France. Conference on Disarmament – Speech of the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Ms Catherine Colonna (Geneva), 27 February 2023. https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Conference-du-desarmement-Intervention-de-la-ministre-de-l-Europe-et-des

Statement by France. Conference on disarmament – Statement by Deputy Permanent Representative Alizée Semon on the prevention of nuclear war (item 2 of the CD agenda) (Geneva), 12 March 2024. https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Conference-du-desarmement-Intervention-de-la-Representante-permanente-adjointe

Statement by France. Conference on Disarmament – Fourth statement by Deputy Permanent Representative Alizée Semon in Subsidiary Body 2 [Prevention of nuclear war: legally binding instruments, including technical and institutional aspects] (Geneva), 3 June 2025. https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Conference-du-desarmement-Quatrieme-intervention-du-Representant-permanent

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Russia ceased production of high enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons in 1989 and plutonium for military purposes in 1994. Russia shut down all its 13 reactors that previously produced weapons-grade plutonium by 2010.

Russia consistently expressed support for launching negotiations on FMCT based on the principles set forth in the 1999 document CD/1299 (the ‘Shannon mandate’).

Russia engaged in the work on a possible FMCT, including in the Group of Governmental Experts established under the Resolution 67/53 of the UN General Assembly in 2014-2015 and in the FMCT High Level Expert Preparatory Group established under the Resolution 71/259 of the UN General Assembly in 2017-2018.

Russia converted 500 tons of weapons-grade uranium under the implementation of the Agreement Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (the HEU-LEU Agreement) with the USA

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

Russia continued to express support for launching negotiations on FMCT based on the principles set out in the Shannon mandate.

Russia stated that it considers the idea of FMCT has become to a considerable extent obsolete. However, Russia is ready to participate in negotiations on its development should such a decision be adopted.

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

Statement by the Russian Federation. Cluster II: Non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. 2025 Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 May 2025. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_Conference_(2025)/Russia%E2%80%99s_Cluster_II_EN.pdf

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK has supported efforts to agree a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a FMCT and developed recommendations to these ends.

The UK stated in its 2010 report to the NPT that “The UK continues to press for negotiations on an FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament and is working actively with other states, including the NWS, to explore ways of moving forward”. More specifically, the UK reports it has “maintained a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices since 1995. In 1998, the UK declared the total size of its fissile material stocks and voluntarily placed all fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards. This material continues to be liable for inspection by the IAEA. Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the UK has been conducted under international safeguards. However, the UK retains the right to resume such activities outside safeguards, under the terms of the UK’s Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA, until agreement is reached on an FMCT.”

The UN General Assembly met on 24 September 2010 for a high-level meeting devoted to “revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”. The UK urged countries not to block the start of negotiations on an FMCT, arguing that this is “damaging for multilateral arms control and may lead committed nations to bypass traditional institutions in order to further their disarmament ambitions”.

The UK actively participated in the 2017-18 high-level fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) expert preparatory group, the 2014-15 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and in Subsidiary Body 2 of the Conference on Disarmament in 2018 and 2022 to identify issues upon which future FMCT negotiators will need to focus.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK reiterated in its 2025 report to the NPT that it “has set out publicly that nuclear disarmament requires a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that bans the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This will need a cross-regional collective effort, and the UK continues to press for negotiations on an FMCT within the CD and is working actively with other NWS and NNWS, to explore ways to move forward.”

In September 2024 12 countries including the UK launched a cross-regional group called Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to expand support for a FMCT negotiation. The ‘FMCT Friends’ comprises Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

However, the UK has not been able (or willing) to broker or lead a new successful consensus on a full, robust Programme of Work in the CD. The repeated failures of consensus reflect structural difficulties in the CD widely acknowledged by disarmament observers.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2025.

Leo Docherty. Minister for Europe. Statement to the Conference on Disarmament (United Nations, Geneva). 27 February 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-conference-on-disarmament-27-february-2023-minister-for-europe-statement

Statement by Mr Alistair Burt. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. High Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations (United Nations New York). 24 September 2010. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2010/statements/part3/24Sept_UK.pdf

Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. U.S> Department of State. 23 September 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/

Ambassador Jo Adamson. Statement on Revitalisation of the Conference on Disarmament by the UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (United Nations, Geneva) 14 June 2012. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2012/statements/part2/14June_UK.pdf

Ambassador Matthew Rowland. Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament. Statement. (United Nations, Geneva) 30 July 2023. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2013/Statements/part3/30July_UK.pdf

High-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group. Note by the Secretary-General. A/73/159 (United Nations, New York). 13 July 2018, https://docs.un.org/en/A/73/159

Group of Governmental Experts to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Note by the Secretary-General. A/70/81 (United Nations, New York). 7 May 2021. https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/D19612093ED869EFC1257EC40033A6B3A7081.pdf

H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle. Permanent Representative. Statement by the United Kingdom. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 28 May 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_%282024%29/UK_nuclear_disarmament_statement.pdf

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States participated in two United Nations initiatives relating to a proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: a 2014-2015 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and a 2017-2018 High-Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group.

The Group of Governmental Experts consensus report, which was published in May 2015, represented the most thorough intergovernmental assessment to-date of the nature and characteristics of an FMCT. The GGE considered a variety of topics, including treaty objectives, scope, definitions, verification, legal and institutional arrangements, duration, and withdrawal clauses, among many others.

Building on the findings of the GGE, the High Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group sought to lay the groundwork for future treaty negotiations by developing a menu of potential treaty elements that could eventually be incorporated into a treaty structure. These included considerations of how each of the above topics explored in the GGE could be institutionalized within a treaty framework. As the Preparatory Group sought to capture a wide range of views rather than to actually negotiate a treaty by narrowing the list of options, the menu is highly expansive and contains divergences between national positions. As such, this effort represents a model for inclusive multilateral engagement constructive deliberation.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

During the Review Cycle, the United States joined and actively participated in the new Friends of FMCT initiative, a cross-regional group with participation from both Nuclear-Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that aims to enhance political attention on and contribute support to the negotiation of an FMCT. As part of this initiative, in September 2024 the United States issued a joint statement with Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom in support of an FMCT in accordance with CD/1299. The statement also expressed support for all voluntary actions taken by states in support of the spirit of an FMCT, including moratoria on fissile material production, the dismantlement or conversion of fissile material production facilities, reporting on domestic stockpiles of civil plutonium, and the development of substantive proposals for the negotiation of an FMCT.

In addition, the United States repeatedly called upon the Conference of Disarmament to agree upon a program of work that prioritizes the negotiation of an FMCT, and specifically noted that the growing nuclear programs of other nuclear-armed states makes this effort even more necessary.

Sources

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

Turner, Bruce. "Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty." Remarks delivered by Ambassador Bruce Turner, United States Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, March 12, 2024. https://geneva.usmission.gov/2024/03/12/remarks-to-the-conference-on-disarmament-on-a-fissile-material-cutoff-treaty/.

United Nations General Assembly. Group of Governmental Experts to Make Recommendations on Possible Aspects That Could Contribute to but Not Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices: Note by the Secretary-General. A/70/81. New York: United Nations, May 7, 2015. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n15/133/37/pdf/n1513337.pdf.

United Nations General Assembly. High-Level Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group: Note by the Secretary-General. A/73/159. New York: United Nations, July 13, 2018. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n18/223/57/pdf/n1822357.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. “Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.” Press Statement, 23 September 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/.