China has stated that nuclear exports should comply with NPT obligations and safeguards requirements.
China’s nuclear export-control regulations require end-use/end-user controls, safeguards-related conditions, and non-proliferation assurances in nuclear cooperation.
China’s membership in the NSG and Zangger Committee supports this practice.
China has continued to emphasize that peaceful nuclear cooperation must comply with non-proliferation obligations while opposing discriminatory restrictions.
China has criticized AUKUS nuclear-submarine cooperation as inconsistent with the spirit of safeguards and non-proliferation norms.
Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons–Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2015/32, 17 April 2015
Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2020/41, 28 January 2022
White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, State Council Information Office, November 27, 2025
Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026
Statement by the Chinese Delegation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, May 9 2025
China’s Non-proliferation and Export Control Laws and Regulations, updated Aug 29 2025
France has concluded several intergovernmental agreements related civil nuclear cooperation with third countries (Australia, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Mexico, Morocco, Mongolia, Morocco, Tunisia, Vietnam, Slovakia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Argentina, Switzerland….), which include clauses that make the materials, goods and equipment subject to IAEA safeguards. Civil nuclear cooperation with third countries is conditioned to their implementation of safeguards.
France has continued to implement intergovernmental agreements related civil nuclear cooperation with third countries which include clauses that make the materials, goods and equipment subject to IAEA safeguards.
National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2
Russia developed its national export control system in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. Russian legislation requires its civilian nuclear cooperation partners to be Party to the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards.
Russia reaffirmed that its national export control system is based on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and the export rules and control lists produced by them.
National report of the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 21 May 2015.
https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-48_National%20report%20of%20the%20Russian%20Fed_E.pdf
National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1
National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14
The UK's export control framework has consistently required that nuclear exports only proceed where IAEA safeguards obligations are in place. The Zangger Committee Trigger List, to which the UK subscribes, requires the export of listed items to trigger IAEA safeguards obligations in the recipient state.
In 2008, the UK revised its policy on nuclear exports to India following the NSG waiver for India. Nuclear-related exports to India are permitted only under the NSG India exception and only for civil facilities safeguarded by the IAEA. Applications for items destined for unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, or where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion, continue to be refused. This policy is reflected in the UK-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, concluded in 2015, and in the current guidance on importing and exporting nuclear-related items.
The United Kingdom says that it supports universal adoption of IAEA safeguards and that it “assesses all export licence applications fully and in accordance with Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines before a final decision is made for any licence application”. The UK also welcomed the publication in November 2025 of an update to the Zangger Committee's Trigger List, which requires IAEA safeguards to be triggered by exports of listed nuclear items.
Export control policy states that the UK will not grant a licence if to do so would be inconsistent with, inter alia, the UK’s obligations under the NPT or the UK’s commitments in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
However, the UK’s India-specific guidance also says nuclear-related exports to India are permitted only under the NSG India exception and only for civil facilities safeguarded by the IAEA.
Department for Business and Trade (2025). International non-proliferation and arms control regimes. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/international-non-proliferation-and-arms-control-regimes
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2024). Importing and exporting nuclear-related items: role of NCAs between the UK and international partners. February. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65d31e920f4eb1f5bba98118/nuclear-cooperation-agreements-guidance.pdf
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>.
United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2024 (2025). House of Commons HC 1251. July 17, p. 53. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/687907f70263c35f52e4dda2/UK_Strategic_Export_Controls_Annual_Report_2024_Accessible.pdf
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established a legally binding framework for the United States to establish significant peaceful nuclear cooperation with other countries. 123 Agreements legally mandate the U.S. partner country’s adherence to nine non-proliferation criteria, including legal obligations for U.S. partners to maintain strong standards with regard to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
In addition, the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision prohibiting the President from submitting a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement to Congress “with respect to a proposed cooperation agreement with any country that has not signed and implemented an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”
During the current Review Cycle, the United States concluded 123 Agreements with five new countries: Singapore, the Philippines, Armenia, Thailand, Mexico.
In November 2025, the Trump administration finalized a series of agreements covering nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia that could potentially undermine the United States’ longstanding non-proliferation policy priorities, given that Saudi Arabia has not adopted the Additional Protocol. The Trump administration has reportedly issued a waiver to Congress granting the President the ability to circumvent the provision in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act; however, Congress has not yet made a decision as to whether it will approve the agreement.
U.S. Department of State. “123 Agreements: Fact Sheet.” July 2025. https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/releases/2025/01/123-agreements.
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Sec. 1264: Limitation on Production of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements, in National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Public Law 116-92. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-116publ92/html/PLAW-116publ92.htm.
Kerr, Paul K., and Nikitin, Mary Beth D. “Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer.” Congressional Research Service. RS22937. February 10, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS22937.
U.S. Embassy in Armenia. “Joint Statement on the Completion of Negotiations on an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Armenia.” February 10, 2026. https://am.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-the-completion-of-negotiations-on-an-agreement-for-peaceful-nuclear-cooperation-between-the-united-states-of-america-and/.
The White House. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Solidifies Economic and Defense Partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” November 18, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-solidifies-economic-and-defense-partnership-with-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia/.
Schwartz, Lowell, H. “How Congress Should Judge a Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.” Just Security. February 12, 2026. https://www.justsecurity.org/131259/congress-judge-saudi-nuclear-cooperation/.