Action 64 - NPT Monitor

China

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China supported the norm embodied in the IAEA General Conference decision of 18 September 2009, GC(53)/DEC/13, on the prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations during operation or under construction. The decision recalled earlier IAEA General Conference resolutions recognizing that any armed attack on, or threat against, nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the UN Charter, international law and the IAEA Statute. China has generally framed this norm as part of the broader protection of peaceful nuclear facilities, nuclear safety, nuclear security and the peaceful settlement of regional nuclear issues.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued to voice opposition to attacks against nuclear installations. In its 2025 NPT working paper, China stated that all efforts should be made to ensure the safety of peaceful nuclear facilities, oppose armed attacks on nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear installations, and fully comply with the 18 September 2009 IAEA General Conference decision prohibiting armed attacks or threats against operating or under-construction nuclear facilities. In its 2026 proposed elements for the NPT Review Conference final document, China again called for ensuring the security of peaceful nuclear facilities and opposing armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations, including nuclear power plants.

China also applied this position to the war in Ukraine (opposing armed attacks against nuclear power plants or other peaceful nuclear facilities, and calls on all parties to comply with international law including the Convention on Nuclear Safety and resolutely avoid man-made nuclear accidents) and Iranian nuclear issue (opposing attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities and criticizing attacks on Iranian facilities under IAEA safeguards as undermining the NPT-based non-proliferation regime and confidence in IAEA safeguards).

Sources

Working Paper on the Elements of the Final Document of The NPT Eleventh Review Conference, April 30, 2026

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

Give Full Play to the Role of the NPT in Promoting Peace and Development in the New Era – Working paper submitted by China, Apr 26, 2025

China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis, Feb 24 2023

China firmly opposes armed attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities: spokesperson, Mar 31, 2026

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

On 9 March 2022, the European Union recalled the IAEA 2009’s decision and the IAEA General Conference Resolution GC(43)/533 which recognises that an armed attack or a threat of armed attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, in operation or under construction, would create a situation in which the UN Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. In this statement and other declarations, France has endorsed IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s Seven Indispensable Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security,’ which includes the principle that ‘the physical integrity of the nuclear facilities, whether it is reactors, fuel ponds, or radioactive waste stores, must be maintained’.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

On 22 September 2022, France, Germany, Italy, Ukraine, Canada, Korea, Switzerland, the United States and European Union delivered a joint statement which notes the 2009 IAEA General Conference unanimous decision GC(53)/DEC/13 entitled “ Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction” which recognised the importance attached to safety, security and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes as well as IAEA General Conference resolutions GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533 regarding armed attacks or threats against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes.
In 2024, it condemned Russia’s illegal occupation of and strikes on the Zaporizhzhia power plant, described as a flagrant violation of the IAEA’s seven pillars.

In addition, the French government indicates that it contributed 3.8 million euros in extrabudgetary funds to the IAEA specifically to support nuclear safety and security at Ukrainian nuclear facilities since the beginning of the war.

With regards to the military strikes against Iran in 2025 and 2026, France did not refer to the IAEA’s decision, but mentioned that ‘it did not participate in, nor support the strikes against the Iranian nuclear programme, emphasizing instead the urgent need for diplomatic engagement as the only option capable of ensuring a lasting response to the Iranian nuclear issue.’

Sources

EU Statement on safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine as delivered at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on 9 March 2022, European Union External Action Service, 9 March 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-statement-safety-security-and-safeguards-implications-situation-ukraine-delivered-international_en

Joint statement on the safety and security of civil nuclear facilities in armed conflicts, 21 September 2022, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, 22 September 2022, https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2022/09/joint-statement-on-the-safety-and-security-of-civil-nuclear-facilities-in-armed-conflicts-21-september-2022/

Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group on a Nuclear Safety and Security Framework for Ukraine (15 Mar. 2022), France Diplomacy, 15 March 2022, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/news/2022/article/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-on-a-nuclear-safety-and

France call on Russia to abide by the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, Permanent mission of France to the United Nations in New York, 15 April 2024, https://onu.delegfrance.org/russia-once-again-france-call-on-russia-to-abide-by-the-resolutions-of-the-iaea

Iran must comply with its non-proliferation obligations, Permanent mission of France to the United Nations in New York, 19 September 2025, https://onu.delegfrance.org/iran-must-comply-with-its-non-proliferation-obligations

Working paper submitted by France. France’s support for the International Atomic Energy Agency. NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.11. 5 March 2025. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n25/060/12/pdf/n2506012.pdf#:~:text=France%20is%20one%20of%20the,Technical%20Cooperation%20Fund%20in%202025.

