Action 16

Prior to 2017, China regularly reported its civilian plutonium stocks to the IAEA under INFCIRC/549. However, China has ceased submitting annual declarations of its civilian plutonium holdings to the IAEA under the voluntary INFCIRC/549 reporting framework since 2017.

France indicated that it has no fissile material in excess of its defence requirements. Civilian fissile material is under the safeguards of the IAEA.

Agreement on application of safeguards between Russia and IAEA entered into force on 10 June 1985.

In its National Report to the Tenth NPT Review Conference Russia stated that the list of facilities to which IAEA safeguards could be applied included more than 40 nuclear installations at more than 20 facilities

Russia submitted annual reports to the IAEA detailing its stock of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel

In October 2016, Russia suspended participation in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement with the United States, in which the parties agreed to eliminate 34 tonnes of excess weapon-grade plutonium

The 1998 Strategic Defence Review declared the UK’s total stockpile of fissile material as part of its commitment to the control of fissile material. This comprised 7.6 tonnes of plutonium; 21.9 tonnes of highly enriched uranium; and 15,000 tonnes of other forms of uranium.

The Review stated that 4.4 tons of plutonium, including 0.3 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, and over 9,000 tonnes of non-highly enriched uranium were no longer required for defence purposes and would be now be placed under European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards and made liable to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, the UK would cease exercising its right to withdraw fissile material from safeguarded stocks for nuclear weapons. The 4.4 tons of fissile material surplus to defence requirements, including 0.3 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, was transferred to the UK’s civilian plutonium stockpile.

The Review also stated that “All stocks of highly enriched uranium will, however, be retained outside safeguards, since material no longer needed for nuclear weapons will be used for the naval propulsion programme. We have considered whether further disaggregation of these totals at this time would be compatible with our continuing, if reduced, security requirement. We have concluded that it would not.”

The ‘Historical Accounting for UK Defence Highly Enriched Uranium’ published by the Ministry of Defence in 2006 reiterated that “MoD HEU is held outside international safeguards for defence purposes, but is subject to a strict materials accountancy regime”.

The UK confirmed in 2010 that this material was under European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards and liable to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The material is stored at the Sellafield nuclear site.

Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) annual declarations of its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel in excess of military requirements, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549). These declarations did not include declarations relating to highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Of hundreds of eligible facilities, only one U.S. facility––the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site––has been under IAEA safeguards for decades and continued to remain under safeguards during the review period.