China
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
Sources
France
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
France has been actively involved in efforts to solve proliferation crises, in particular with regards to Iran and the DPRK.
On Iran, it has been involved as part of the E3 in pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the crisis but also implementing sanctions at the UN and EU level in reaction to Iran non-compliance to its non-proliferation obligations. This involvement led to the adoption of the JCPOA in 2015. It has remained active on this file as part of the E3 following the unravelling of the JCPOA. In particular, the E3 triggered the JCPoA’s dispute resolution mechanism in January 2020. In 2020 and 2021, they engaged in talks with the aim of restoring the JCPoA and returning the United States to the deal.
With regard to the DPRK, France has been actively condemning the withdrawal of the country from the NPT, which it considers illegal. It has voted consistently at the UN Security Council to condemn key nuclear developments, in particular nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches. It has supported the Panel of Experts established to monitor sanctions taken against the DPRK in accordance with various UN resolutions. At the 2019 Preparatory Committee, it sponsored a joint statement on the North Korean nuclear challenge.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
Since 2022, France has continued its involvement as part of the E3 to try and restore the JCPOA and convince Iran to implement its obligations. In July 2025, the E3 offered a one-time snapback extension provided that Iran agreed to resume direct and unconditional negotiations with the United States, return to compliance with its legally binding safeguards obligations, and address its high enriched uranium stockpile. In August 2025, they officially notified the UN of their intent to reinstate sanctions due to Iran’s “clear and persistent non-performance” of its commitments. These sanctions are part of the “snapback mechanism” described under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which was adopted to implement the JCPOA in 2015. On 19 September 2025, France voted against preserving sanctions exemption at the UN Security Council. On 28 September 2025, the snapback was officially activated by France, Germany and the UK and the three countries have been working since on the re-imposition of the various sanction regimes and attempting to put in place a sanction monitoring committee.
France has continued to oppose, at the highest level, North Korea’s nuclear programme, including at the UN Security Council. France has spoken out against Russia’s decision to block the renewal of the mandate of the DPRK sanction Panel of Expert. At the 2024 Preparatory Committee, it sponsored a joint statement underlining the urgency and stakes of this proliferation crisis and organised a side-event in cooperation with South Korea and the Philippines. At the 2025 Preparatory Committee, France cosponsored another side-event on the DPRK’s nuclear challenge with South Korea.
Sources
Activation of the snapback – Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the UK (28 September 2025), France Diplomacy, 28 September 2025, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/activation-of-the-snapback-joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-france
National Report submitted by France. Report submitted by France under actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2022–2026). NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2. 7 March 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2
Statement by Mr Nicolas De Rivière, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to the Security Council, (translation from French), New York, Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 13 July 2023, https://onu.delegfrance.org/france-will-not-resign-itself-to-north-korea-becoming-a-nuclear-state
Addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge, Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/13, 13 May 2019, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/13
Conclusion of the 2nd Preparatory Committee of the NPT, Permanent Representation of France to the Conference of Disarmament, 14 August 2024, https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Conclusion-of-the-2nd-Preparatory-Committee-of-the-NPT
Russia
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
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United Kingdom
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
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United States
View country profileWhat has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?
The United States’ annual "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies its own compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. In every annual Compliance Report published prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States has self-certified full compliance with its NPT and broader arms control and non-proliferation obligations.
What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?
The United States’ annual "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" report––prepared by the State Department with input from the Intelligence Community and in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff––is the formal mechanism by which the United States certifies its own compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. In every annual Compliance Report published during the current Review Cycle, the United States has self-certified full compliance with its NPT and broader arms control and non-proliferation obligations.
Sources
U.S. Department of State. "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments." [Annual reports index page.] https://www.state.gov/adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/.