China concluded a voluntary offer safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with the IAEA, which entered into force in 2002, making China the first nuclear-weapon State to bring an Additional Protocol into force, under which selected Chinese civil nuclear facilities may be offered for IAEA safeguards.
China has placed some civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, but the scope remains limited, consistent with the voluntary-offer model for nuclear-weapon States.
China has continued to support voluntary-offer safeguards arrangements for nuclear-weapon States, reporting that it has submitted 30 nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, including power reactors, research reactors, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, uranium enrichment facilities and nuclear fuel fabrication lines.
Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons–Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2015/32, 17 April 2015
Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2020/41, 28 January 2022
White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, State Council Information Office, November 27, 2025
Statement on Nuclear Non-proliferation by Delegation of China at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, May 5, 2025
Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026
The following agreements have been adopted to place relevant French installations under safeguards, according to the specificies of nuclear-weapon states:
From 2013 to 2022, between 15 and 23 IAEA inspections were conducted annually on 17 eligible installations.
As per EURATOM agreements, financial and personnel costs linked to inspections are covered by EURATOM members.
In 2023 and 2024, the IAEA and the French government indicated that 10 inspections had taken place in France. Discussions are ongoing with the IAEA on the possibility of placing additional French civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections.
EURATOM and IAEA Safeguards in France: Current Situation and Future Challenges, INMM ESARDA 2023 – Paper ID 237, 2023.
International safeguards implementation in France, Working paper submitted by France, NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.12, Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 4 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.12
Russia’s Voluntary Offer Agreement with the IAEA entered into force in 1985 and allows the IAEA to apply safeguards to designated nuclear material within its civilian nuclear fuel cycle.
In its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference Russia reported that more than 40 nuclear facilities in its territory are listed as those to which the IAEA safeguards could be applied
The Text of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, INFCIRC/327, 1 July 1985
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc327.pdf
National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.
https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14
The NPT does not require the United Kingdom to have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as a nuclear-weapon state. However, the UK does have a Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA and all civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to UK safeguards and to the terms of the UK/IAEA safeguards agreements.
The UK concluded a Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA on 7 June 2018 to replace the existing trilateral arrangements between the IAEA, Euratom and the UK following the UK's withdrawal from Euratom post-Brexit. These agreements ensured that the IAEA retained its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities and continue to receive current safeguards reporting.
The UK Voluntary Offer Agreement (INFCIRC/951) applies safeguards to nuclear material in civil nuclear facilities designated by the IAEA and empowers the IAEA to inspect civil nuclear facilities, ensuring that international verification of the UK's safeguards activity remains robust. The Additional Protocol grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and locations of the UK's civil nuclear assets above and beyond the Voluntary Offer Agreement.
In August 2024, the UK presented to Parliament updated treaty texts of both the Voluntary Offer Agreement and the Additional Protocol with the IAEA, confirming the continued application of IAEA safeguards to UK civil nuclear material under INFCIRC/951and its Additional Protocol.
The 11th Review Conference national report confirms that all civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to UK safeguards under the Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and to the terms of the UK/IAEA Voluntary Offer Agreement and Additional Protocol, with the ONR operating the UK SSAC and meeting all IAEA reporting obligations.
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018). UK nuclear safeguards on track for EU exit. 9 July. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-nuclear-safeguards-on-track-for-eu-exit
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2020). Civil Nuclear Safeguards. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-agreements-if-the-uk-leaves-the-eu-without-a-deal/civil-nuclear-safeguards
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2024). UK/IAEA: Agreement for Application of Safeguards in Connection with Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [TS No.56/2024]. August. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66c4a6fed10184fe9b13e44f/TS_56.2024_UK_IAEA_Agreement_Application_Safeguards_Non-Proliferation_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). UK National Report for the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. February. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69a03520532c9ad91ebbcd60/UK-National-Report-for-the-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf
As part of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the United States provides the IAEA with a list of all of its civil nuclear facilities, excluding only facilities with direct national security significance. In 1980, the United States submitted a list of more than 200 eligible facilities, and the IAEA is notified whenever a change to the list takes place. In 2009, the United States made its list public, but following public controversy, removed it from official government websites.
Of hundreds of eligible facilities, only one U.S. facility––the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site––has been under IAEA safeguards for decades and continued to remain under safeguards during the review period.
As part of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the United States provides the IAEA with a list of all of its civil nuclear facilities, excluding only facilities with direct national security significance.
Of hundreds of eligible facilities, only one U.S. facility––the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site––has been under IAEA safeguards for decades and continued to remain under safeguards during the review period.
U.S. Department of State. “U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement.” Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5209.htm.
Obama, Barack. “The List of Sites, Locations, Facilities, and Activities Declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Message from the President transmitting the U.S. Additional Protocol declaration to Congress, House Document 111–37, 111th Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Government Printing Office, May 6, 2009. https://fissilematerials.org/library/us09.pdf.
U.S. Department of State. “The International Atomic Energy Agency.” https://2021-2025.state.gov/iaea/.