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Russia supported the IAEA General Conference decision of 18 September 2009 on the prohibition of armed attacks or threats against nuclear installations by joining the consensus through which the decision was adopted

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

In March 2022, Russian military seized control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. Russia has subsequently stated that it was taking all necessary measures to ensure the nuclear safety and security of Zaporizhzhia NPP and accused Ukraine of conducting military attacks on the power plant.

Russia stated that it is categorically opposed to strikes on any nuclear facilities, especially those under IAEA safeguards and has submitted a working paper to the 2026 NPT Review Conference that criticised military actions by the United States and Israel against Iranian nuclear facilities

Sources

International Atomic Energy Agency. Summary Records. First Plenary Meeting. 67th Session of the IAEA General Conference (Vienna), 25 September 2023. pp.15-16.

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc67or1_prl_0.pdf

Statement by Russia. ‘Prohibition of All Forms of Attacks and Threats of Attack against Nuclear Sites and Facilities under IAEA Safeguards’. 69th Session of the IAEA General Conference (Vienna), 19 September 2025

https://viennamission.mid.ru/en/news/statement_by_permanent_representative_of_the_russian_federation_mikhail_ulyanov_at_iaea_general_conference_prohibition_of_all_forms_of_attacks_and_threats_of_attack_against_nuclear_sites_and_facilities_under_iaea_safeguards/

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Foreign Ministry Statement regarding the Resolution of the 69th session of the IAEA General Conference – Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine’. 19 September 2025.

https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/2047877/

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

Working paper submitted by Russia. ‘Erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a result of the worsening situation related to the Iranian nuclear programme’. 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 13 April 2026

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/WP.44

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The UK did not conduct or plan attacks on civilian nuclear facilities in the prior review cycle.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom states that it “recognises the importance attached to safety, security and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.”

In 2022 the ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and senior officials from Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the USA, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy expressed their express “grave concern regarding the threats posed to the safety and security of nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes in Ukraine and their personnel, significantly raising the risk of a nuclear accident”. They underscored the importance of the IAEA Director General’s ‘Seven Indispensable Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security’, outlined in his statement to the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on March 2 to 3, 2022 and welcomed the IAEA’s Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ).

In contrast, the UK has not condemned military attacks by Israel and the United States on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025 and 2026. Instead, it has only acknowledged in a joint statement with France and Germany that it was not involved in the 2025 attacks and a statement by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer that the UK was not involved in the 2026 attacks. The UK has acknowledged military strikes in the vicinity of Iranian nuclear infrastructure has not explicitly operationalised or cited the 2009 IAEA General Conference prohibition in its public statements, instead relying on general non-proliferation, de-escalation, and self-defence framing.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2022) Safety and security of civil nuclear facilities in armed conflicts: joint statement. 21 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-safety-and-security-of-civil-nuclear-facilities-in-armed-conflicts-21-september-2023

France, Germany and the UK (2025).NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: E3 Statement to the IAEA Board of Governors. 10 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/npt-safeguards-agreement-with-iran-e3-statement-to-the-iaea-board-of-governors-september-2025

Prime Minister’s Office (2026). PM statement on Iran: 28 February. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-iran-28-february-2026.

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States did not conduct or threaten armed attacks against any civilian nuclear installations.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

U.S. military action against Iran in 2025––particularly its strikes against the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, all three of which were under IAEA safeguards––directly contravened GC(53)/DEC/13. The fact that Iran was itself in breach of its safeguards obligations does not mitigate the prohibition on armed attack under the GC decision, nor does the decision offer exceptions for pre-emptive or preventative strikes.

Sources

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.” GC(53)/DEC/13, September 2009. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc53dec-13_en.pdf.