China has had an Additional Protocol in force since 2002 (signed in December 1998, and ratified in March 2002).
China has actively encouraged others to follow suit and supported universalization of the AP as a new norm for verifying nuclear activities.
China has continued to support the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol.
International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA Safeguards. May 27, 2010.
Li, Song. “Statement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy at the Tenth NPT Review Conference.” August 8, 2022.
Chinese Delegation. “Statement on Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference.” May 5, 2025.
France signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1998, which came in force on 30 April 2004.
France expressed its support for the universalisation of Additional Protocols. France is a member of the “Group of Friends of the Additional Protocol”.
France has continued its participation to the “Group of Friends of the Additional Protocol” and also promotes the universalisation of additional protocols through the European Union.
IAEA. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between France, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in France. INFCIRC/290/Add.1. 24 February 2005. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1981/infcirc290a1.pdf
National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2
France Diplomacy. Focuses of the fight against nuclear proliferation. Accessed on 25 September 2025. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/focuses-of-the-fight-against-nuclear-proliferation/
Russia signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 2000. It came into force on 16 October 2007.
Russia stated that it recognizes the importance of additional protocols to safeguards agreements and encouraged countries that have not yet signed an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible. Russia emphasized that this measure is strictly voluntary, and any coercion as to the signing of an additional protocol is completely inappropriate.
Russia continued to express support for universalization of the Additional Protocol, stressing the voluntary nature and inadmissibility of imposing it as a mandatory measure.
International Atomic Energy Agency. Protocol between the Russian Federation and the IAEA Additional to the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. INFCIRC/327/Add.1. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 22 January 2009.
National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1
Statement by the Russian Federation. General debate. 2023 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 August 2023. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1899782/
The UK was subject to the 1957 Euratom Treaty from joining the European Community in 1973 to leaving the European Union on 31 January 2020. All nuclear material in the UK not intended for defence purposes was subject to reporting to, and inspection by, the Euratom safeguards inspectorate during this period.
The UK signed an Additional Protocol in 1998 to the “Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. The AP enhanced the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear material within the UK by providing additional inspection powers and access to information.
Euratom is a separate body from the EU, but it is governed by the EU Commission and linked to the EU’s legal framework. This necessitated the UK’s withdrawal from it as part of the Brexit process. In order to maintain the extent and coverage of nuclear safeguards and to minimise the amount of adjustment required by UK nuclear operators the UK negotiated a new Additional Protocol with the IAEA that was signed on 7 June 2018 to replace the UK’s existing Additional Protocol to the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom. The UK then passed domestic legislation through the “Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019” to establish the UK’s domestic safeguards regime following its exit from Euratom. This enabled the UK to meet its international non-proliferation obligations, including those with the IAEA, when it came into force on 31 January 2021.
N/A
International Atomic Energy Agency. Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/951. 12 January 2021.
Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/263/Add.1. International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna). 24 February 2025.
The United States’ Additional Protocol came into force in 2009, granting the IAEA expanded rights to obtain a much fuller picture of the United States’ nuclear program and fuel cycle. This was done in part to assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that signing the Additional Protocol would not place them at a commercial disadvantage.
The Additional Protocol requires the United States to submit declarations to the IAEA regarding research and development not involving nuclear materials; fuel cycle related manufacturing and production activities; uranium mines and concentration plants and thorium concentration plants; site declarations for some nuclear facilities; and, on a quarterly basis, the export of certain nuclear facilities and equipment. The United States’ Additional Protocol is limited to civilian nuclear facilities and exempts those directly related to national security.
Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States actively encouraged the establishment of the Additional Protocol standard as a precondition for exports of nuclear technical information and cooperation between states.
Throughout the current Review Cycle, the United States continued to submit declarations to the IAEA in compliance with its Additional Protocol.
After Iran announced in February 2021 that it would stop implementing its Additional Protocol, the United States has since repeatedly called upon Iran to return to verifiable implementation of its commitments. In addition, the United States has supported five IAEA Board of Governors resolutions censuring Iran for failing to comply with its safeguards obligations and investigations.
United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.
U.S. Department of State. "Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (and Protocol Thereto)." Signed at Vienna, November 18, 1977. Entered into force December 9, 1980. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5209.htm.
International Atomic Energy Agency. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America. INFCIRC/288/Add.1. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, April 2, 2009. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1981/infcirc288a1.pdf.
U.S. Department of State. 2025 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2025. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Arms-Control-Treaty-Compliance-Report_Final-Accessible.pdf.