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Pillar 1

Action 7

All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has long shown support for the efforts by the CD to start substantive work on an international legal instrument for unconditional NSA as soon as possible.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has identified NSAs as a realistic and feasible disarmament measure and a potential “low-hanging fruit” for the 2026 review cycle.

China has indicated its openness towards any other proposals or measures that help advance progress on the issue of NSAs.

China has actively promoted the prioritization of NSAs in the NPT review process. It submitted working papers calling for the early conclusion of an international legally binding instrument and urged the CD to commence substantive work as soon as possible.

Sources

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2015/32, 17 April 2015

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2020/41, 28 January 2022

White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, State Council Information Office, November 27, 2025

Statement by the Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Negative Security Assurances at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, May 2, 2025

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

France expressed its support for the adoption of a programme of work in 2009 which included the item “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

France expressed its support for the adoption of a programme of work in 2024 (renewed in 2025) which included the item “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”.

Sources

Statement by France. Unofficial transcript, France, Ambassador Eric Danon (Geneva), 26 May 2009. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2009/statements/2session/26May_France.pdf

Conference on disarmament – Statement by Ambassador Camille Petit on the adoption of a programme of work for the Conference (Geneva), 13 June 2024. https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Conference-on-disarmament-Statement-by-Ambassador-Camille-PETIT-on-the-adoption

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Russia expressed its support for the adoption of a CD programme of work in 2009 which included the item “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”

Russia expressed its support for the creation of subsidiary bodies, including one to deal with “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” in 2018 and in 2022.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Russia expressed its support for the creation of subsidiary bodies, including one to deal with “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” in 2024 and in 2025.

In 2026 Russia stated that substantive discussion on the topic of negative security assurances with remains highly relevant. However, Russia opposed the re-establishment of subsidiary bodies, including on negative security assurances, and instead called for negotiating a more focused and ambitious mandate for each subsidiary body.

Sources

Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 20 January 2009, P.17

https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g09/606/36/pdf/g0960636.pdf

Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 28 February 2018.

https://mid.ru/de/foreign_policy/news/1564914/?lang=en

Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 22 February 2022.

https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/28-02-2022_statement-ma_94912087a65c1a566063847165c87afb/

Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 23 January 2024

https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_(2024)/Statement_of_the_Russian_PR_23-01-2024_ENG.pdf

Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 23 January 2025.

https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/1992770/

Statement by the Russian Federation. Plenary meeting. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 3 February 2026.

https://geneva.mid.ru/en/activities/news/statement_by_a_russian_representative_at_the_plenary_session_of_the_conference_on_disarmament/

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The UK states that it supports progress through consensus-based programmes of work in the Conference on Disarmament. During its 2019 CD Presidency, the UK proposed establishing four Subsidiary Bodies covering the CD’s core agenda items including negative security assurances, alongside other items. The proposal committed states only to discussions rather than negotiations because the UK says it supports consensus-based progress while not committing to a legally binding instrument.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The UK has stated in the Conference on Disarmament that it remains open to having discussions on legally-binding instruments on NSAs but that it would not be able to accept NSAs without the caveat requiring that a state not be in material breach of its obligations under the NPT.

The UK has stated that it reaffirms its existing unilateral negative security assurances regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that it updated in the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy. This stated that “The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations.” It has also underscored its legally binding commitments to over 100 countries in the context of the nuclear weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Central Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

The UK has clarified the ‘material breach’ in the context of its existing NSAs refers to “a State developing or attempting to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, not safeguards or procedural issues”.

Overall, the UK supports substantive discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on negative security assurances and recognises the legitimacy of efforts to develop international arrangements. However, it continues to rely on its unilateral declarations and has not committed to negotiating a universal, legally binding instrument.

Sources

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2021). UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, statement at the Conference on Disarmament, 21 January. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/conference-on-disarmament-2021-session-uk-statement>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2019). Looking back at the UK’s Conference on Disarmament Presidency. FCDO Blog. https://blogs.fcdo.gov.uk/aidanliddle/2019/03/22/disarmament-blog-looking-back-at-the-uks-conference-on-disarmament-presidency/

UK Mission Geneva (2024). Conference on Disarmament. Statement by the United Kingdom by H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative Geneva, 14 March. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_(2024)/UK_NSAs_statement.pdf

Cabinet Office (2021). Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy

Foreign. Commonwealth & Development Office (2024). Conference on Disarmament: High-level Segment. Statement by the United Kingdom, as delivered by Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon at the United Nations on 28 February. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-at-conference-on-disarmament-high-level-segment>

UK Mission Geneva (2024). Conference on Disarmament. Statement by the United Kingdom by H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative Geneva, 14 March. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_(2024)/UK_NSAs_statement.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2024). UK Statement at Conference on Disarmament: High-level Segment. 28 February. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-at-conference-on-disarmament-high-level-segment

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

See Action 6.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

See Action 6.

Sources

See Action 6.