Skip to main content
Pillar 2

Action 44

The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

China

View country profile

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has developed national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials through nuclear-security regulation, port-of-entry radiation detection, physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, and non-proliferation export controls. China’s 2016 national nuclear-security progress report stated that China regarded combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material as a key element in preventing nuclear terrorism and had installed more than 1,000 radiation-detection devices at sea, air, highway and railway ports. China also participated in international counter-nuclear-smuggling cooperation, including activities with the United States and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and developed domestic controls through export-control licensing, end-user and end-use certification, control lists, customs supervision and enforcement mechanisms.

China has supported UN Security Council resolution 1540 implementation and relevant non-proliferation capacity-building.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued to strengthen nuclear-security and non-proliferation controls relevant to Action 44. In its 2026 NPT national report, China reported upgrading physical protection systems for nuclear materials, improving nuclear-security regulations and standards, strengthening nuclear-security culture, building the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence, and enhancing capabilities for nuclear-material control, supervision, transport security and cybersecurity. China also reported continued support for non-proliferation capacity-building, including cooperation with UNODA and the 1540 Committee to host training courses for Security Council resolution 1540 points of contact in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, China continued to strengthen domestic export controls: the 2026 Atomic Energy Law requires strict control over proliferation-sensitive items and materials that could be used for nuclear explosive devices and requires that nuclear imports and exports be used for peaceful purposes.

Sources

National Progress Report on Nuclear Security of the People's Republic of China, April 1, 2016

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

France

View country profile

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

France signed an agreement with IAEA in 2011 to identify sources exported by French companies and secure those sources in the countries where they are now located or, where that is impossible, to bring them back to France for processing. At the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. in 2016, the President of the Republic proposed an initiative to strengthen the security of high activity sealed radioactive sources. France held side events on this subject during the International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material, held in Vienna in December 2018. Alongside Germany and the United States of America, France co-chairs an annual technical meeting to identify and promote initiatives on alternative technologies to high-activity radioactive sources.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

France held side events on this subject during the International Conference on Nuclear Security, held in May 2024.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Abu Dhabi, October 27-31, 2013 Security of Radioactive Sources France – IAEA cooperation France Repatriation policy, https://www.wins.org/files/13-114_full_paper_iaea_abu_dhabi_conf_oct_27-31_security_of_radioactive_sources__france-iaea_cooperation__b_se.pdf

Russia

View country profile

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

At the 2015 NPT Review Conference Russia reported that it is taking measures to improve systems for accounting, control and physical protection of radioactive sources.

Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

Russia reported that under bilateral agreements and contracts, it has provided assistance to countries in the establishment of security systems for nuclear material and facilities

In 2006 Russia and the United States launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Russia has organized a number of events relating to the Initiative since its launch, including on nuclear forensics

Russia has supported and participated in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Russia continues to participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)

At the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reaffirmed that the transport of nuclear material and radioactive substances in Russia are subject to the necessary security measures in its national report.

Russia also reaffirmed that it has founded its national export control system on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee and implements the recorded decisions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in its regulatory framework in a timely manner and without delay.

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.

https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

United Kingdom

View country profile

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Programme Cyclamen, the UK's radiological and nuclear border detection system, has been in continuous operation since 2003. The Home Office described it as the UK's primary defence against the illicit importation of radiological and nuclear materials, sitting alongside wider detection and response capabilities that make up the UK's domestic nuclear security system and form part of the government's Nuclear Security Strategy and CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom says that it has deployed radiological and nuclear detection capabilities at its borders and inland through Programme Cyclamen, specialist response capabilities to protect and prepare against an attack using these materials, and a robust regulatory framework to protect nuclear materials.

The UK participates in international nuclear security architectures, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and INTERPOL-linked efforts to detect illicit trafficking.

The UK has established specialist response and investigative capacity, including counter-terrorism policing structures and nuclear/radiological incident response capabilities coordinated across the Office for Nuclear Regulation, Civil Nuclear Constabulary and counter-terrorism units.

The UK has continued to invest in the Cyclamen Programme with a contract worth up to £300 million covering fixed, vehicle-based and mobile radiological and nuclear detection capability at ports and airports around the UK and one site in northern France, running to 2034.

The UK's Counter-Terrorism Strategy CONTEST 2023 sets out the aim of reducing the risk from terrorism, including from radiological and nuclear threats, through detect, prepare, prevent and pursue strands of activity.

The UK says it is “committed to the continued implementation and universalisation of nuclear security conventions, sharing best practice and expertise with international partners, and supporting global nuclear security assistance”.

Sources

Home Office (2024). Cyclamen Programme. 6 August. https://www.find-tender.service.gov.uk/Notice/024659-2024.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London).<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.

Home Office (2024). Cyclamen Programme. 6 August. https://www.find-tender.service.gov.uk/Notice/024659-2024

Home Office (2023). CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2023. CP 902. July. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/650b1b8d52e73c000d54dc82/CONTEST_2023_English_updated.pdf

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>, p. 26.

United States

View country profile

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration established the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program––its flagship program to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Prior to the current Review Cycle, the program had deployed nearly international 800 radiation detection systems; transitioned responsibility for the long-term operation and maintenance of more than 620 systems deployed to international partners; and engaged with 15 international partners to increase global nuclear forensics capabilities.

The United States also co-founded the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2006––a voluntary partnership of 89 nations and six international organizations that are committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. The United States served as co-chair of the GICNT alongside Russia.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

During the current Review Cycle, the National Nuclear Security Administration continued to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials through its Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program. Through this program, NSDD collaborates with international organizations including INTERPOL, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Commission, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Customs Organization, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. NSDD also partners with Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Finland, among other partner countries to fund joint capacity building efforts around the globe.

The United States served as co-chair of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism alongside Russia; however, in 2022 the GICNT paused all official meetings of the GICNT and its working groups indefinitely.

Sources

National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA marks 20th anniversary of the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program.” May 21, 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20210516092731/https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-marks-20th-anniversary-nuclear-smuggling-detection-and-deterrence-program.

U.S. Department of State. “The Global Initiative To Combat Nuclear Terrorism.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-global-initiative-to-combat-nuclear-terrorism/.

National Nuclear Security Administration. “Countering Nuclear Smuggling.” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/countering-nuclear-smuggling.