China
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
Sources
France
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
France has not communicated on the implementation of this action.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
France has not communicated on the implementation of this action.
Sources
France has not communicated on the implementation of this action.
Russia
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
Sources
United Kingdom
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
Sources
United States
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
In 1996, in partnership with Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States began a cooperative effort known as the “Trilateral Initiative,” with the goal of exploring the feasibility of a verification system for monitoring nuclear warheads and/or fissile material. Throughout the six years of the initiative, technical experts from Russia, the United States, the IAEA, and other countries were hosted at different facilities with the goal of exploring technical measures that could be applied to verification.
One of the key deliverables of the Trilateral Initiative was the development of an iterative draft Model Verification Agreement to ensure that any fissile material subject to IAEA verification under the agreements remained removed from nuclear weapon programmes. In particular, the agreement was designed to allow for a verification mechanism that would not reveal any classified information while simultaneously permitting the IAEA to verify that the material being verified was of a particular nature. The final report on the results of the Trilateral Initiative concluded that the progress made during the initiative––particularly the draft Model Verification Agreement––would provide the building blocks needed for the pursuit of bilateral verification agreements with the IAEA; however, changes in political leadership in both the United States and Russia, as well as the rise of subsequent disagreements and geopolitical tensions, eroded the landscape for continued progress on the Trilateral Initiative.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
The International Atomic Energy Agency regularly issues task requests to countries with which it has a Member State Support Program (MSSP), allowing the IAEA to take advantage of different capabilities and expertise across a range of countries to resolve deficiencies in research and development relating to safeguards and verification, including trainings, environmental sampling and analysis, the procurement of new equipment, and other initiatives. The United States accepts by far the largest number of task requests (105 in 2022, compared to the European Commission’s second-largest number of 35), and allows the IAEA to task specific national labs.
In addition, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation conducts safeguards-related research and development on its own initiative, the results of which are regularly demonstrated to the IAEA for potential incorporation into IAEA verification mechanisms. The Government Accountability Office reported in 2024 that “if IAEA’s safeguards program determines that an NNSA-developed technology or tool could be applicable to a current safeguards challenge or has potential to address an emerging challenge, IAEA could create a task request to the USSP to further develop the technology.” Such a task request occurred in 2013 following a proposal in 2007 for the development of an unattended verification system for cylinders containing uranium for enrichment; in February 2022, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory delivered its prototype to the IAEA.
Sources
Shea, Thomas E., ‘IAEA Verification of Weapon-Origin Fissile Material in the Russian Federation and the United States: The Trilateral Initiative ‘, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-SM-367/9/01 (2001). https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20files/Session%209/Paper%209-01.pdf
Shea, Thomas E., and Rockwood, Laura. ‘Nuclear Disarmament: The Legacy of the Trilateral Initiative.’ Deep Cuts Working Paper, No. 4 (March 2015), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/192450/DeepCuts_WP4_Shea_Rockwood_UK.pdf
Government Accountability Office. ‘Efforts Are Underway to Address Factors Affecting the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Safeguards Program’. GAO-24-106296 (May 2024), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106296.pdf.