Action 24

N/A: As a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, China is not required to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement covering all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities as called in Action 24. Nevertheless, China has supported the role of IAEA safeguards in implementing article III of the Treaty. China concluded a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1988 and signed an Additional Protocol in 1998, which entered into force in 2002, making China the first nuclear-weapon State to bring an Additional Protocol into force. China has also submitted selected civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards under its voluntary offer arrangement and has supported IAEA safeguards-related training, research and technical capacity-building.

The following agreements have been adopted to place relevant French installations under safeguards, according to the specificies of nuclear-weapon states:

• Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) between France, Euratom and the IAEA of July 27, 1978 (INFCIRC/290) in force since 12 September 1981
• Additional Protocol (AP) of 22 September 1998 (INFCIRC/290/Add.1) in force since 30 April 2004
• Safeguards Agreement for the Caribbean French territories of 21 March 2000 (INFCIRC/718) in force since 26 October 2007, together with the modifications on the Small Quantities Protocol of 17 September 2017, in force since 25 February 2019.

From 2013 to 2022, between 15 and 23 IAEA inspections were conducted annually on 17 eligible installations.

As a nuclear-weapon state, Russia has a Voluntary Offer Agreement with the IAEA that allows the IAEA to apply safeguards to designated nuclear material within its civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The agreement entered into force in 1985.

Although not required to do so under the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state, the UK concluded a Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA, signed on 7 June 2018, replacing the existing trilateral arrangements between the IAEA, Euratom and the UK following the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom post-Brexit. These agreements ensure that IAEA safeguards continue to apply to all source or special fissionable material in UK civil nuclear facilities.

As a Nuclear Weapon State, the United States is not required to agree to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Instead, it maintains a Voluntary Offer Agreement and has signed the Additional Protocol.