Action 34 - NPT Monitor

China

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has actively contributed to the development of a robust and adaptive international safeguards technology base through sustained cooperation with the IAEA and other Member States. Joining the IAEA Member State Support Programme in 2007, China has since undertaken research and development on safeguards verification tools, methodologies, and concepts, including measurement uncertainty analysis and safeguards approaches for advanced reactor types.

In addition, China became a member of the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) and participated in sample analysis and technical validation, thereby contributing to the scientific and technical foundations of safeguards. It also supported the development of facility-specific safeguards approaches, including cooperation with the IAEA on new reactor technologies such as high-temperature gas-cooled reactors.

China has also invested in human capital and technical capacity, including the establishment of joint training initiatives with the IAEA to strengthen expertise in safeguards implementation and nuclear material accountancy.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued and expanded its contribution to the development of advanced, flexible, and cost-effective safeguards technologies, emphasizing both technical innovation and international cooperation. China has maintained active participation in IAEA-led safeguards R&D projects, continuing to generate technical outputs in verification methodologies and analytical techniques. It has also deepened its role in technical cooperation and training, including through joint training centers and expert exchanges, aimed at strengthening global safeguards capacity.

China has supported the application and refinement of safeguards technologies in practice, including by placing a growing number of nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and cooperating with the Agency in developing safeguards approaches for new nuclear technologies.

Sources

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, State Council Information Office, November 27, 2025

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

France has been leading research & development on technologies that can be used for advanced safeguards. Through the French Support Programme for IAEA safeguards (PFSG), established in 1983, it has participated in the training of AIEA inspectors in all facilities of its fuel cycle. The PFSG’s purpose is to develop the resources required to implement safeguards, including equipment, measurement systems, information and sample analysis, expertise, satellite imagery and training.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

France continues research & development on technologies that can be used for advanced safeguards and training of AIEA inspectors through the implement of the French Support Programme for IAEA safeguards (PFSG). The PFSG’s purpose is to develop the resources required to implement safeguards, including equipment, measurement systems, information and sample analysis, expertise, satellite imagery and training.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

National report submitted by France. National report pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2015–2022. NPT/CONF.2020/42. (New York), 20 December 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/42

France’s support for the International Atomic Energy Agency, Working paper submitted by France, NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.11, 5 March 2025, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n25/060/12/pdf/n2506012.pdf

Projet de loi portant application du protocole additionnel à l’accord entre la France, la Communauté européenne de l’énergie atomique et l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique relatif à l’application de garanties en France, Rapport n° 621 (2012-2013), déposé le 4 juin 2013, Sénat, https://www.senat.fr/rap/l12-621/l12-621_mono.html

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Russia has supported and facilitated strengthening of the technical capability of the IAEA Department of Safeguards

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Russia continued to support and facilitate strengthening of the technical capability of the IAEA Department of Safeguards

In its report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia highlighted the following relevant activities:

Russia assisted the IAEA by examining in its analytical laboratories environmental samples collected by the Agency during inspections
Russia performed joint missions with the IAEA to elaborate approaches to verification for new types of nuclear plants, such as mobile nuclear power plants with small modular reactors, and to examine the feasibility of safeguards by design
Russia supported development of new technologies are being developed to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities and the Agency’s efforts to develop innovative measurement equipment that would allow for more accurate control of irradiated nuclear fuel its efforts to establish uniform non-discriminatory methods for implementing safeguards at facilities that are being decommissioned.
Russia emphasized importance of training of the Agency’s inspectors, including in the use of non-destructive techniques for testing nuclear material and in the conduct of inspections at uranium enrichment facilities.
Russia provided training in nuclear material accounting and control to IAEA Secretariat staff

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The UK Safeguards Support Programme established in 1981 has provided continuous technical support to the IAEA in developing and maintaining the international technology base for safeguards. The programme provides expertise and advice for the further development of safeguards strategies in new and existing activities, analytical services to support the IAEA in analysing nuclear material from safeguards inspection samples, access to facilities and experts for training IAEA personnel in advanced techniques, and development of techniques and methods for safeguarding facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The UK has continued to provide support to the IAEA's international technology base through its Safeguards Support Programme.

Sources

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025). UK nuclear safeguards support programme: reports on activities and progress. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-safeguards-support-programme-report-on-activities-and-progress

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

In 1977, the United States established the United States Support Program (USSP) at Brookhaven National Laboratory to fund research and development activities on behalf of the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards. The USSP responds to official requests for assistance from the IAEA and has assisted the Agency across a broad spectrum of disciplines, including non-destructive analysis of nuclear material, containment/surveillance capabilities, environmental monitoring techniques, remote monitoring, and information collection, processing and analysis.

In 2008, the NNSA established the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) “to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges.” As part of NGSI, NNSA’s Office of International Nuclear Safeguards coordinates collaborations with international partners to jointly advance safeguards technologies through the International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement (INSEP) program.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States has continued to respond to the IAEA’s tasking requests through the United States Support Program (USSP) and has engaged with other Member States through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative.

Due to ongoing advancements in small modular reactor technologies, the United States has been a leading proponent of the “safeguards by design” concept. For example, in December 2024, Oak Ridge National Laboratory hosted the IAEA’s Interregional Workshop on Safety, Security and Safeguards by Design in Small Modular Reactors, which welcomed 76 attendees representing 15 countries, three U.S. national labs, domestic and international industry partners, as well as IAEA officers.

During the second Trump administration, support for international institutions, including the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency, has declined. In particular, the Trump administration suspended two programs designed to provide American aid to the international nuclear inspection regime: a scientific and technical recruitment programme based at Brookhaven National Laboratory, and an illicit nuclear detection program based at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. At least one of these programs was ultimately reinstated following political and public outcry.

Sources

U.S. Department of Energy. U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards. Brookhaven National Laboratory. https://www.bnl.gov/ispo/ussp.php.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Office of International Nuclear Safeguards.” National Nuclear Security Administration, https://www.energy.gov/documents/nnsas-next-generation-safeguards-initiative-brochure.

Baldwin, George, and Mongiello, Risa. “International Nuclear Safeguards Cooperation.” Sandia National Laboratories. SAND 2011-XXXX. January 2011. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1110551.

International Atomic Energy Agency. “Safeguards By Design.” https://www.iaea.org/topics/assistance-for-states/safeguards-by-design.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory. “ORNL leads international community on safeguards, security for advanced reactors.” December 2, 2024. https://www.ornl.gov/news/ornl-leads-international-community-safeguards-security-advanced-reactors.

Broad, William J. ‘Atomic Detectives Who Inspect Iran Sites Are Affected by Trump’s Aid Freeze.” New York Times, 8 March 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/08/science/trump-nuclear-inspectors-aid-freeze.html.