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Pillar 2

Action 23

The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

China

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

China has consistently supported the authority, effectiveness and universality of the NPT, describing the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and calling on States that have not yet joined the NPT to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States.

China has also treated the peaceful settlement of regional nuclear issues, especially through diplomatic processes such as the Six Party Talks on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, JCPOA, and the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, as important to preserving confidence in the NPT regime.

China has opposed arrangements including extended deterrence, forward deployment, nuclear sharing, and transfer of nuclear-powered submarines and naval nuclear-propulsion technology to non-nuclear-weapon States, most notably under AUKUS that it considers as undermining the object and purpose of the NPT.

China has urged States outside the Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States and has supported regional approaches, including a Middle East WMD-free zone, that would reinforce universality.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

China has continued the above-mentioned policies and practice.

China has opposed military strikes launched without the mandate of the U.N. Security Council against Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, as it considers the action detrimental to the NPT’s universality and credibility.

Sources

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons–Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2015/32, 17 April 2015

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2020/41, 28 January 2022

White Paper: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era, State Council Information Office, November 27, 2025

Statement on Nuclear Non-proliferation by Delegation of China at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, May 5, 2025

Positions and views of the Government of China on the establishmentof a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, May 30, 2025

Working Paper on the Elements of the Final Document of The NPT Eleventh Review Conference, April 30, 2026

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China, NPT/CONF.2026/33, 17 April 2026

France

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

France officially supports the universalisation of the NPT. In 2006, it stated officially that France, alongside the European Union, called all non-parties to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. No information is available on specific outreach activities towards these states.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

No new development has occurred since 2022 regarding the implementation of this action. The support for the universalisation has been reiterated in the National Report submitted to the 2026 Review Conference.

Sources

National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2

Response to Parliamentary Question n°101693, published to the Journal Officiel on 14 November 2006, https://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q12/12-101693QE.htm

Russia

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

Russia has consistently expressed support for strengthening and universalization of the NPT

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

Russia reaffirmed its support for strengthening and universalization of the NPT in its national report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference

Sources

National report of the Russian Federation, 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 19 March 2021.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/17/Rev.1

National report of the Russian Federation, 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 2 March 2026.

https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/14

United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

The UK continued to press strongly for NPT universalisation and stated that it raised this with non-NPT states parties at every opportunity.

The G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement of April 2021 confirmed the G7's priority to promote universalisation of the NPT and called on all states to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

The United Kingdom continued to call on all states that are not party to the NPT to sign and ratify the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states at the earliest opportunity. The UK states that it attaches great importance to the universalisation of the NPT.

The G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement of August 2025 called on all states that have not yet done so to accede to the NPT, and committed to working with all states to achieve a successful 2026 Review Conference.

The UK does not say what it has done to work towards this beyond making this type of statement.

Sources

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). UK national report pursuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the NPT Review Conference 2010, for the 10th NPT Review Conference. 1 November. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-uk-national-report-for-the-10th-review-conference

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2021). G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group: statement 19 April 2021. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-19-april-2021/g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-statement-19-april-2021

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2026). National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69df600a53469bbcdf408e8b/UK-National-Report-11th-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT-Review-Conference.pdf>

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2025). Statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, 20 August 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-20-august-2025/statement-of-the-g7-non-proliferation-directors-group-20-august-2025

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle 2022–2026)?

US efforts were instrumental in bringing the Non-Proliferation Treaty to near-universal adherence, and President Clinton made the negotiation of an indefinite extension to the NPT a central priority of his administration. These efforts continued in successive administrations; in 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John S. Wolf stated that ‘US support for the goal of universal NPT adherence remains undiminished. We do not support any change to the NPT that would accord a different status to states currently outside the Treaty.’

In 2005, however, the Bush administration reached an agreement with India on a deal that would lift the moratorium on US nuclear trade with India and provide US assistance to India's civilian nuclear energy program. Critics of the agreement suggested that this agreement undermined the United States’ support for the universality of the NPT, given that it normalized India’s status as a nuclear weapon state outside the bounds of the NPT.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle 2022–2026?

During the current Review Cycle, the United States has continued to stress the importance of the universalization of the NPT. In its 2025 report assessing compliance with arms control and non-proliferation agreements, the United States stated that it ‘supports universal adoption of the AP by States Parties to the NPT.’

During the second Trump administration, however, the United States has undertaken actions that critics suggest could undermine its previous support for core tenets of NPT. For example, the Trump administration has proposed several avenues for U.S.-Saudi nuclear energy cooperation, which could potentially include the forgoing of Saudi safeguards and nonproliferation requirements as a prerequisite to a deal. While the conclusion of such a deal would not require either country to withdraw from the NPT, it could undermine the spirit of the treaty depending on its exact parameters.

Sources

Clinton, Bill, C. Statement on Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Posted online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/221301.

Wolf, John S. 'The Time for Business As Usual Is Over'. 28 April 2003. Accessible via Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. https://acronym.org.uk/old/archive/npt/03us.htm.

Kerr, Paul K. ‘U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service. RL33016. 26 June 2012. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL33016/RL33016.68.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. 2025 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2025. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Arms-Control-Treaty-Compliance-Report_Final-Accessible.pdf.

Blanchard, Christopher M., and Kerr, Paul K. ‘Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation’. Congressional Research Service. IF10799. 11 March 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10799.